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"[f]he instant decision •.. tends to bring adjudications of this 
tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for 
this day and train only. I have no assurance ... that the opinion 
announced today may not shortly be repudiated and overruled by 
justices who deem they have new light on the ·subject.'' 
Justice Owen Roberts1 
"A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compul-
sions to revere past history and accept what was once written. But 
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he 
swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors 
may have put on it." 
Justice William 0. Douglas2 
1. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts,]., dissenting). 
2. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 735; 736 (1949). 
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Introduction 
The dramatic end of the 1990-1991 Supreme Court Term focused 
national attention on a perennial question in constitutional law: to 
what extent do the Justices follow precedents with whose reasoning 
or holdings they disagree. Justice Thurgood Marshall's abrupt res-
ignation on the last day of the Term underscored his frustrations 
over the Court's overruling of two criminal procedure precedents 
on that same day in Payne v. Tennessee, 3 and over the possibility that 
"scores of established constitutional liberties are now ripe for re-
consideration."4 In the aftermath ofJustice Marshall's resignation, 
including the contentious confirmation proceedings for Justice Clar-
ence Thomas, 5 many Senators and concerned Americans expressed 
their frustration over the prospect of the Court's dismantlement of a 
significant number of precedents recognizing protection for individ-
ual liberties in such varied areas of constitutional law as abortion, 
affirmative action, separation of church and state, and criminal 
procedure. 6 
The anxiety generated by these events is complex. It includes 
concerns not only about the potential loss of specific liberties but 
also about the Court's abandonment of the institutional values nor-
mally associated with fidelity to precedent, 7 including the neutral, 
impartial, consistent application of the rule of law8 as well as the 
3. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), ovenuling South Carolina v. Gath-
ers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). See infra notes 38-
39 & 44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Payne. 
4. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
5. For a general commentary on justice Thomas' confirmation proceedings, see 
Michael]. Gerhardt, Divided justice, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming Apr. 1992) (dis· 
cussing what the Thomas hearings revealed about justice Thomas, the confirmation pro-
cess, and the Supreme Court). 
6. For a list of such precedents, see Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2623 & n.2 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); infra note 44. 
7. As used in this Article, "precedent" refers to the facts, procedural posture, rea-
soning, and/or holding of the decision in which a court has resolved a particular legal 
dispute. CJ infra note 18 (discussing stare decisis). But see Henry P. Monaghan, Stare 
Decisis and Constitutional Atijudication, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 723, 763-67 (1988) (suggesting 
that there is no clear definition of precedent but that whatever definition people choose 
should include the rule or standard set forth in a case). 
8. See, e.g., ARTHUR]. GOLDBERG, EQ..UALjusncE 75 (1971) (suggesting that fidelity 
to precedent "fosters public confidence in the judiciary and public acceptance ofindivid-
ual decisions by giving the appearance of impersonal, consistent, and reasoned opin-
ions"); RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE jUDICIAL DECISION 56-84 (1961) (identifying 
certainty, consistency, fairness, equality, efficiency, and predictability as justifications for 
adherence to precedent); Geoffrey Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in 
Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 67, 70 (1988) (explaining that a "doc-
trine of precedent" promotes efficient judicial decisionmaking, "predictability in our af-
fairs," more attention to the "stakes" of resolving a particular legal dispute, caution in 
judicial decisionmaking, and chances that a justice can make lasting contributions. "If a 
justice disregards the judgments of those who preceded him, he invites the very same 
treatment from those who succeed him. A justice who wants to preserve the value of his 
own coin must not devalue the coin of his predecessors."). Although similar institu-
tional values or values such as stability and continuity are promoted when a court fol-
lows a precedent in common law and constitutional adjudication, those .values can be 
outweighed in constitutional adjudication by a justice's normative views of the Constitu-
tion. See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text (discussing how different Justices 
factor such values into their decisionmaking). For commentary on the role of precedent 
70 (VOL. 60:68 
The Role of Precedent 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
legitimation of our system of government under which the Court 
and the other branches should be bound (at least in some meaning-
ful way) by the rule oflaw.9 
If the Justices were to adopt a low level of deference to precedent 
(for example, overruling a precedent merely deemed erroneously 
reasoned}, then they will have increased the chances that a subse-
quent Court will take the same route. Future Justices could rely on 
past decisions as expressing a theory of precedent that supports 
them in overruling precedent based solely on disagreement with the 
underlying reasoning of those precedents. The inevitable conse-
quence of all this would be chaos, lack of certainty regarding the 
durability of a number of individual freedoms, and/or proof positive 
that constitutional law is nothing more than politics carried on in a 
different forum. 
A pervasive problem with trying to allay these concerns, however, 
is that it is difficult to determine how much the Supreme Court re-
spects precedent as a source of decision. The subject often does not 
generate candor (or full explication) because it encompasses the at-
titudes someone may have but not be fully prepared, inclined, or 
even encouraged to disclose about constitutional law. to For exam-
ple, the Justices infrequently debate openly and ~lly or reach any 
consensus on the reasons and criteria for affirming or overruling 
precedents. The Justices also have differed and not fully clarified 
when it would be appropriate for them to adopt a common law (or 
doctrinal) approach to constitutional adjudication, under which the 
Court moves incrementally, evolving its views over time and 
grounding them in experience, 11 or some other approach that 
would give more weight to their underlying views· on constitutional 
in common law adjudication, see Larry Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (1989) (analyzing three separate models of common law stare decisis); Frederick 
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 595-602 (1987) (arguing for the development 
of "a rule of precedent" because respect for precedents strengthens judicial decision-
making, increases social welfare, and ensures fairness by treating like cases alike). 
9. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 744-53 (arguing that precedents perform several 
functions other than providing stability in decisionmaking, including limiting the 
Court's agenda, illuminating the areas in which the Court has been consistently or pe-
rennially divided, and legitimating judicial review). 
10. Cf. Steven Stark, Comment: Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1389, 1392 
(1984) (arguing that legal writing is unclear because lawyers try to obscure what they are 
really doing). 
11. See generally PHIUP BoBBITT, CoNSTtTUTIONAL FATE: THEORY AND CoNSTtTUTION 
39-58 (1982) (describing the evolution and significance of the doctrinal approach to 
constitutional acljudication); HARRY {!. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTlTUTION: 
THE SuPREME CouRT AND TilE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 77-158 (1990) (maintaining 
that the common law method of judicial review best explains American constitutional 
law and is normatively superior to other approaches); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitutio11 
as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 23 (1984) (advocating a common law approach to consti-
tutional interpretation). 
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interpretation than to the values commonly associated with fidelity 
to precedent. 
Similarly, commentators have not explained the process by which 
the Court reviews precedents, how it might be improved, or the rea-
sons for their failure to do either of the above. Nor have commenta-
tors always acknowledged the relationship between their efforts to 
explain constitutional interpretation and their attitudes regarding 
certain precedents. For example, conservatives criticize the Warren 
Court's disregard for precedents,12 but not the Rehnquist Court's 
assault on liberal precedents. 13 Likewise, liberals denounce the 
Rehnquist Court's attacks on their icons,14 but not the Warren and 
Burger Courts' overrulings of conservative precedents.15 Thus, the 
Court's review of its constitutional precedents remains the least un-
derstood of the processes by which such decisions can be limited or 
overruled.16 
12. See, e.g., RoBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING oF AMERICA: THE PoLmcAL SEDUC-
TION OF THE LAw 130, 348-49 (1990) (characterizing the Warren Court's disregard for 
precedents as one example of its unprincipled activism); Charles]. Cooper, Stare Decisis: 
Precedent and Principle in ConstitutionalAcijudication, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 401, 404-06 (1988) 
(suggesting that the Warren Court's lack of respect for precedents was a product of its 
preference to do the convenient rather than the principled thing); see also RAouL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
344-46 (1977) (critiquing the Warren Court's disregard for precedents as evidence ofits 
unprincipled decisionmaking); PHIUP B. KuRLAND, PoLmcs, THE CoNSTITUTION, AND 
THE WARREN CoURT 37-38,90-91 (1970) (suggesting that the Warren Court's overruling 
of precedents more often than any other Court threatened the legitimacy of the Court's 
decisionmaking};Jon D. Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruling of Constitutional Decisions in 
the Warren Year.s, 4 VAL. U. L. REv. 101, 112-31 (1969} (surveying precedents overruled 
by the Warren Court and rationales on which the Court relied}; cj. Earl M. Maltz, Some 
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467, 467 (ex-
pressing one conservative commentator's concern over the Warren and Burger Courts' 
failure to respect precedents}. 
13. See infra notes 38-44 & 125-30 and accompanying text (discussing the views of 
the Rehnquist Court and of recent Justices toward Warren Court precedents). 
14. See, e.g., William W.Justice, The New Awakening: judicial Activism in a Conservative 
Age, 43 Sw. LJ. 657, 666-67 (1989) (accusing the Rehnquist Court ofmischaracterizing 
the issues in fundamental rights cases to avoid being bound by precedent}; Note, Consti-
tutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1344, 1344, 1359-61 (1990) (critiquing the Rehn-
quist Court's disregard for precedents involving abortion rights). But see Envin 
Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REv. 43, 103-04 (1990) 
(claiming that criticism of the Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren Courts' disregard for 
precedents is misguided because respect for precedent ultimately turns on the degree to 
which one agrees with the values underlying particular decisions). 
15. For example, no liberal commentator has criticized Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963}, in which the Warren Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require the States to provide legal counsel for indigent defendants, overruling 
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), or Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), in which 
the Burger Court held that a prosecutor cannot, consistent with equal protection, use 
peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors solely on the basis of their race, overrul-
ing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
16. The other processes by which such decisions are traditionally narrowed or re-
versed include constitutional amendment, congressional modifications of the Court's ju-
risdiction, the President's power to nominate Justices who might agree with her 
criticisms of certain precedents, the Senate's power to advise and consent to judicial 
nominations, and impeachment. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS D. RowE, JR., 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 1992) (summa-
rizing the ways in which the political branches can respond to the Court's precedents); 
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 71-84 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing various 
mechanisms of political control of the Supreme Court). 
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This Article offers a series of reflections on the role of precedent 
in constitutional decisionmaking and theory.17 It examines the ways 
in which precedents operate as a stabilizing influence and source of 
indeterminacy in constitutional law, are factored into eachjustice's 
decisionmaking, and pose problems for Justices and·theorists that 
stricdy adhere to some unifying principle that easily can be applied 
to strike down contrary views embodied in precedents. 
This Article offers support for the traditional view that precedents 
should be overruled only when the prior decision was wrongly de-
cided and there is some other important disadvantage in respecting 
that precedent. It also proposes a novel framework for understand-
ing the Court's review of its precedents as a dynamic (dialogic) pro-
cess in which the justices individually" try to balance their respective 
views on how the Constitution should be interpreted and certain so-
cial or institutional values such as the need for stability and consis-
tency in constitutional law. This process is undermined or violated 
(and stability and consistency are sacrificed) when a majority of jus-
tices dogmatically adhere to a single constitutional vision in its deci-
sionmaking because such an approach aims to perpetuate or 
reinforce itself but not to mediate (as the dialogic process does) 
among different constitutional visions. 
The first two Parts of this Article provide background for evaluat-
ing how much precedents matter as a source of decision to the 
Court and for determining whether a coherent body of case law or 
doctrine exists with respect to the Court's review of its precedents. 
In particular, Part I examines the ways in which precedents provide 
a stabilizing influence on constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents 
perform historical and structural fun~tions that frame the Court's 
agenda in the certiorari process, shape governmental institutions 
and programs, and sometimes even immunize prior decisions from 
overruling. These functions illustrate many of the conditions under 
which the Court defers to, or at least seriously considers, precedents 
in its deliberations. · 
Part II explores four ways in which the creation and interpretation 
of precedents produce unpredictable constitutional decisionmaking. 
17. See also GERHARDT & RoWE, supra note 16; Michael]. Gerhardt, Critical Legal Stud-
ies and Constitutional Law, 67 TEX. L. REv. 393, 395 (1988) (reviewing MARK TusHNET, 
RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988)) (defining 
"grand" or unitary constitutional theory as the systematic effort to explain constitutional 
law or to defend constitutional decisions in terms of some overarching or unifYing prin-
ciple or set of principles from which certain conclusions flow logically); see also Michael]. 
Perry, Why Constitutional Theory Matters to Constitutional Practice (and Vice Versa), 6 CaNST. 
CoMM. 231, 249 (1989) (arguing that, inter alia, "constitutional theory is an effort to 
justify a constitutional practice-to justify, that is, a particular interpretive style and judi-
cial role"). 
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First, the Justices necessarily leave the scope of some decisions un-
clear, because they often gloss over their differences for the sake of 
forming coalitions. Second, the Justices have latitude in dealing 
with the ambiguities or ideas found in precedents and in choosing 
the level of generality at which they will state the rule of law of a 
case. Third, the Court's use of more than one technique to treat 
precedents generates confusion as to the status of, and the Court's 
real intentions regarding, those decisions. Last, there is no predict-
able pattern to the Court's explicit overrulings because the Justices 
do not consistently follow the same approach in making such deci-
sions. Each of these sources of indeterminacy allows the Justices to 
be flexible (if not manipulative) when confronting new ideas and 
arguments. 
Part III suggests that the Court's inconsistent rulings on prece-
dents make sense in light of public choice theory, chaos theory, and 
legal pragmatism-all of which posit that multimembered institu-
tions, such as the Court, inevitably render incoherent and inconsis-
tent ju_dgments despite their individual members' efforts to make 
principled decisions. This Part proposes that an effective way to 
measure the role of precedent in constitutional decisionmaking is to 
examine the degree to which each Justice consistently applies a co-
herent approach to constitutional stare decisis.18 
Accordingly, Part III describes several themes gleaned from are-
view of how the Justices individually factor precedents into their 
decisionmaking. It shows, for example, that whenever the Court re-
views its precedents, the Justices try to balance their views on how 
the Constitution should be interpreted with their recognition of the 
practical need to submerge those views for the sake of such social or 
institutional values as stability and continuity in constitutional law or 
consensus. 
Part III also shows that the Court's conservative majority is split 
18. "Stare decisis" has been defined variously as "to stand by the decisions and not 
to disturb settled points," Robert A. Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Deci-
sis and the Extent to Which it Should Be Applied, 31 A.B.A.J. 501-02 (1945) (quoting jAMES 
KENT, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 477 (Lacy ed., 1889)); "let the decision stand 
and do not disturb things which have been settled," GoLDBERG, supra note 8, at 74; and 
"stand by the precedents and do not disturb the calm," Stanley Reed, Stare Decisis and 
Constitutional Law, 9 PA. B.A.Q; 131, 131 (1938) (Reed was then Solicitor General of the 
United States). Hence, the phrase "constitutional stare decisis" refers to the settled 
doctrine about the respect the Court should have for its own decisions interpreting the 
Constitution. CJ. supra note 7 (defining "precedent"). 
This Article does not, however, address the degree of respect the Court should have 
for stare decisis in cases involving statutory interpretation. For discussions on the defer-
ence the Court should show its prior statutory decisions, see William N. Eskeridge,Jr., 
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. LJ. 1361 {1988) (criticizing the "super-strong pre-
sumption of correctness" accorded to statutory precedents and urging a more flexible 
approach incorporating changes in policy); Lawrence L. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": 
The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L REv. 177 (1989) (sug-
gesting that an absolute rule mandating respect for stare decisis in statutory cases is 
justified under separation of powers analysis, which would give the Congress the final 
word on questions of statutory interpretation); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and 
Relrability in judicial Decisions, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 422 (1988) (suggesting that constitu-
tional precedents deserve greater deference than statutory ones because the latter can 
be changed more easily through the political process). 
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between nvo views on the appropriate standard for overruling deci-
sions. One view (followed in large part by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia) urges the overruling of virtually any precedent 
that they consider erroneously reasoned, while the other view (ad-
vanced at various times by Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter) bases the overruling of a precedent on its erroneous reason-
ing and some other substantial consideration. Part m argues that 
the latter view tracks the practice of an overwhelming majority of 
Justices to overrule precedents based on some extraordinary show-
ing of need, while the former view, if adopted by a majority of the 
Court, would wreak havoc on constitutional law, because it would 
become a rule oflaw on which future Justices could rely to overrule 
any decision with whose reasoning they could find a flaw.: 
Part IV provides a descriptive analysis of, and normative 'response 
to, the conflict benveen precedents and unitary theory (an'-~pproach 
that prefers that the Court rigidly apply only one unifying principle 
of constitutional interpretation). Part IV suggests "that this conflict 
results because the Court's review of precedent takes place as part 
of the more general dialogue in which the Justices debate whether 
the Court should perpetuate the values it previously has endorsed 
for the operation of government, while a unitary theorist usually 
seeks to cut off this dialogue, or at least, to restrict it to the terms of 
a single constitutional vision. Consequently, because so many 
precedents are based on, or, at least can only be explained as the 
result of the rejection of any one view of theory, this tension fre-
quently presents a proponent of a rejected unitary theory with the 
dilemma of choosing to overrule the bulk of constitutional doctrine, 
or to abandon or modifY the unifYing principle dominating her the-
ory in numerous substantive areas to provide constitutional law with 
stability and continuity. Moreover, theorists often fail to appreciate 
the relationship between their attitudes toward precedents and their 
proposed solutions to this dilemma. This dilemma also raises the 
question whether the public's respect for the Court depends on its 
aversion to any single theoretical approach to interpretation and 
adjudication. 
This Article concludes with a normative proposal for reconciling 
theory and nonconforming precedents by treating the Court's re-
view ofits precedents as a dialogue in which theJustices each con-
sider the "substantially countervailing considerations"19 for no 
longer preserving the values their predecessors previously have en-
dorsed for controlling the operation of government. This kind of 
decisionmaking is necessary to protect the rule oflaw, and the insti-
tutions and expectations built around it, and to allow some flexibility 
19. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 757. 
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and deviation from the past when there are substantial or important 
reasons to do so. The Article concludes that the Court's primary 
mission is to preserve and to enhance this dialogue in which the 
Justices take seriously precedents and the social values associated 
with their preservation. · 
L Precedent as a Stabilizing Influence in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking 
Precedents commonly are regarded as a traditional source of con-
stitutional decisionmaking, 20 despite the absence of any clear evi-
dence that they ever have forced the Court into making a decision 
contrary to what it would rather have decided.2I Although some 
constraint is desirable because it ensures stability in constitutional 
law,22 it is widely accepted that the Court should be able to review 
and, if necessary, to overrule its constitutional precedents because 
they are too difficult to overturn in the political process.23 
Yet the apparent lack of consistency in the Justices' standards or 
reasons for overruling precedents has led many commentators to 
argue that precedents make little real difference to the Court. 24 
Critics have tried to prove this point by measuring explicit overrul-
ings because they believe such decisions provide the clearest in-
stances in which the Court has expressed its lack of regard for 
20. The other traditional sources of constitutional decisionmaking include constitu-
tional text, history, structure, and theory. See GERHARDT & RowE, supra note 16; see also 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 
HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1987) (attempting to construct a unified theory of constitutional 
interpretation through coordinating the traditional sources of decisionmaking). 
21. But see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAw SYSTEM IN AMERICA 4 (Paul Gewirtz 
ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989) (1933) (claiming that in the American common law 
system precedents "constrain" judicial decisionmaking by providing historical 
perspective). 
22. For purposes of this Article, "stability" refers to predictable and continuous ap-
plication of previously formulated rules of law. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 749 
(viewing a critical function of precedents as providing predictability and "continuity by 
ensuring the survival of [important] governmental norms"); see also id. at 744-53 (argu-
ing that precedents perform several functions other than providing stability in decision-
making, including limiting the Court's agenda, illuminating the areas in which the Court 
has been consistently or perennially divided, and legitimating judicial review). 
23. The classic statement of this view is by Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co.: 
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more im-
portant that the applicable rule oflaw be settled than it be settled right .... 
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its 
prior decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force 
of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful 
in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function. 
285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting). 
24. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 12, at 402 (suggesting that "stare decisis has always 
been a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liberals"); Note, supra note 
14, at 1345-47 (criticizing the Court for routinely failing to take a principled approach to 
precedent); James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare 
Decisis, Tlze Constitution, and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 371-75 (1986) (arguing 
that precedents have never barred the Court from doing what it would prefer to do); cJ. 
Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 103 (suggesting that it is the values underlying prior 
decisions and not the precedents themselves that carry weight in constitutional law). 
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precedents.25 If the rules of law precedents embody do not con-
strain, then they do not function as a conventional source of deci-
sion. The public is more likely .to re~ain <;onfid~~ce in the 
impartiality and consistency of the Court's decisionmaking if the 
reasons for the Court's choices are persuasive and if the Court gen-
erally adheres to principles t~at will reliably safeguard popular 
precedents.26 ~ 
Focusing only on what the Court already has decided expressly, 
however, overlooks the degree to which precedents actually influ-
ence constitutional decisionmaking. By looking at what the Court 
has said, and not said or not decided regarding its prior judgments, 
one can discern that precedent contributes to the predictability and 
continuity of constitutional law. The·weight of precedent performs 
historical and structural functions that help to frame the Court's 
agenda in the certiorari process, to shape government institutions 
25. See, e.g., Charlotte C. Bernhardt, Supreme Court Reversals on Constitutional issues, 34 
CoRNELL L.Q, 55, 60 (1948) (omitting cases in which the Court qualified, distinguished, 
or expressed disapproval of precedents); Albert P. Blaustein & Andrew H. Field, "Over-
ruling" opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MicH. L. REv. 151, 156-59 (1958) (noting the 
practical difficulties of analyzing "instances of erosion" as opposed to explicit overrul-
ings);jerrold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 
211, 214 n.15 (offering a limited definition of"directly overruled" cases); Maltz, supra 
note 12, at 494 (listing only explicit overrulings in appendix to article criticizing disre-
gard of precedent); Noland, supra note 12, at 118 (commenting on the value of an objec-
tive measure of respect for precedent available through examination of explicit 
reversals); cf. Henry Ellenbogen, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should 
Be Applied, 20 TEMP. L.Q, 503, 506-12 (1947) (not distinguishing the ways in which the 
Court can weaken precedents); Albert Kocourek & Harold Koven, Renovation of the Com-
mon Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 ILL. L. REV. 971 passim (1935) (treating implicit and 
explicit overrulings as the functional equivalents). 
26. See, e.g., john M. Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of Uncertainty in the Concept of 
Law, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 195, 237-38 (1980) (arguing that the purpose of the judiciary is 
to clarify and to fill in the gaps in the law, so that its interpretations of the law should be 
as significant and weighty as the text of the law); Maltz, supra note 12, at 472-84 (lament-
ing that the decline of stare decisis contributes to several problems in constitutional law, 
including uncertainty, unpredictability, and inconsistency); MichaelS. Moore, A Natural 
Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 372 (1985) (suggesting 
that fidelity to precedent promotes the values of"equality, liberty, fairness, and utility" 
and that these values should be of sufficient weight to prevent the Court from com-
pletely abandoning precedent in favor of the "moral or natural" value found in directly 
interpreting the Constitution's text); Note, supra note 14, at 1356-57, 1361-62 (arguing 
that the need for stability, predictability, and legitimacy in the Court's decisionmaking 
require absolute deference to precedent, which should be modified only through consti-
tutional amendment). But see Bernhardt, supra note 25, at 70 (suggesting that precedents 
should last as long as reasonably possible but must ultimately give way to changes in 
social and economic conditions); Blaustein & Field, supra note 25, at 183 (stressing that 
it is more important for the Court to be right than consistent); Cooper, supra note 12, at 
404 (observing that the two major drawbacks to constructing a doctrine on stare decisis 
in constitutional law are that any such doctrine can be easily manipulated to hide the 
actual reasoning underlying certain decisions and that it shields mistakes from repair); 
Rehnquist, supra note 24, at 371-76 (suggesting that because the justices will always do 
what they want when reviewing precedents the Court could better maintain the public's 
respect if it were to reject any formal rule dictating its level of respect for precedents). 
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and programs, and sometimes even to immunize prior decisions 
from overruling. These functions illustrate the Court's respect for 
its past practices and traditions. 
A. The Role of Precedent in the Certiorari Process 
Behind the scenes, precedents perform a crucial role in constitu-
tional decisionmaking by framing the Court's decisions on whether 
to grant certiorari. After the virtual abolition of mandatory jurisdic-
tion, 27 the Court has nearly complete discretion over its docket 
through the certiorari process. At the outset of each case, the Court 
in effect determines whether the questions brought to it have been 
settled through prior decisions or whether those decisions require 
clarification or reconsideration. It is practically impossible for the 
Court to decide any constitutional issue without first trying to deter-
mine the scope of prior decisions. The Justices' respect for the 
Court's precedents and historical practices is most evident in their 
choices of which matters not to hear. Thus, in the certiorari pro-
cess, the Justices often demonstrate most clearly their desire to ad-
here to the precedents they might not have decided the same way in 
the first place.2s 
For example, the Court no longer considers whether the liberty 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause ap-
plies the Bill of Rights (in whole or in part) to the states.29 Nor do 
27. See Act of june 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (eliminating the 
Supreme Court's mandatory appeal jurisdiction). 
28. At the very least, it is clear that precedents are important because the Supreme 
Court does not grant certiorari when it does not want to (or feels it cannot) change the 
law. See, e.g., Turner v. California, 111 S. Ct. 768, 768 (1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting 
from the Court's denial of certiorari) (dissenting from the Court's refusal to reconsider 
his argument, rejected in previous cases, that the Court should recognize that "compar-
ative proportionality review" is constitutionally required in capital cases); Teague v. 
Tennessee, 473 U.S. 911,911-12 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting from the Court's denial 
of certiorari) (dissenting from the Court's repeated rejection of his argument that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits requiring "a capital defendant to prove that any mitigating 
circumstances he has established outweigh any aggravating circumstances the State has 
proved"); Snead v. Stringer, 454 U.S. 988, 989 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from 
the denial of certiorari) (protesting the Court's adherence to a line of precedents that, in 
his opinion, have culminated in the Court's failure to reverse a lower court's erroneous 
construction of the Sixth Amendment as mandating a new criminal trial for a defendant 
who by telephone, but without consulting counsel, volunteered a statement to a prose-
cutor); see also H.W. PERRY, jR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SE'ITJNG IN THE UNITED 
STATES SuPREME CouRT (1991) (discussing how the justices make initial decisions in the 
certiorari process about the precedents they wish to leave alone and those they want to 
clarify, narrow, expand, or reverse); infra notes 29-37 & 73-87 and accompanying text. 
29. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition on double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968) (recounting the Court's decisions from 1897 through 1967 incorporating most of 
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause and holding the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial applicable to the States 
through the same clause); Pointerv. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment's right to confrontation of opposing witnesses); Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unu-
sual punishment); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A 
Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 420 & n.46 
(1990) (describing the relationship between the Court's precedents on incorporation 
and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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the Justices try to revisit the Warren Court decisions on reappor-
tionment30 or the precedents recognizing equal protection-funda-
mental rights or interests.s1 In the First Amendment area, the 
Court shows no interest in reconsidering its highly protective test 
for political expression in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 32 or the basic New York 
Times v. Sullivan33 standard for the protection of public figures 
against libel suits. In addition, the Court exhibits no inclination to 
revisit its opinions defining the scope of Congress' spending, war, 
and taxing powers.34 The justices also do not rehear many signifi-
cant Warren Court precedents subjecting state criminal procedures 
30. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down an Alabama ap-
portionment scheme); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (stn'king down a Georgia 
apportionment scheme); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that malapportion-
ment presented a justiciable political question). 
31. Equal protection-fundamental riglits generally are regarded as those interests 
that are sufficiently important that distinctions regarding such rights and interests re-
quire compelling interest justification. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969) (striking down state and federal provisions denying welfare benefits to individu-
als who had resided in the administering jurisdictions for less than one year); Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down a Virginia poll tax); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (using the Equal Protection 
Clause to strike down an Oklahoma law providing for the sterilization of persons con-
victed of two or more "felonies involving moral turpitude" but expressly exempting 
from the terms of the statute offenses such as embezzlement and violations of revenue 
acts); see also Gerhardt, supra note 29, at 421-22 (describing the relationship between 
equal protection-fundamental rights and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
32. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a state may not "forbid or proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or oflaw violation except where such advocacy is directed ·to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action"). 
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public official must prove "actual malice" to 
recover for defamation). But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 770-71 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that public 
figures should have to prove falsity only, and not actual malice, to recover for 
defamation). 
34. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal statute 
passed pursuant to Congress' spending power that directed the-Secretary ofTransporta-
tion to withhold a portion offederal highway funds from states that do not prohibit the 
purchase of alcohol by people under the age of21); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 
22 {1953) {upholding occupational tax on gamblers as long as the congressional mea-
sure was revenue producing on its face); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 
(1948) (upholding use of Congress' war powers to remedy effects of war even after the 
conflict is over). 
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to federal standards.35 In the controversial area of implied funda-
mental rights, the Court does not reopen several previously ques-
tionable rulings, 36 including the much-criticized decision in The 
Slaughter-House Cases. 37 
Certiorari decisions also reveal the Court's present agenda tore-
consider precedents in specific areas. For example, the Court 
clearly has tried to redefine several aspects of criminal procedure 
law. This intent is evidenced by its consideration three times within 
the past four years of the admissibility of victim impact statements in 
the sentencing phase of capital trials, 38 culminating in the overrul-
ing of the Court's first•two rulings on that subject in Payne v. Tennes-
see. 39 The Court's desire to undo or limit criminal procedure 
precedents is also apparent in its implicit overturning of a decision 
that automatically invalidated the criminal conviction of a defendant 
whose coerced confession had been admitted into evidence,40 and 
its limiting of the scope of the exclusionary rule.41 The Court also 
35. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements ob-
tained from a defendant during incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated at-
mosphere, without full warning of the defendant's constitutional rights, were 
inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (using the Equal 
Protection Clause to require a state to provide counsel for all indigent defendants chal-
lenging their criminal convictions as of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel and requiring the States 
to provide counsel to indigent defendants); Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (hold-
ing that a state must furnish an indigent criminal defendant with a free trial transcript if 
such a transcript is necessary for "adequate and effective appellate review" of his convic-
tion). But see irifra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing some of the Court's 
recent overrulings and narrowings of criminal procedure precedents). 
36. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a fundamen-
tal right of married couples to use contraception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925) (establishing a substantive due process fundamental right to send one's child 
to a private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (establishing a substantive 
due process fundamental right to teach one's child a foreign language). 
37. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges 
and Immunities Clause as merely protecting interests already protected by other federal 
constitutional and statutory provisions). This may be an especially good example of a 
previously controversial decision that the Court will not revisit despite its transparently 
dishonest reasoning and shaky doctrinal result. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 29, at 
417-19,426-30 (critiquing The Slaughter-House Cases). 
38. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 
U.S. 805 (1989) (holding that a prosecutor had engaged in an improper argument dur-
ing the sentencing phase when he read from a religious tract that the victim had been 
carrying and commented on personal qualities he had inferred from the victim's posses-
sion of the tract and a voter registration card); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) 
(holding that the introduction of a victim impact statement at the sentencing phase of a 
capital murder trial violated the Eighth Amendment). 
39. 111 S. Ct. 2597, overruling Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 and Booth, 482 U.S. 496. 
40. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (ruling that the use of a co-
erced confession in a criminal trial is not grounds for the automatic reversal of a convic-
tion), implicitly overruling in part Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (identifying 
coerced confession, biased judge, and deprivation of counsel as errors so serious as to 
invalidate a criminal conviction automatically, and noting that the errors were not sub-
ject to harmless-error analysis); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991) 
{holding that neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment prohibited police from ques-
tioning a man jailed for armed robbery about an unrelated murder charge without his 
lawyer in the robbery case present). 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the Fourth 
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has invited and considered various challenges to precedents involv-
ing abortion rights42 and the separation of church and state.4S This 
trend lends some credence to Justice Marshall's admonition in his 
Payne dissent that the Court is prepared to weaken, if not overrule, 
as many as seventeen constitutional precedents.44 
Although more explicit overrulings have occurred in this century 
Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar the prosecutor's use of evi-
dence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on an invalid search warrant 
issued by a magistrate). · 
42. For a discussion of the Court's recent rulings cutting back on precedents involv-
ing abortion rights, see infra notes 125-30 & 154-58 and accompanying text. 
43. The Court's precedents regarding the Establishment Clause and the Free Exer-
cise Clause have been in flux for years. The Court's tripartite test for evaluating Estab-
lishment Clause guarantees has been challenged.since it was first set forth in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (upholding a law under the Establishment Clause only if 
(1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect is neither to 
advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive.government entan-
glement with religion). For cases challenging Lemon, see Lee v. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090 
(1st Cir. 1990) (directly challenging the Lemon test), cerl. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (U.S. 
March 19, 1991) (No. 90-1014); Board of Education v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2377 
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (proposing, as an alternative to the Lemon test, that 
government cannot give direct benefits to religion to such a degree that it effectively 
establishes a state religion, and government cannot coerce any student to participate in 
religious activity); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (examining 
whether the government's practice had the purpose or effect of endorsing religion); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (re~sing t9 endorse "any single test or 
criterion in this sensitive area"). Before Lemon, the Court varied in its approach to Es-
tablishment Clause challenges. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) 
(upholding a state program to loan secular textbooks to parents of children attending 
private schools); Aoington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding uncon-
stitutional a state law requiring that ten verses from the Bi~le be rea4 aJoud at the open-
ing of each school day); Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding a New 
Jersey statute authorizing local school boards to reimllucie the cost of. bus transporta-
tion to parents with children in private schools, most of which were Catholic parochial 
schools). 
The Court's two-part test for evaluating free exerCise of religion claims also has been 
under attack from the time it was first set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) (upholding a law under the Free Exercise Clause only if it does not substantially 
burden the free exercise of religion, or if the government has a compelling reason for 
doing so). For precedents challenging Sherbert, see Employment Division, Department 
of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (holding that an Oregon criminal 
statute prohibiting peyote use did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that the Forest 
Service's plan to permit logging and road construction in areas of forest used by Indian 
tribes for religious rituals did not violate their free exercise of religion); Bowen v. Roy, 
476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to government welfare pro-
grams requiring social security numbers, even though the claimants believed that the 
use of the number would impair their child's spirit). Before Sherbert, the Court varied in 
its approach to free exercise claims. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) 
(rejecting a free exercise challenge by Orthodox jews claiming that a state law requiring 
stores to be dosed on Sundays put them at a competitive disadvantage because their 
religion required closing their stores on Saturday); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940) (reversing the disturbing the peace conviction ofaJehovah's Wimess who 
played a record attacking all organized religions). 
44. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2623 & n.2 (1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting) 
(stating that the following 17 precedents are "endangered': based on the criteria the 
Court used in Payne: Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (upholding the 
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than in the previous one, and consequently seem to be on the rise,45 
the Court is not necessarily showing less regard for its precedents.46 
During this same period oftime, the Court's case load has increased 
at a rate even higher than that of explicit overrulings.47 It stands to 
authority of the federal government to set aside broadcast licenses for minority appli-
cants); Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (holding that the First Amend-
ment prohibits denial of public employment on the basis of party affiliation); Peel v. 
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990) (First Amend-
ment right to advertise legal specialization); Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990) 
(holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids repeated prosecution for the same 
criminal conduct); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (finding a due process right 
to procedural safeguards aimed at assuring voluntariness of decision to commit oneself 
to a mental hospital); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment demands exclusion of illegally obtained evidence introduced for impeach-
ment of defense witness); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment requires jury instructions that do not preclude consideration of 
nonunanimous mitigating factors in capital sentencing); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 
378 (1987) (holding that the First Amendment protects public employees when expres-
sing views on matters ofpublicimportance); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (hold-
ing that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments support a right of a criminal defendant to 
provide hypnotically refreshed testimony on her own behalf); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 
U.S. 648 (1987) (rejecting applicability of harmless error analysis to Eighth Amendment 
right not to be sentenced to death by "death qualified" jury); United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149 (1987) (right to promotions as remedy for racial discrimination in govern-
ment hiring); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment forbids execution of the insane); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (reaffirming right to abortion); Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (holding that the Sixth Amendment is violated by intro-
duction of statements made to government informant-codefendant in course of prepar-
ing defense strategy); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (finding that the 
Establishment Clause forbids certain governmental assistance to parochial schools); 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (rejecting theory that 
Tenth Amendment provides immunity to the States from federal regulation); Pulliam v. 
Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding that injunctive relief is available for constitutional 
violations committed by judicial officers)). 
45. See generally Appendix (listing all explicit overrulings). 
46. Even though the cases in which the Court grants certiorari present especially 
difficult constitutional issues, this does not mean that the Court is more likely to over-
rule itself. For one thing, the statistics do not support this proposition. See infra note 47; 
see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 805-07 
(1982) (explaining that the Court has agreed to consider an increasing number of diffi-
cult cases, which inevitably divide the Court); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and judicial 
Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 281, 284-85 (1990) (suggesting that explicit overrul-
ings are the rare exception rather than the rule in constitutional decisionmaking);John 
P. Stevens, The Life Span of a judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1983) (attempting 
to dispel the myth that stare decisis no longer matters to the Court). 
47. The Court has explicitly overruled itself only about 100 times. See Appendix; see 
also CoNGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRRARY OF CoNGRESS, THE CoNSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 16, 99th 
Cong.,1stSess.2115-27 (1987 &Supp.1988) [hereinafterCoNSTtTIJTIONREPORT]. The 
relatively small number of explicit overrulings may be explained partially by the fact that 
explicit overrulings represent the most extreme kind of decisive action, which is difficult 
to achieve in controversial cases. See supra note 46. Moreover, explicit overrulings have 
not increased at the same rate as the Court's case load. For example, during the decade 
1960-70, the Court had an average case load per year of 2660.82 cases and averaged 
4.09 explicit overrulings per year; however, during the decade 1980-90 the Court had its 
case load increase to an average of 4354.44 cases per year but explicitly overruled an 
average of 2.22 cases each year. See CoNSTITUTION REPORT, supra (listing all overrulings 
through june 29, 1988); The Statistics, 75-103 HARV. L. REv. (1960-1990) (providing an-
nual surveys of the Supreme Court's case load); see also Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610 n.1 
(observing that the Court had overruled 33 cases in 20 Terms); Powell, supra note 46, at 
284 (suggesting that there are only two or three overrulings each Term despite the 
Court's increasing case load); Stevens, supra note 46, at 4-5 (pointing out that even 
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reason that if the Court is being asked to hear an increasing number 
of cases, there will be more questions about the scope of prior deci-
sions, and the greater number of such issues, the greater opportuni-
ties for overruling precedents. Yet Justice Marshall remains the 
only modern Justice to suggest that the Court in recent years has 
been targeting a greater proportion of its cases for 
reconsideration.48 
Precedents clearly do matter to the Court in setting its agenda. 
When considering which cases to hear, the Court has its first and 
most important chance to deliberate on the degree to which it in-
tends to be constrained by a prior opinion. Once the Court chooses 
to decide an issue, however, there arise more nuanced questions as 
to the degree to whic~ precedents still constrain or matter to the 
Court. I consider these nuances next. 
B. Precedent as a Source of Stability for Constitutioruzl Law 
Precedents perform historical and structural functions that help 
stabilize the branches' operations and interactions.49 This Section 
considers each of these functions in turn, and then examines the 
special conditions under which they can help to immunize certain 
decisions from reconsideration. 
1. The Historical Functions of Precedent 
Precedents can serve two historical functions. First, the Court's 
though the Court's case load has been increasing the Court still explicitly overrules itself 
no more than two or three times each Term). 
48. Several other modem justices have noted the importance of following prece-
dent. See Williamj. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 427, 437 (1986) 
(acknowledging that a Justice has a "general duty" to follow precedents); Antonin 
Scalia, TheRuleofLawasaLawofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1177 (1989) (suggesting 
that the real work of the Court consists of distinguishing, clarifying, and interpreting 
precedents); see also Powell, supra note 46, at 285; Stevens, supra note 46, at 4-5. In 
addition, in his press release announcing his resignation from the Court, justice Bren-
nan expressed his belief that many of the precedents he helped construct would survive 
the test of time. See Linda Greenhouse, Brennan, Key Libera~ Q!lits Supreme Court: Battle for 
Seat Likely, N.Y. TIMES, july 21, 1990, at 1 (quoting justice Brennan's press release). 
Some might argue, however, that changes in personnel on the Court may lead some 
justices to avoid calling attention to their own disregard for precedent by overruling or 
narrowing precedents in more subtle and less principled ways. See supra note 24. This 
argument overlooks the critical fact, discussed at irifra notes 119-77 and accompanying 
text, that the justices may choose to forego explicit overrulings for a variety of defensi-
ble reasons. 
49. Neither the historical nor structural functions of precedents receive adequate 
attention from other commentators. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note.20, at 1260-62 (describ-
ing precedent's relative status vis-a-vis other sources of decisionmaking but not consid-
ering the historical and structural functions performed by precedents); Stephen R. 
Munzer &James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1029, 1044 (1977) (suggesting that the authority of a precedent turns solely on the 
degree to which it can be linked to the constitutional text). 
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decisions often are intertwined with historical events to such an ex-
tent that it is not possible to understand those events without con-
sidering the degree to which precedents contributed to their 
development. A famous illustration of this function is Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 50 which divided the Court and the nation on whether the 
Constitution had an answer to the moral, social, and political di-
lemma posed by slavery and set the stage for the Civil War and the 
Reconstruction Amendments. 5 1 Dred Scott is important to the Jus-
tices (and others) as the precedent overturned by the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments and as an important symbol for the consequences 
of the Court's reliance on questionable historical analysis and inter-
ference with socially divisive issues. 52 
Second, the Justices can be the constitutional historians for their 
successors as well as for the elected branches. Because the Court is 
a critical interpreter of and player in historical events, 53 its prece-
dents preserve, illuminate, and provide a perspective on the nation's 
social, political, and legal traditions.54 The Court often defines the 
relevant past for itself and the other branches so that the Court's 
assertions about history can matter to present and future Justices 
and other government decisionmakers even more than anything the 
Framers may have said. Consequently, there are a number of areas 
in which the Court and the elected branches are likely to consult the 
Justices' historical commentary, as reflected in New York Times v. Sul-
livan 55 regarding the original understanding of the scope of the 
First Amendment's protection of the press from libel actions and, 
more recently, in Harmelin v. Michigan56 regarding the extent to 
which the Framers meant for the Eighth Amendment to guarantee 
proportionality of punishment.57 The more each of the branches, 
50. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that neither slaves nor their descendants 
could be citizens of the United States). 
51. See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the 
Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 894-95 (1986) (discussing the role of 
Dred Scott in influencing the development of the Reconstruction Amendments). 
Precedents can also reflect the attitudes of a particular historical period. For example, 
the development of the civil rights movement in this country was intertwined with the 
long line of cases in which the Supreme Court restricted government's use of race as a 
classifying trait in legislation. See generaUy RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE jUSTICE 82-83, 88, 
118-19, 122-23, 134-35, 219-20, 239-46 (1975) (discussing the relationship between 
various Supreme Court decisions and the development of the civil rights movement). 
52. See, e.g., BoRK, supra no~e 12, at 28-33 (describing Dred Scott as illustrating sub-
stantive due process at its worst); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitu-
tion, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693, 700-02 (1976) (pointing to Dred Scott as an example of the 
damage judicial activism can wreak). 
53. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,540 (1953) (Jackson,J., concurring) (observing 
that Supreme Court justices "are not final because [they] are infallible, but [they] are 
infallible only because [they] are final"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803) (stating that it is the province of the Court to "say what the law is"). 
54. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE LJ. 1029, 1051-55 
(1990) (arguing neither precedent nor tradition in our past should be ignored because 
our legal precedents and traditions have shaped our current attitudes and practices). 
55. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
56. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
57. Other examples of precedents whose historical analysis may be consulted subse-
quently by the Court and the other branches include Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 786, 
786-92 (1983) (reconciling the history of the Establishment Clause with the practice of 
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including the Court, accepts the Court's historiography, the more 
entrenched the precedents become structurally and the less likely 
the Court will revisit or overrule them. ss _ 
The Court's mediations of past events59 can be more reliable than 
the histories compiled by the elected branches because the latter 
traditionally do not have to explain the reasons for their positions 
on historical questions as fully and openly, as does the Court. 60 
Moreover, the adversaries in each case closely scrutinize the infor-
mation submitted to the Court. A premise of the adversarial system 
is that strong advocacy on each side of a dispute '\viii expose the 
flaws of the historical material submitted to the Court. If the 
Court's historiography is self-serving and, therefore, cannot be re-
lied upon by subsequent Justices or the other branches, 61 then one 
must concede that the adversarial system works less thari ideally. 
2. The Structural Functions of Precedent 
Precedents perform two kinds of structural functions. First, 
opening legislative sessions with prayer); jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 
422-44 (1968) (recounting the history of the Congress' power to pass appropriate legis-
lation to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 
92-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (providing an appendix detailing the original un-
derstanding of incorporation of the Bill of Rights via the Fourt~enth Amendment); see 
also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 
45, 115, 186-87 (1988) (showing, inter alia, how the other branches consult precedents 
to obtain information on the ways in which past conflicts over foreign affairs have been 
resolved). In addition, the Court's choice to join one side in a historical-debate is itself a 
matter of historical concern. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297. U.S. 1 (1936) (agree-
ing with Hamilton's rather than Madison's interpretation of tHe Congress' spending 
power); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (siqing With Hamilton's 
rather than Madison's construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause); see also HAROLD 
HoNGJU KoH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CoNSTITUTioN: SHARING PowER AFTER THE IRAN-
CoNTRA AFFAIR 135-49 (1990) (detailing the regularity with which the Court has sided 
with the President on separation of powers issues). 
58. See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (discussing th!! conditions immuniz-
ing precedents from overruling). 
59. Written history usually is recorded by someone other than the primary historical 
actor. For one discussion of the consequences of this, see Akhil R. Amar, Our Forgotten 
Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE LJ. 281 (1987) (observing that the text of 
the Constitution we use today is not the actual one originally ratified by the States). 
60. On the need for, and practice of, the justices to discuss the reasons for their 
judgments, see itifra notes 209 8e 356-59 and accompanying text. 
61. See R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 9-12 (1946) (noting that history 
furthers self-knowledge only if it contains the interpretation of evidence; mere recount-
ing of facts is useless); LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN 4 (1964) (stressing the 
need to understand the relationship between a reader, the text she is trying to interpret, 
and the cultures in which she lives and in which the text was·written); Quentin Skinner, 
Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. THEORY 3, 30-35 (1969) (criticiz-
ing the failure of many readers to appreciate the strategies authors employ to disguise 
their true meaning); see also Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and tlze Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 
SuP. CT. REv. 119 (criticizing the Court's historiography as having been written solely 
for the purpose of supporting results that the justices wanted to reach). But cf. DAVID L. 
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45, 50 (1977) (suggesting that courts are 
better equipped to find "historical" rather than "social" facts). 
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precedents help to establish and maintain government operations 
and relationships.62 For example, the Court's decisions on separa-
tion of powers have defined the relationships among the three 
branches of the federal government, 63 and those on the nature of 
the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have clarified 
the relationship between the federal and state governments in cer-
tain areas.64 
Second, the Court's decisions inform the choices or agendas of 
the other branches.65 For example, two precedents set the terms 
and illuminated the roles of the elected branches in the recent con-
troversy whether flag burning should be protected as political pro-
test under the First Amendment. No sooner had the Court held in 
Texas v. johnson 66 that a state law prohibiting desecration of the flag 
violated the First Amendment, than much of the public denounced 
the ruling, prompting President Bush to try to overturn it through a 
constitutional amendment.67 Congress responded that a constitu-
tional amendment would be premature, and instead tried to draft a 
statute that would preserve the flag's integrity without conflicting 
with johnson. Hence, Congress passed a federal statute68 that sought 
to protect the flag on a content-neutral basis. 69 Mter the Court 
struck down the statute in United States v. Eichman, 7° Congress de-
bated, but rejected, the President's renewed proposal to amend the 
Constitution. 71 In short, the flagburning dispute shows how the 
62. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 431-32 (maintaining that some prece-
dents can have immutable structural effects on governmental operation); Monaghan, 
supra note 7, at 730-34, 749-52 (demonstrating how precedents have shaped govern-
mental structure). 
63. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that Congress 
may delegate the authority to create mandatory sentencing guidelines to an independent 
commission located in the judicial branch); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (up-
holding Congress' power to delegate to the judiciary the appointment of an independ-
ent prosecutor charged with investigating certain high-level executive officials); INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that Congress violated the Presentment and Bi-
cameral Clauses of the Constitution by enacting a one-house veto over the decisions of 
certain executive officials); see also Michael]. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeach-
ment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1, 50-65 (1989) (discussing many of the prece-
dents that have laid the foundation for the modern understanding of the separation of 
powers). 
64. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 29, at 421 & n.50 (describing the precedents 
exploring the nature of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
65. Another function of precedents is reflected in the influence they wield in setting 
the Court's own agenda. See supra notes 27-48 and accompanying text. 
66. 497 u.s. 397 (1989). 
67. President Bush's proposed amendment provided that "The Congress and the 
states shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United 
States." See Tom Kenworthy, Flag Amendment Fails in Decisive House Vote; Year-Long Fight on 
Desecration Put to Rest, WASH. PoST, june 22, 1990, at A18. 
68. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N (103 Stat.) 
777 (providing criminal penalties for desecration of the American flag). 
69. But cf. Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1990) (arguing that the statute was an attempt to slow down the 
amendment process). 
70. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (striking down the federal flag protection statute as con-
tent-based regulation of political speech). 
71. 136 CoNG. REc. 4035-88 (daily ed.June 22, 1990); 136 CoNG. REc. H400b-29 
(daily ed.June 21, 1990); see also Kenworthy, supra note 67 (reporting the House's 254-
177 defeat of President Bush's proposed amendment). Interestingly,jo/mson framed the 
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Court's decisions can shape the elected branches' agendas.72 
3. The Immunization of Precedents from Overruling 
Part I thus far has suggested but not yet shown how some prece-
dents become immune to overruling. In fact, there are times when 
the Court does not reconsider previously adjudicated issues because 
the relevant issues have become practically immutable. Further-
more, there are cases that the Justices decide a particular way be-
cause there is a secure ruling on point, even though they might have 
decided the question another way had they been doing so in the first 
instance. 
A precedent does not achieve permanency solely because it per-
forms a historical or structural function. Rather, it achieves such 
issue for every government decisionmaker except that of the Eichman dissenters. In writ-
ing for the latter, justice Stevens did not show any deference to johnson, nor even try to 
distinguish it. In his only reference to johnson, justice Stevens explained that deferring 
to it "would not honestly reflect my considered judgment concerning the relative impor-
tance of the conflicting interests that are at stake. I remain persuaded that the consider-
ations identified in my [dissenting] opinion in Texas v. johnson are of controlling 
importance in this case as well." Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2412 (Stevens,J., dissenting). 
72. Once they have acted in pursuit of the agendas or choices shaped by the Court's 
precedents, the other branches may effectively nullifY or obviate the need for the Court 
to revisit those decisions. For example, Congress effectively nullified the specific result 
in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), through its subsequent 
enactment of antitrust legislation in the latter part of the nineteenth and in the early part 
of the twentieth centuries, and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), through its 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Similarly, after the Court in Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), rejected a free exercise challenge to an Air Force 
regulation prohibiting the wearing of headgear while jndoors as applied to an orthodox 
Jewish officer who was disciplined for wearing a yarmulke, Congress passed a law that 
provides: "[A] member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while 
wearing the uniform of the member's armed forces [unless] the wearing of the item 
would interfere with the performance of the member's military duties [or] the item of 
apparel is not neat and conservative." Yet another example is Congress' passage of 
legislation to prohibit third-party searches of newspapers, Privacy Protection Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 
(1988)), a practice the Court had upheld in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 54 7, 550-
53 (1978}. For further discussion of how the political branches can take action to but-
tress (rather than undermine) precedents, see infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text. 
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status when its structural function combines with its age (or histori-
cal purpose),73 social or institutional reliance,74 or political accept-
ance. 75 Although these factors do not all need to apply 
simultaneously for precedents to become secure, immutability is 
most likely to result when all three apply. 
For example, all three elements have helped to insulate The Legal 
Tender Cases 76 from reconsideration. The decision is over one hun-
dred years old; financial and other important social institutions have 
been built on expectations that decision will not be overruled; and, 
even though it has been criticized as a deviation from original un-
derstanding, 77 it has been accepted by a wide range of political in-
terests such that there is no well-organized political force working to 
undo it. 78 It is hard to conceive of circumstances in which the Court 
would even consider overruling it. 
When all three factors do not apply simultaneously, the most im-
portant source of permanence is institutional reliance based on 
political acceptability (or at least on the absence of any serious polit-
ical opposition). The precedents upholding the New Deal79 and the 
73. The combination of structure and age can be seen as the intersection between 
structural and historical functions. Indeed, it is rare for history standing alone to immu-
nize a precedent from reconsideration. Cf. Kronman, supra note 54 (arguing for greater 
deference to precedents because we are obligated to, and constrained by, the past and 
because we want later generations to show respect for our judgments). 
74. See BoRK, supra note 12, at 155-59 (suggesting that substantial institutional reli-
ance on a precedent can protect it from overruling even if it deviated from original 
understanding); Cooper, supra note 12, at 409-10 (suggesting that institutional reliance 
is the only justification for following a precedent that conflicts with original understand-
ing); Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 431 (discussing legislative and administrative reli-
ance as a powerful factor in immunizing a precedent from overruling). 
75. See BERGER, supra note 12, at 412-13 (conceding that precedents that at one time 
should have been properly overruled as wrongly decided become entitled to recognition 
as authoritative after the passage of enough time and after the citizenry has come to rely 
on them); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfoct Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 382 
(1981) (noting the role expectations should play in mitigating the degree to which origi-
nal intent should control constitutional decisions). 
76. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (upholding the constitutionality of 
paper money), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870) (holding it 
unconstitutional to make paper money legal tender for antecedent debts). 
77. See BORK, supra note 12, at 156-57; Cooper, supra note 12, at 410; Kenneth W. 
Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 367, 389. 
78. But all three factors did not prevent the Court from eventually reconsidering 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 {1896), discussed in more detail at irifra notes 143-48 
and accompanying text, or from rendering several decisions, see infra note 80, upholding 
congressional legislation effectively nullifying The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 {1883). 
The nullification of these two well-established precedents not only caused profound so-
cial disruption but also demonstrated the Court's willingness to buck considerable criti-
cism for the sake of endorsing certain values. The critical thing to keep in mind, 
however, is that during the substantial period of time that passed prior to their nullifica-
tions, support for those decisions diminished and opposition to those decisions increas-
ingly developed social and political respectability and power. 
79. See, e.g .• Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill {1942) (upholding federal legislation 
regulating the production of wheat for personal consumption on the family farm); NLRB 
v.jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937) {upholding the constitutionality of 
the National Labor Relations Act); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 {1937) 
(upholding state regulation of minimum wage laws for women); Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding New York's regulation of milk prices). 
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Great Society8° exemplify this poin_t, because they have become im-
mune to reconsideration even though they are less than half as. old 
as The Legal Tender Cases. These <lecisions were secured by reason-
ably swift81 and sufficiently widespread political support for New 
Deal and Great Society programs, despite ongqing academic skepti-
cism about the legitimacy of the relevant precedents82 and the op-
position of some politicalleaders.83 Today, these precedents form 
the bedrock of the administrative state, which is so well entrenched 
that it could be done away with only by constitutional revolution. 
The failure to overrule precedents that initially were controver-
sial84 has not turned simply on the perceived correctness of, or on 
the degree of textual support for, those decisioi'ls.85 Rather, the . 
permanency of such decisions has rested on the degree to which 
initially hostile political forces cease to have much influence.B6 The 
longer such groups take to weaken a Court ruling, the greater 
80. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding Congress' 
amendment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 allowing citizens of New York-primarily 
from Puerto Rico-to vote even though they could not read English); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Congress' power to pass the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 under its Commerce Clause power); Katzenbach v. McClung, 
379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be applied, through 
the Commerce Clause, to small, local establishments). · 
81. Within ten years of the Supreme Court's endorsement of the New Deal, and 
within half a decade of the Court's endorsement of the Great Society, the institutions 
that they sanctioned became widely accepted by both Republicans and Democrats. See 
Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 431-33 (discussing the degree to which certain precedents 
have influenced the structure and agenda of government). 
82. See, e.g., Bonx, supra note 12, at 56-61, 129-30, 156 (criticizing the precedents 
upholding the New Deal and Great Society as deviating from original understanding); 
CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 8-9, passim 
(1984); Raoul Berger, The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L. REv. 751,755-
56 (1984) (denouncing various precedents upholding the New Deal for having deviated 
from original intent). 
83. See, e.g., Sidney Blumentlial, Stirring Populist Emotions for a Country Club Cause, 
WASH. PoST, june 2, 1985, at Cl (noting President Reagan's opposition to the programs 
comprising President Franklin D. Roosevelt's second New Deal); William]. Eaton, Con-
gressional Liberals Switch to the Offensive, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1988, Part I, at 1 (describing 
President Reagan's fundamental disagreements with, and attacks on, federal programs 
spawned by the New Deal and Great Society); jon Margolis, Party Labels just Aren't Sticking 
to Voters Anymore, CHI. Tn.IB., Aug. 31, 1986, at 1 (observing that the Reagan administra-
tion had failed to persuade a majority of lawmakers and their constituents into aban-
doning New Deal and Great Society policies). 
84. Controversy here is measured by the Justices' contemporaneous and subsequent 
attitudes toward tlie original precedent, the academic and political reaction to the deci-
sion at the time it was decided, and the degree to which lower courts seem to have 
problems applying or interpreting the· precedent. . 1 
85. But see Munzer &: Nickel, supra note 49, at 1044 (arguing that the "autliority" of a 
precedent depends on its textual support or how well it fits the purpose and meaning of 
tlie constitutional text). ' 
86. For example, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), became secure 
after many soutliern Democrats and Republicans, who had initially resisted it, accepted 
it as the law of the land. Similarly, by acquiescing in many of the New Deal and Great 
Society programs they initially had opposed, the southern Democrats and Republicans 
reduced any political support for criticisms of the precedents upholding them. The 
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chance the ruling has to become entrenched. The more entrenched 
precedents become, the more difficult it is to undo them. And there 
is a point at which precedents can be so ingrained that they become 
a permanent baseline for any constitutional dispute about the values 
that should guide government operation.87 
II. Precedent as a Source of Indeterminacy in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking 
Ideally, precedents should contain identifiable rules of law and 
have some measurable degree of influence on subsequent decision-
making. 88 But unless the instant case is on all fours with some prior 
decisions, the Justices have significant latitude in how they view, de-
fine, and apply the inconsistencies and ambiguities in such prior de-
cisions.89 The Justices may conscientiously disagree over the scope 
and reach of a P.rior decision and may even make some decisions 
intentionally vague as a result of their conscious choices to gloss 
over their differences of opinion for the sake of forming coalitions. 
The creation and interpretation of precedents, however, involves 
an unavoidable degree of indeterminacy.90 In particular, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to predict how the Justices will deal with the 
ambiguities in prior decisions, the ideas new Justices get looking at 
old decisions, and how those decisions will influence the Justices' 
choices of the level of generality at which to state the rule of a case. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how the Justices will manage the confu-
sion generated by the Court's use of more than one method to 
weaken or bolster its precedents and the uncertainty fostered by the 
Republicans also opposed the Court's narrow interpretation of the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36 (1873), but later came to embrace that opinion as part of the Party's political 
theory of government. For their part, many Democrats initially opposed, but accept 
today, the Court's general practice to recognize that the Constitution primarily protects 
negative rights, which require the government to refrain from certain conduct, rather 
than positive rights, which impose affirmative duties on the government to take actions 
or to expend resources to meet the needs of certain citizens. See Gerhardt, supra note 
29, at 410. . 
87. Another example of a permanent precedent is Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
(1954), which prohibited the federal government from maintaining segregated public 
schools in the District of Columbia on the ground that the Fifth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause imposed the same equal protection of the laws concept on the federal gov-
ernment as the Fourteenth Amendment had imposed on the states. Bolling has become 
immutable despite the considerable academic and political controversy it has generated. 
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY jUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FouRTEENTii AMENDMENT (1977); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Indeed, Bolling has been criticized as re-
cently as 1989 by one of President Reagan's Supreme Court nominees. See BoRK, supra 
note 12, at 83-84 (maintaining that no neutral principles can be derived from original 
understanding to support the result in Bolling). 
88. See Moore, supra note 26, at 359. 
89. Precedents are sometimes termed "horizontal" when being reviewed by the 
same court issuing them or "vertical" when constraining a lower court obliged to follow 
them. Marshall, supra note 18, at 178 n.1; Cooper, supra note 12, at 6. This Part focuses 
on the extent to which precedents can "horizontally" constrain the Supreme Court. 
90. CJ. LLEWELLYN, supra note 21, at 4, 73-76 (observing that precedents can "liber-
ate" judicial decisionmaking because they inherently contain inconsistencies, which can 
be manipulated easily). 
90 [VOL. 60:68 
The Role of Precedent 
'11IE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
Court's inconsistent explanations for explicit overrulings. These 
sources of indeterminacy in dealing with preceden~ have the effect 
of enabling the Justices to engage in conscientious disagreements 
over the scope of precedents, to consider new or renewed argu-
ments, and to contribute to the evolution of constitutional 
doctrine.91 
A. Purposeful Versus Unintentionally Indeterminate Precedents 
A purposefully indeterminate precedent, difficult as it might be to 
spot, results from the Justices' efforts to gloss over their differences 
for the sake of creating working mcgorities, or from their conscious 
or deliberate choices to leave some constitutional matters un-
resolved, or both. The larger the coalition on the Court, the more 
differences the Justices may have to submerge for the sake of con-
sensus, and the scope or reach of even unanimous opinions may be 
ambiguous or vague. 
. Brown v. Board of Education 92 may be the most famous example of a 
purposefully indeterminate precedent. Having taken two years to 
write, Brown glossed over the concerns of several of the Justices as to 
the historical and textual support for the Court's striking down laws 
explicidy mandating racial segregation in public schools.9s Brown 
raised more questions than it answered, including the timing and 
nature of a remedy,94 the continued constitutionality of segregation 
outside the public school context, and the standards for determin-
ing when the States could be held responsible for segregated condi-
tions in public schools.95 
Of course, Brown could decide only so much, inevitably leaving 
many questions to be resolved and debated later. Indeed, in trying 
to dispose of the case before it, the Supreme Court almost always 
leaves related, but not identical, issues to be resolved through sub-
$equent decisionmaking.96 Because there is no way to ensure that 
91. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 808-09 (1983) (arguing that the institutional 
pressures on the Court to obtain clear majorities undercut the Court's ability to produce 
opinions based on the application of neutral principles which the entire majority ad-
dresses). The resulting ambiguities can be intentional or accidentaL See, e.g., Vincent 
Blasi, The Unanswered Questions of the First Amendment, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 1992) (discussing eight questions regarding the central meaning of the First Amend-
ment left unresolved by constitutional adjudication). 
92. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
93. See generally WILLIAM 0. DouGLAS, THE CouRT YEARS: 1939-1975: THE AUTOBI-
OGRAPHY OF WILUAM 0. DOUGLAS 113-15 (1980) (describing the evolution of Brown and 
suggesting that its appearance of unanimity is misleading); KLUGER, supra note 51, at 
694-99 (describing the justices' responses to Chief justice Warren's draft of Brown). 
94. Brown was, however, saving this question for reargument. 
95. To be sure, the Court made clear and unequivocal its disapproval of segregation 
of public schools. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text. 
96. For example, the Court has had to address the questions left unanswered or 
1991] 91 
later decisions will preclude ambiguities, an inevitable degree of in-
determinacy creeps into the Court's decisionmaking. In other 
words, vagueness in the scope and reach of the Court's precedents 
can exist and pose the same problems for subsequent decisionmak-
ing independently of the Justices' intentions. The next section ex-
plores more fully this kind of indeterminacy. 
B. Four Sources of Indeterminate Precedents 
1. The Consequences of Substantive Splits on the Court 
Judicial decisionmaking imposes pressure to find c9mmon 
ground. In some cases, the Justices disagree strongly but can still 
find the common ground to state a clear rationale, 9 7 but, in other 
cases, no clear rule may emerge from the decisionmaking process. 
For example, from 1976 through 1990, the substantive differences 
of opinion among the Justices prevented them from producing a 
clear holding regarding an. affirmative action measure under the 
Equal Protection Clause.98 As a practical matter, these decisions 
signaled only the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a specific 
unclear by Brown in a number of cases. See Brown v. Board ofEduc. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 
294 (1955) (ordering a gradual adjustment to an integrated school system, rather than 
immediate integration, and vesting significant discretion in the lower courts); Green v. 
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that a plan allowing a student to choose 
her own public school does not constitute adequate compliance with the school board's 
responsibility to achieve desegregation when there is a history of intentional segregation 
in the school system); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(holding that the command to desegrate schools does not mean that every school must 
reflect the racial composition of the community as a whole, but that busing is permissi-
ble if necessary to dismantle a dual school system); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 
189 (1973) (holding that whenever a policy of intentional segregation is proved with 
respect to a portion of a school system, the burden of proving that other schools in the 
system were not intentionally segregated falls on the government). 
97. Arguably, this was the case in Brown, to the extent that the Court explained that 
segregation of the races in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause because 
such segregation negatively stigmatized black children. See KLUGER, supra note 51, at 
655-99 (describing the differences of opinion of the justices on the Brown Court, and the 
willingness of those justices to suppress those differences to reach a unanimous result); 
see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CAsE AND THE SUPREME 
CoURT passim (1986) (describing the strong differences of opinion among the justices 
over the constitutionality of court-ordered busing that ultimately did not preclude them 
from consenting to a clear endorsement of that remedy under certain circumstances). 
98. See, e.g., Wygant v.Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that layoff 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between a school board and a union 
were not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a federal set-aside program to increase minority partici-
pation in government contracting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978) (striking down a medical school admissions program setting aside a specific 
number of seats for minorities). Even though there were clear holdings in City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a city program setting 
aside thirty percent of its subcontracts for minority businesses), and Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC, llO S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (upholding FCC broadcast license issuing poli-
cies favoring minority firms), these two cases are not easily reconciled with each other, 
or with the Court's previous decisions. See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REv. 125, 125-35 (1990) (noting that the 
Court treated governmental decisions differently in the two cases, depending upon 
whether federal or state action was involved); Charles Fried, Comment: Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1990) (noting Aletro 
Broadcasting's focus on group rights in direct contrast to Croson "s reliance on an individ-
ual rights approach to the Equal Protection Clause). 
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Iaw.99 Similarly, no sooner had the Court held in Board of Education 
v. Dowell too that federal courts could end their supervision of school 
desegregation plans after a school district has eliminated "the ves-
tiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable" then the Court 
understandably granted certiorari in Freeman v. Pitts 101 to clarify 
w~en a school district has met its duties under a desegregation 
order.l02 
The ambiguities reflected in these and other cases may be a sub-
stitute for an elusive neutrality. For example, even if the Justices 
think they have been impartial in using such terms or phrases as 
99. Sometimes the seemingly strong feelings among the Justices on certain issues 
perhaps can be inferred from fractured majorities. For example, during the 1989 Term, 
there were five instances in which a concurring member of the Court provided the criti-
cal fifth vote to decide a case and thereby rendered the rationale, and perhaps even the 
holding, in the case unclear. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, llO S. Ct.-3115, 3125 
{1990) (Justice Kennedy's concurrence .in. the judgment provided the fifth vote to uphold 
a restriction on solicitation outside a post office}; American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 
110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 {1990) (Justice Scalia providing the crucial fifth vote to strike 
down an Arkansas highway tax under the Commerce Clause); Peel v. Attorney Registra-
tion and Disciplinary Comm'n, llO S. Ct. 2281, 2293 (1990) (Justice Marshall providing 
the crucial fifth vote to strike down certain restrictions on attorney credentialing as vio-
lative of the First Amendment); Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (in 
which justice Scalia wrote a plurality opinion on transient jurisdiction, commanding only 
two other votes, while Justice White concurred in J?art and in the judgment and five 
other Justices concurred only in the judgment); North Dakota v. United States, 110 S. 
Ct. 1986, 1999 {1989) (Justice Scalia providing the crucial fifth vote to uphold under the 
Twenty-first Amendment North Dakota laws regulating liquor sold to military bases 
within the state). 
At other times, the strong feelings among the justices may not preclude a clear ruling 
but rather lead to intemperate language. For example, in Burnham v. Superior Court, 
110 S. Ct. 2105, 2117-19 (1990),Justice Scalia inserted into his plurality opinion a gra-
tuitous section in which he uncharitably attacks Justice Brennan's dissent, commenting, 
for example, that "one can marvel at justice Brennan's assertion." In addition, in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2, 124 n.4, 126 n.5, 127 n.6 {1989),Justice 
Scalia caustically comments on four occasions that he has no idea what justice Brennan 
is arguing. Several other Justices have also demonstrated a harsh and intolerant tone for 
their colleagues on the Court. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 
490, 538, 559-60 (1989) (Blackmun,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claim-
ing that the plurality had "gone about [its] business in ••• a deceptive fashion •••• (and 
had invited] charges of cowardice and illegitimacy"); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 
781 {1982) (O'Connor,j •• concurring in part and dissenting in part) {suggesting that the 
majority's analysis of law was an "absurdity"). See generally Brenda j. Quick, Whatever 
Happened to Respec!ful Dissent?, 77 A.B.A.]. 62 (1991) (discussing the justices• increasing 
tendency to berate each other). 
100. 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991). 
101. ll1 S. Ct. 949 (1991), granting cerL to 887 F.2d 1438 (lith Cir. 1989). 
102. Yet another example of substantive splits on the Court precluding a clear ration-
ale or rule is the Court's approach to obscenity cases from 1967 to 1973. During those 
years the Court's inability to articulate a definition of obscenity that could command the 
allegiance of the majority created chaos. In Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), 
the Court began the practice of per curiam reversals of convictions for the sale or exhibi-
tion of materials that at least five members of the Court, applying their separate tests, 
deemed to be obscene. The Court disposed of some 31 cases in this fashion from 1967 
to 1973. · 
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"neutral" state action, "innocent whites," or "benign racial discrim-
ination," other Justices (as well as other people) may debate 
whether these terms or phrases are justifiable, and disagree as to 
what they imply, including whether they reflect the speaker's or 
writer's unconscious attitudes about race and racism in American 
society. 103 Others may suspect that something more is going on 
than the opinions suggest arid try to dissect them to uncover the 
values truly underlying them. The perspectives with which others 
on the Court read what the Justices say often can dictate subsequent 
debates over the use of the terms or phrases used in various opin-
ions. Thus, the Justices often leave uncertainty over the scope of 
the precedents they have made by relating disputes in ways that 
other Justices believe do not disclose fully the actual underlying rea-
sons or values. 
2. The Difficulties of Determining the Level of Generality at which to 
State the Rule of a Case 
Precedents contain two elements that contribute to the flux in, or 
the unpredictability of, constitutional decisionmaking. First, prece-
dents contain ambiguous terms or principles that can leave a wide 
scope of choices because Justices acting later can deal with the ambi-
guities in ways that state a desired principle or reach a desired result 
while claiming fidelity to the precedent. Second, precedents can 
prompt, generate, or be the source of ideas on which later Courts 
can build constitutional doctrine. Because there is no way to predict 
who future Justices will be or how they may interpret the ambigui-
ties or develop the ideas in precedents, there is inevitably substan-
tial uncertainty over the direction of constitutionallaw.104 
103. Scholars debate the degree to which the language used in debates on affirmative 
action reflects unconscious attitudes about race and racism in American society. See, e.g., 
Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-FfJTewfJTd: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. 
L. REv. 4, 76-77 (1985) (criticizing "formal equality" and color-blind adjudication as 
methods of protecting white control over the black struggle for meaningful equality); 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (arguing that a symbolic message test is superior to 
the current discriminatory intent test for determining equal protection violations be-
cause the former can root out unconscious racism); Thomas Ross, Innocence and A.ffinna-
tive Action, 43 VAND. L. REv. 297 (1990) (suggesting that the rhetoric surrounding 
affirmative action conceals a strong undercurrent of unconscious racism). 
104. Some uncertainty about the meaning of precedents is inherent in the interpreta-
tion of legal texts. The interpretive process is the broad enterprise of trying to assign 
meanings or underlying intentions or understandings to the documents being read. But 
see Moore, supra note 26, at 284 (suggesting the interpretive process consists solely of 
the application of the law to the facts). The interpretive process is unpredictable be-
cause there are no universally accepted rules for interpreting the ambiguities, gaps. and 
contradictions inherent in every legal text, and because, even if there were such rules, 
they too would be texts subject to interpretation. See Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. 
L. REv. 1325, 1326-32 (1984); Michaelj. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
1358, 1365-71 (1990) (book review) (discussing the inherent difficulties in interpreting 
legal texts). 
The degree to which constitutional decisionmaking is inevitably indeterminate is not, 
however, as a practical matter, boundless. To preserve the rule oflaw, some commenta-
tors have argued that it is necessary to have a structure to assign at least a range of 
meanings to a legal dispute at some point in the adjudicative process. Consequently, the 
Constitution recognizes an authoritative reader of the Constitution in the form of the 
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The latitude that subsequent Justices might have in defining the 
scope of ambiguously phrased precedents is similar to the well-
known difficulties in searching for original understanding. Original-
ists argue that judges should enforce a constitutional provision ac-
cording to its original understanding.l05 Originalists maintain that 
the relevant understanding to constitutional interpretation is not 
the Framers' specific views regarding particular co~stitutional issues 
but rather the general understanding of the public at the time of the 
framing and ratification of the constitutional text in question.l06 
Although originalists usually agree that the critical question is the 
level of generality at which the judge chooses to state the intent of 
the Framers and ratifiers, 107 they often disagree on how to specifY 
the appropriate level of understanding in a particular case. In a re-
cent article, Professor Michael Perry explains that the inquiries of 
even a "sophisticated originalist"'into the original meaning and into 
how to specifY in a particular case "the principle that represents the 
relevant aspect of the original meaning" are indeterminate, subject 
to different readings depending upon the Justice or theorist's partic-
ular moral or political judgments of a good society and of the 
Court's role in our political system.tos 
The interpretation of precedents involves a similar process. In 
trying to determine the extent to which some prior decision points 
to a definite resolution ofhow the justices should decide the case in 
front of them, they too must choose the appropriate level of gener-
ality at which to state the rule of law embodied in the original deci-
sion.109 But once the Justices depart from the specific facts or 
Supreme Court, which embodies its pronouncements in precedents that are handed 
down to guide the lower courts, the rest of the legal community, and subsequent genera-
tions and justices. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
739, 740 (1982) (suggesting that a conceptualization of the judicial role and a hierarchy 
of constitutional decisionmakers may ensure objective interpretation) with Sanford Lev-
inson, lAw as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373,401-02 (1982) (suggesting that the coopera-
tive framework, which Fiss sees as protecting objective interpretation, does not exist 
within the judicial system). 
105. See generally BoRK, supra note 12, at 139-40. 
106. See id. at 144. 
107. See id. at 149. 
108. Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 77 VA. L. REV. 668,715 (1991). Many critics oforiginalism maintain, however, that 
as long as it is permissible to ignore the actual, specific opinions of the Framers and 
ratifiers, and instead rely on general principles, the choice of a general principle de-
pends on the interpreter or theorist's construction of a fi~tion. As Professor Dworkin 
has stated: "[T]here is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be dis-
covered, even in principle. There is only some such thing waiting to b'e invented." Ron-
ald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 477 (1981). 
109. See Scalia, supra note48, at 1179 (suggesting that a critical task for each justice is 
to determine the appropriate level of generality at which to state a rule of law); see also 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DoRF, ON READING TIJE CONSTITUTION 71-73 (1991) 
(indicating that the level of generality in precedents often "is where the battle for consti-
tutional meaning is joined"); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in 
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rationale of a precedent, they are in a position to reshape its ambi-
guities and tensions beyond the original configurations of that pre-
cedent. The Justices' efforts to define the scope of the rule of law 
set forth in a prior opinion illustrate that precedents can often open 
rather than close the range of choices for subsequent Courts to 
make.ll0 
The ideas used in precedents can become the seeds of doctrine 
seemingly unimportant to the initial case but of such importance to 
a subsequent Court as to overshadow the specific ruling in the origi-
nal decision. Constitutional adjudication develops in part through 
subsequent Justices' scanning precedents for concepts and princi-
ples that can resolve present controversies.111 In this sense, prece-
dents serve as the repository for ideas on which future Justices can 
build constitutional doctrine. 
Perhaps the most prominent example of this aspect of constitu-
tional decisionmaking is United States v. Carotene Products. 112 Carotene 
Products held that state laws restricting the transportation of filled 
milk across state lines violated the Commerce Clause. But the case 
is litde remembered for its facts or holding. Carotene Products has 
had its greatest impact on modern equal protection jurisprudence 
through the ways subsequent Justices have interpreted its fourth 
footnote, which suggested that the Equal Protection Clause might 
the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057 (1990) (exploring the problem of trying to 
determine the appropriate level of generality at which to construe broad constitutional 
language arguably protecting implied fundamental rights). 
110. For example, in FCC v. League ofWomen Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984),Justices 
Brennan and Rehnquist argued over the extent to which Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), should have controlled. Justice Brennan read Regan as 
holding that Congress could choose, under its spending power, not to subsidize lobby-
ing activities of tax-exempt charitable organizations by prohibiting those groups from 
using tax-deductible contributions to support their lobbying efforts, but only if the stat-
ute provided the organizations some method to separate tax-deductible funds from non-
deductible funds. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 399-400. Justice Rehnquist read 
Regan as holding that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a funda-
mental right does not infringe the right," so that Congress could absolutely bar organi-
zations receiving federal funds from editorializing. Id. at 405-07 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 549). Subsequently, Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
lied on this latter language from Regan in his opinion for the Court in Rust v. Sullivan, 
Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (1991) (upholding federal regulations prohibiting counseling 
services that receive federal funds from mentioning abortion). 
Another recent example of a disagreement over the proper reading and application of 
a precedent is County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, Ill S. Ct. 1661 (1991), in which 
Justices O'Connor and Scalia disagreed over the definition of the term "promptly" as 
used by the Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975), to hold that officials 
must provide for a probable cause hearing "either before or promptly after [the] arrest" 
of a suspect. Justice O'Connor suggested that a judicial determination of"promptness" 
was sufficient to satisfy the Gerstein standard, Riverside, Ill S. Ct. at 1670, while Justice 
Scalia argued that tradition and current state practices suggested that "promptly" meant 
within 24 hours; id. at 1676-77 (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
111. In constitutional law, chronology of decision is of major significance, regardless 
of whether the order results from happenstance or from the Court's conscious choices in 
setting its agenda. The order in which decisions are made underlies the development of 
the common law and constitutional doctrine. See generally WELLINGTON, supra note 11, 
passim (arguing that the Supreme Court should continue to interpret the Constitution by 
common law principles, evolving its views over time and grounding them in experience). 
112. 304 u.s. 144 (1938). 
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protect "discrete and insular minorities" from adverse state ·regula-
tions.113 This footnote planted the idea that subsequent Courts de-
veloped into the doctrine that effectively granted different levels of 
protection under the Equal Protection Clause for different groups, 
depending on the relative degree of their powerlessness.ll4 
The major difference in the debates over the levels of generality at 
which to state rules of decision or original understanding is that 
judges can all agree on the authority of-precedents as a source of 
decisionmaking whereas they may not agree on the degr~e to which 
original understanding should constrain what they do. With the 
possible exception of the Supreme Court; all players in the legal 
system are bound mox:e stringently by a Supreme Court decision 
than they are bound by original understanding. This difference 
stems from the relatively strong respect for the Supreme Court as a 
critical interpreter of the Constitution itself, 115 as compared to the 
lesser degree of respect among judges and scpplars for, or consen-
sus on, the Framers' understanding of the constitutional text.116 
This difference in the debates over the level of generality at which 
. 1i3. Id. at 152 n.4; see afro J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83'NW. U. L:REv. 275, 281-82 
(1989) (suggesting that footnote four has taken on far greater significance than tlie origi-
nal holding of the case, despite the irony that the Co~rt's dramatic message regarding 
marginalization was itself marginalized into ·a footnote to the text of the opinion). An-
other prominent example of this phenomenon is Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 
U.S. 697 (1931), which has come to be genera!ly regarded as the first case holding prior 
restraints presumptively invalid. In fact, Near involved a slightly different question. In 
Near, the Court struck down the Minnesota Gag La\v authorizing a permanent injunction 
against any person engaged in the business of regularly publishing a "malicious, scan-
dalous and defamatory newspaper." Id. at 702. Although the Supreme Court reversed 
the Minnesota Supreme Court's affirmation of a permanent injunction against the publi-
cation of the Saturday Press, the letter's publisher, Jay Near, was not under a true prior 
restraint. First, there was no licensor whose approval needed to be obtai~ed prior to the 
publication. Second, there was an adversarial, not an ex parte, proceeding prior to any 
determination. Third, the Gag Law 'was aimed at providing a remedy for those libel 
plaintiffs suing impecunious publishers. . 
114. See jOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST! A THEORY OF jUDICIAL REVIEW 75-
77; 135-79 (1980) (explaining the relationship between footnote four and the theory of 
representation-reinforcement); Biilkin, supra note 113, at 301 (suggesting that, even 
when not invoked, the footnote can provide support for virtually all contemporary due 
process and equal protection decisions). But see Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene 
Products Reminiscence, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1100-05 (1982) (asserting that much of 
the. theoretical and judicial reliance on the footnote is based on overbroad or erroneous 
interpretations of its meaning). 
115. See supra note 53. 
116. Indeed,' the Justices themselves talk about respect for precedents in a way that 
they do not talk about original understanding. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 
2597, 2609 (1991) ("Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the even-
handed, predictable, and consistent development oflegal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process."); see afro Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
476 U.S. 747,786-87 (1986) (White,J., dissenting) (stating that "stare decisis is essential if 
case-by-case adjudication is to be reconciled with the principle of the rule of law, for 
when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases be-
comes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable re~ults"). 
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to state the rule of a case and original understanding has opera-
tional consequences for the ways the Justices treat precedents and 
original understanding. First, every court of law, including the 
Supreme Court, tries to reconcile its present decision with at least 
some precedents, whereas references in judicial decisionmaking to 
original understanding are less common. 117 The courts give more 
widespread deference to and discuss precedents more often than 
original understanding. Second, everyone agrees on what the text 
of a precedent is (if not what it means), though there is extensive 
dispute over which components of original understanding are rele-
vant to judicial decisionmaking.118 Any lawyer knows where to find 
the text of a specific decision, whereas the same cannot be said for 
original understanding. 
3. The Art of Weakening Precedents 
The Supreme Court can overturn or othenvise weaken precedents 
through explicit overrulings, overrulings sub silentio, or subsequent 
decisionmaking that narrows or distinguishes precedents to the 
point of practical nullification. 119 Neither the Court nor commenta-
tors have discussed fully the reasons for, or consequences of, the 
117. Two Supreme Court decisions explicitly endorsing recourse to the framers' in-
tent are Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
{19 How.) 393 (1856). But a more common phenomenon encountered when justices try 
to rely on original understanding is reflected in Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 
(1991), in which the majority split over the degree to which the original understanding 
showed that "the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality [of punishment] guar-
antee." Id. at 2686. On behalf of himself and Chief justice Rehnquist, justice Scalia 
found that all relevant historical materials indicated that the framers and ratifiers of the 
Eighth Amendment "chose ..• not to include within it the guarantee against dispropor-
tionate sentences that some state constitutions contained." Id. at 2696. Justice Scalia 
also found that many of the Court's precedents recognized this same principle. I d. at 
2699-702. 
On behalf of the four dissenters, however,Justice White argued that the evidence was 
not "strong enough to come close to proving an affirmative decision against the propor-
tionality component." Id. at 2710 (White,]., dissenting) (noting that a plain reading of 
the text of the Amendment and the Court's precedents supported the inclusion of a 
proportionality principle). 
This debate reflects two things. First, the common source of decision in justices 
White and Scalia's analysis was precedent. Seqmd, the justices encountered a common 
problem limiting the Court's reliance on historical data for its decisions: such data may 
often be inconclusive or indeterminate (or at least not overwhelmingly persuasive). 
118. Compare WELLINGTON, supra note 11, at 50-60 and Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
QJ.lestfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 205 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, 
The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 476 {1981) with RichardS. Kay, Adherence to 
the Original Intentions in ConstitutionalAcijudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 226, 230 (1988) and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evi~ 57 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 849, 856-65 (1989). 
119. Implicit overrulings or overrulings sub silentio occur when the Court suggests 
obliquely or by inference that some precedent(s) may no longer be viable. See, e.g., Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 {1989) {Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the Court can overrule prece-
dents either explicitly or sub silentio). Implicit overrulings and distinguishing cases dif-
fer in their respective practical effects: an implicitly overruled precedent no longer 
controls even the fact situation it initially purported to resolve, while a distinguished 
precedent at least retains sufficient vitality to resolve a fact situation identical to that 
which it originally settled. Sometimes the Court can cause confusion when the Court 
does not make clear whether it is distinguishing or implicitly overruling a precedent. 
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Court's choice of one of these methods. By weakening precedents 
through inconsistent means, the Court can confuse the public, the 
legal community, and subsequent Justices as to the status of, and its 
real intentions, regarding such decisions. 
There are, however, four interrelated factors that seem to influ-
ence the Justices' choice of a method to weaken precedents: {1) the 
mood and composition of the Court; (2) the.political climate or tim-
ing; (3) the subject matter; and (4) the facts of the case. Although 
some combination of these factors is usually at work when the Court 
weakex:ts precedents, it is possible to identify situations when at least 
one factor applies. 
a. The Effects of the Court's Mood and Composition 
Change in personnel on the Court is often the catalyst for overrul-
ings. New Justices may bring novel insights into old issues and 
sometimes help to bring about an unforeseen overruling. For ex-
ample, even though the Court upheld state laws mandating flag 
salutes in public schools in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 120 a 
change in personnel contributed to the Court's explicit overruling 
of Gobitis three years later in West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Bamette.12 1 
For example, the Court generated considerable confusion in a series of decisions involv-
ing whether private shopping centers could regulate political speech. See Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (reversing the conviction of a jehovah's Witness for 
distributing religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town); Amalga-
mated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) 
(holding that the prohibition of peaceful labor picketing of a store within a shopping 
center violated the First Amendment); lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (up-
holding a privately owned shopping center's prohibition of union picketing of a store on 
the premises); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (clarifying that Lloyd effectively 
had ove~led Logan Valley). · 
120. 310 u.s. 586 (1940). 
121. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). By the time the Court heard Barnette, Chief justice 
Hughes and justice McReynolds, both of whom had been in the Gobitis majority, retired 
from active service on the Court. justice Stone, who dissented in Gobitis, replaced the 
Chief Justice, while Robert jackson and Wiley Rutledge replaced Stone and McReyn-
olds, respectively, as Associate Justices. The new members of the Court, particularly 
justice jackson (who wrote for the majority in Barnette), convinced justices Douglas, 
Black, and Murphy that intervening events had proven that the political process could 
not represent fairly the interests of, or protect, the children of the plaintiff jehovah Wit-
nesses from violence. justices Black and Murphy each wrote separate concurrences to 
explain how their views had changed. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624 (Black,j., concurring); id. 
at 644 (Murphy,]., concurring). 
Another example of new Justices bringing new insight into old issues is Michelin Tire 
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), in which the Court overruled Low v. Austin, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871). In Michelin, the Justices decided that the original package 
doctrine set forth in Low (providing that all state taxes, however nondiscriminatory, were 
void if imposed on foreign imports before the package in which the goods arrived was 
broken or before actual sale or use, whichever occurred first) was nonsensical enough to 
modem minds to be abandoned. 
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The Legal Tender Cases 122 offer perhaps an even more dramatic ex-
ample of an overruling traceable to a change in personnel. In 1870, 
the Court ruled 5-3 in Hepburn v. Griswold 123 that paper money was 
unconstitutional. In the year following Hepburn, Justice Grier, who 
had been in the Hepburn m~ority, resigned and was replaced by Jus-
tice Strong, and the Congress added a ninth seat to the Court, filled 
by Justice Bradley. In 1871, Justices Strong and Bradley joined the 
three Hepburn dissenters (Justices Miller, Swayne, and Davis) in 
overruling Hepburn, prompting a heated dissent from Chief Justice 
Chase (who had writt~n the Court's opinion in Hepburn) charging, 
inter alia, that Hepburn was being overruled under the unprece-
dented circumstances in which none of the Justices who had partici-
pated in Hepburn had been persuaded in the meantime to vote 
differently on the constitutionality of paper money, and in which 
"the then majority find themselves in a minority on the court."124 
The Legal Tender Cases are only one illustration of the fact that it is 
not unusual for Presidents to appoint certain Justices for the pur-
pose of weakening, if not overruling, certain precedents. A vivid 
recent example of this phenomenon involves Roe v. Wade. 125 Both 
Presidents Reagan and Bush campaigned against Roe, and there has 
been widespread expectation that their appointments to the Court 
portend the end of Roe. In fact, Presidents Reagan and Bush have 
had the opportunity to replace five members of Roe's majority with 
their six appointments to the Court.t26 Not surprisingly, in Webster 
v. Reproductive Health Services, 127 three of President Reagan's appoin-
tees to the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy, voted to abandon Roe's trimester framework for measur-
ing the strength. of the state's interest in regulating abortions. 128 
More recently, in R'USt v. Sullivan, 129 Justice Brennan's replacement, 
Justice Souter, cast the crucial fifth vote to uphold federal regula-
tions prohibiting counseling services receiving federal funds from 
mentioning abortions. Both Webster and Rust have narrowed public 
access to abortions and have increased the States' ability to regulate 
abortion.130 
Similarly, Presidents Reagan and Bush both campaigned on the 
122. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 
U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). 
123. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). 
124. Knox, 79 U.S. at 572 (Chase, CJ., dissenting). 
125. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
126. President Reagan nominated Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and 
Anthony Kennedy to replace Justices Potter Stewart, William Rehnquist, and Lewis Pow-
ell, respectively; President Reagan also nominated justice Rehnquist to replace Chief 
Justice Warren Burger. President Bush nominated David Souter to replace justice Wil-
liam Brennan and Clarence Thomas to replace Justice Thurgood Marshall. Chiefjustice 
Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell had been in the m~ority in 
Roe, see id., while then-:Justice Rehnquist had dissented in Roe. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist,j., 
dissenting). 
127. 492 u.s. 490 (1989). 
128. /d. at 516-21. 
129. 111 S. Ct.1759 (1991). 
130. See, e.g., Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1784·86 (Blackmun,j., dissenting); n~bster, 492 U.S. 
at 537-38, 539 n.l, 554-56 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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need to appoint federaljudges who would be tougher on criminals, 
and, in three of the more important criminal procedure cases from 
the 1990 Term, their appointees to the Court cast the decisive votes 
to cut back or narrow the rights of criminal defendants. For exam-
ple, in Payne v. Tennessee, 131 President Reagan's and Bush's appoin-
tees to the Court uniformly agreed to join Justice White in 
overruling two recent precedents barring the admission of victim 
impact statements in the sentencing phase of capital trials. In 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 1s2 the five-member majority, all of whom had 
been appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush, agreed either to 
overrule or severely narrow a prior precedent applying proportion-
ality of punishment analysis to noncapital criminal sentences. In ad-
dition, in Arizona v. Fulminante, 133 Presidents Reagan and Bush's 
appointees again joined to implicitly overrule a prior ruling that au-
tomatically invalidated the criminal conviction of a defendant whose 
coerced confession had been admitted into evidence:· · 
In all of these cases-Webster,' 'Rust, Payne, Fulmi~ante, and Harme-
lin-spirited dissents charged the majorities ~th not having suffi-
ciently important and nonpolitic~ reasons for cutting back on prior 
decisions and for not deciding cases inctemen~ally.l34 Ironically, 
the conventional complaint about the W~rren Court's numerous de-
cisions overruling precedents is really a complaint about the Jus-
tices' failure to adopt a common law approach to constitutional 
adjudication, under which the Justices could have built upon their 
predecessors' experience and re~soning while maintaining a healthy 
degree of stability and continuity in constitutioncil.law.185 
When overrulings have been made possible only as the result of 
131. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 
(1989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). · 
132. Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (practically nullifying the Court's prior decision in Solem 
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983}). . 
133. 11 i S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (holding that the admission of a coerced confession does 
not require automatic reversal of a criminal conviction, thereby partially reversing Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (I967)). Justice Souter also·cast the critical fifth vote in 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991}, nullifying the Court's prior decision in 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (striking down a mandatory life sentence without 
parole), and he was a member of the six-person majority in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. 
Ct. 2597 (1991), which reversed Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, and Booth, 482 U.S. 496. 
134. See, e.g., Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619-25 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (accusing the ma-
jority of departing from an established precedent without "special justification"); Rust, 
Ill S. Ct. at 1786 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (The "majority [opinion] disregards estab-
lished principles of law and contorts this· Court's decided cases to arrive at its pre-
ordained result."); Hannelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2709-19 (White,J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the majority's decision effectively nullified a number of past cases without providing 
adequate justification for doing so); Webster, 492 U.S. 490, 552 (I989) (Blackmun,.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the majority's decision as " 'it-is-
so·because-we-say-so' jurisprudence," substituting brute force for reasoning). 
I35. See generally supra notes II, 24 & Ill and accompanying text (discussing the com-
mon law approach to constitutional adjudication). 
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the participation of new Justices, the new Justices are particularly 
susceptible to charges that they have abandoned the doctrinal ap-
proach to constitutional adjudication for no good (or new) reason, 
and they instead have exercised raw power to reject prior experi-
ence in favor of ruling in conformity with their political prefer-
ences.136 At least for the time being, this charge seems to have 
some merit because President Reagan's and Bush's appointees to 
the Court have strong conservative ideologies and have thus far 
generally followed them in voting to overrule or narrow several 
precedents conflicting with those ideologies.I37 
But changes in the composition of the Court do not, of course, 
invariably produce overrulings. Even though new Justices might 
have decided some precedents differently in the first instance, they 
begrudgingly may accept certain precedents as a permanent base-
line, 138 which, under certain circumstances, may even compel them 
to expand those decisions. For example, Minnick v. Mississippi 139 
surprised many critics expecting the Rehnquist Court to curtail Ed-
wards v. Arizona 140 and Miranda v. Arizona, 141 which had restricted 
police interrogation of criminal suspects whose legal counsel were 
not present throughout questioning. In fact, the Court expanded 
Edwards and Miranda by establishing a bright~line rule that once a 
detained suspect declines to talk to police without a lawyer, the po-
lice can never thereafter initiate questioning without the suspect's 
attorney present.I42 
136. See, e.g., Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshali,J., dissenting) ("Power, not reason, 
is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking .•.• Neither the law nor the facts 
supporting Booth and Gathers underwent any change in the last four years. Only the 
personnel of this Court did."); id. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Today's majority 
has obviously been moved by an argument that has strong political appeal but no proper 
place in a reasoned judicial opinion."). 
137. See Guido Calabresi, What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TIMES, july 28, 1991, at 
15 (criticizing the Court for following a "statist" ideology to enhance the power of gov-
ernment at the expense of individual liberty and, thus, to engage in behavior inconsis-
tent with "what a judicious moderate, or even conservative, judicial body should do"). 
138. See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (providing a general discussion of 
some of the conditions that immunize certain precedents from being overruled). 
139. Ill S. Ct. 486 (1990). 
140. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that once an accused requests counsel, officials 
may not reinitiate questioning until counsel has been made available to him). 
141. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that police must terminate interrogation of an ac-
cused in custody if the accused requests the assistance of counsel). 
142. See Ill S. Ct. 486 (1990). But cJ. McNeil v. Wisconsin, Ill S. Ct. 2204 (1991) 
(holding that neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment prohibits police ~rom question-
ing a man jailed for an armed robbery about an unrelated murder charge without his 
lawyer in the robbery case present). In two recent decisions, the Court has expanded 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause pro-
hibits prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike black jurors on the basis 
of their race). See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (hold-
ing that private lawyers in civil cases cannot exclude potential jurors because of their 
race); Powers v. Ohio, Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (holding that under the Equal Protection 
Clause a criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected 
through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors 
are the same race). 
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b. The Court's Sensitivity to Current Political Mores 
. 
The justices may be sensitive to the social disruption and political 
backlash that explicit overrulings might produce, and consequently 
opt for something less than an oytright overruling of a prec;edent 
·with which they disagree. In some significant ways, Brown v. Board of 
Education 143 illustrates this kind of sensitivity. The Court delayed 
oral argument in Brown until after the 1952 presiqeq.~al election to 
avoi.d having Brown become an issue in the election.l44 More impor-
tant, Brown did not explicitly overrule Plessy v. Ferguson, 145 in which 
the Court upheld segregation of the races in public transportation 
as long as the separate facilities were equal. Rather, the Court in 
Brown implicitly abandoned its prior pJ;actice of allowing separate 
but equal facilities in public education, with the effects of (1) par-
tially deflecting controversy over precisely how much the Court 
would undo segregation outside the public school context; (2) ad-
hering to the Court's practice of issuing sepat?-te lines of decision 
on segregation in public schools and in other areas such as public 
transportation;146 and (3) suggesting that the stigma from segrega-
tion in education had more severe, immediate, and lasting conse-
quences on its victims than those on the victims of segregation in 
other areas.l4 '1 In short, the ·writing of Brown reflects many of the 
Justices' concerns about the propriety of overruling Plessy while at 
the same time taking a stand against segregation in public 
education.148 • 
143. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
144. See KLUGER, supra note 51, at 539. · 
145. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). But cJ. Israel, supra note 25, at 214 n.15 (suggesting that 
Brown overruled Plessy). 
146. Compare Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (ordering the admission of a 
black student to a white law school because there was no substantially equal black law 
school in the same state); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 
U.S. 637 (1950) (holding unconstitutional a state's practice of admitting a black student 
into an all white school but separating him physically from the other students) and Sipuel 
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (holding that a state was constitutionally 
obliged to provide a black student with an equal legal education) with Henderson v. 
United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (holding that the rules and practices of a railway to 
separate black and white diners violated a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act 
prohibiting any railroad from subjecting any person to pr«tiudice) and Buchanan v. 
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that a statute prohibiting blacks from occupying a 
residence in a block where the m~ority of the houses were occupied by whitell, and vice 
versa, violated the Fourteenth Amendment). · 
147. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (acknowledging that "education is perhaps the most im-
portant function of state and local governments"). Interestingly, in a series of terse per 
curiam opinions handed down in the years immediately after Brown, the Court held un-
constitutional segregation in a wide \oariety of other public facilities. See, e.g., Gayle v. 
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 
879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 
U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches and bathhouses). 
148. Of course, the hesitancy to overrule Plessy was not just a concern about timing. 
It also derived from a concern about substance. Indeed, justice Douglas noted in his 
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c. Perennial Controversy as a Deterrent to Explicit Overrulings 
In his excellent 1988 study on constitutional stare decisis, Profes-
sor Henry Monaghan wondered about, but did not reach any finn 
conclusion regarding, the role that precedent should play in the 
Court's decisionmaking when ':_judicial closure" is not likely with re-
spect to contested areas of constitutionallaw.l49 Not surprisingly, 
precedent seems to be particularly unstable in disputed areas. For 
example, in such perennially contested areas of constitutional law as 
affirmative action, 150 church-state relations, 151 criminal proce-
dure, 152 and hate speech, 158 the Court occasionally has overruled 
itself during the past two or three decades but repeatedly has shifted 
directions and established new lines of decision by distinguishing 
autobiography that had the Court decided Brown when it was first argued in 1952, the 
decision would have been 5-4 to uphold Plessy. DouGLAS, supra note 93, at 113. 
149. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 746. 
150. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (listing recent affirmative action prece-
dents and noting the perennial division of the Court on the issue). 
151. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's consistently in-
consistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
152. Compare supra note 35 and accompanying text (listing certain expansive Warren 
Court precedents left untouched by the Burger and Rehnquist courts) with notes 38-41 
and accompanying text (discussing the Court's willingness to revisit many criminal pro-
cedure precedents). 
153. Although the Court has recently agreed to hear R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S. 
Ct. 2795 (1991) (granting certiorari to consider whether a city ordinance violates the 
First Amendment by criminalizing the use of symbols, graffiti, or other objects that 
would arouse "anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, 
religion or gender"), it has been unclear whether the government may regulate offensive 
expression directed at, and harmful to, the status of certain social groups. For example, 
not everyone agrees that New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), implicitly 
overruled Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952), in which the Court upheld a 
"group libel" statute that criminalized the speech of any person who "exposes the citi-
zens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). Yet the 
Court has relied on Beauharnais on at least two occasions. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (citing Beauharnais to show that some 
content-based regulation of speech is permissible); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
763-64 {1982) (citing Beauharnais as an example of one type of speech that is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment). Moreover, Beauharnais is a source of much of the grow-
ing commentary favoring regulations of racist and sexist hate speech. See, e.g., Richard 
Delgado, Legal Theory: Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 343, 376 {1991) (arguing that Beauharnais may remain a viable source of au-
thority for regulating hate speech); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431,464 n.120 (acknowledging "com-
pelling arguments ... for the continued viability of Beauharnais") (citation omitted). 
In addition, the Court held that fighting words are not constitutionally protected in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), which the Court subsequently nar-
rowed in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974) (stating that words 
conveying or intended to convey disgrace do not necessarily constitute fighting words); 
Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 3 (1973) (per curiam) (striking down as over-
broad a statute prohibiting a person from abusing another by using menacing, insulting, 
slanderous, or profane language); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522-24 (1972) 
{striking down as overbroad a statute that prohibited people from using insulting lan-
guage that tended to breach the peace against another). For a further illustration of the 
confusion in the case law on hate speech, compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971) {holding that a state could not prohibit the use of profanity expressed as part of a 
message critical of·government) with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) 
{holding that the government could prohibit using certain words on the radio through 
reasonable content-neutral regulations}. 
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precedents (sometimes on dubious bases). These "fluctuations sug-
gest that agreement even about the basic concepts has been so un-
likely in these areas that consensus on something as extreme as an 
explicit overruling is even rarer. Thus, there is no guarantee that 
the changes in these four areas represent anything more than the 
continuation, rather than the resolution, of the underlying political 
and legal conflicts. 
As a normative matter, though, it is important to understand the 
benefits and the costs of continued instability in certain areas of con-
stitutional law. The principal benefits are: first, some groups might 
feel as if they are part of an ongoing debate in the Supreme Court 
on the issues involved; and second, the Court appears sensitive to 
the social consequences of doctrinal shifts in these areas and to new 
arguments and the lessons of history. 
The costs of instability in persistently contested areas of constitu-
tional law, however, affect both the Court and the citizenry. First, 
the Court might appear indecisive or incapable of asserting a lasting 
leadership role in resolving these tough questions. Second, the 
Court's fluctuations create uncertainty in many people about their 
individual rights in these areas. This uncertainty can be particularly 
problematic because these four areas-affirmative action, church-
state relations, criminal procedur!e, hate speech-involve some of 
the most intimate and sensitive ways people interact with their 
government. 
A particularly controversial example of a case ill1;1strating the costs 
of the Court's failure to reach 'judicial closure" is Roe v. Wade.t54 
Whatever th.e merits of Roe, it has never stabilized; from the begin-
ning it has been criticized by a wide spectru~ of politicians and 
scholars, 155 and has been the subject of constant challenges. In re-. 
cent years, the Court formally has rejected invitations to overrule 
Roe, 1~6 even while gradually dissecting it.157 Indeed, this incremen-
tal dismantling is precisely the fate that Justice Scalia predicted for 
Roe in spite of his own statec:\ .preference to explicitly overrule the 
154. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
155. Critics on the right include RoBERT BORK, supra note 12, at 111-17; and Michael 
W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transfonning Moral Convictions into Law, 98 
YALE LJ. 1501, 1539-41 (1989) (book review). Critics on the left include MICHAEL]. 
PERRY, MoRALITY, PoLITics, AND l..Aw 172-78 (1988); ARcHIBALD Cox, THE RoLE oF THE 
SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-14 (1976); and john H. Ely, The Wages of 
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973). 
156. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983). 
157. See supra notes 125-30 and i1![ra notes 218-27 and accompanying text (describing 
many of the precedents arguably narrowing Roe). 
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It is difficult to see much of an upside to Roe's prolonged instabil-
ity. Most of the people involved in the public and legal debate 
about Roe's future feel strongly about the need for the Court (1) to 
protect women's unfettered discretion to make decisions about what 
to do with their bodies, (2) to restore an important principle of fed-
eralism under which the elected branches assume the responsibility 
for regulating or permitting abortions, or (3) to recognize abortion 
as the moral equivalent of murder.159 Moreover, the uncertainty 
about Roe's future raises profound questions about precedent: are 
the reasons for Roe's instability unique, and, if so, why. Alterna-
tively, if Roe's fate is not unusual, to what extent can people ever feel 
secure that the Court will adhere to its rights-granting decisions. 
Whatever happens to Roe, its fate will serve as an excellent illus-
tration of the problems that controversial precedents can cause for 
the Court. Roe's subsequent judicial treatment has been and will 
continue to be a microcosm of how a number of themes involving 
precedent interact, including changes in the Court's personnel, sub-
stantive differences of opinion over the merits of a decision, the in-
fluence of politics and public opinion, and the consequences of not 
having judicial closure on a significant social problem.160 
d. Weakening Precedents Through Distinctions 
A common way to determine the scope of a rule oflaw announced 
by the Court is to test the degree to which it can or should control 
factual situations similar to, but not precisely the same as those in 
the original decision. It is routine for the Court to develop or probe 
a constitutional principle through a series of similar identical cases. 
Sometimes this kind of decisions can set the stage for explicit 
158. Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Of course, Justice Marshall's departure from the Court makes it more likely that 
Roe could be overruled rather than eviscerated. But whichever of these two fates is in 
store for Roe will depend on the prevailing Justices' attitudes about Roe as a precedent. 
Assuming arguendo Justice Scalia's prediction is correct and the Court incrementally 
shifts the forum of dialogue about abortion from the federal courts to the legislatures, 
then Roe's dismantling would resemble the shifts in other, perennially divisive areas. See 
supra notes 35, 43 & 98. It would also resemble the fate of Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905), whose recognition of an implied fundamental right to contract was dis-
placed by the Court in a series of decisions that ultimately shifted debate about the 
propriety of regulating private economic interests from federal court to state legisla-
tures. See generally Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987) 
(describing Lochner's decline as a precedent but its persistence as an idea). Chief justice 
Rehnquist routinely has urged the same kind of reasoning-recognizing a right or inter-
est but treating it as not fundamental-in the abortion cases that the Court used to 
displace Lochner. See infra note 265. 
159. See LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (discussing 
the difficulty of finding the proper forum for meaningful dialogue about abortion, given 
the strong differences people have about the subject); cJ. Gumo CALABRESI, IDEALS, BE· 
LIEFS, AlTITUDES, AND THE LAw 98 (1985) (arguing that the problem with Roe is that the 
Court should have acknowledged the claims and feelings of antiabortionists as a legiti-
mate voice in the community, even while proclaiming that they could not override the 
liberty interests of women choosing to pursue abortions). 
160. See infra notes 215-306 and accompanying text (discussing the attitudes of indi-
vidual Justices toward precedents with which they disagree). 
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overrulings. For example, the Court explicitly overruled National 
League of Cities v. Usery 16 1 in Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit Authority 162 
only after deciding several cases that progressively undermined Na-
tional League of Cities. 163 These decisions highlighted the degree to 
which National League of Cities had deviated from the Court's inter-
vening rulings upholding congressional enactments under the Com-
merce Clause in spite of their arguable impact on traditional state 
activities. Indeed, in overruling the Court's 1968 decision in Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 164 National League of Cities became the first case in forty 
years to invalidate a congressional enactment pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause.165 In the nine years between National League of Cities 
and Garcia, in four decisions the central issue was the applicability of 
National League of Cities' rule prohibiting the federal government 
from regulating traditional state functions under the Commerce 
Clause; 166 the Court, however, did not grant states immunity from 
federal regulation in any of those cases. Consequently, those rul-
ings destabilized National League of Cities. 167 Although the Court 
could have kept distinguishing and na~owing National League of Cities 
in its Commerce Clause decisions, overruling National League of Cities 
161. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that the Tenth Amendment protected the States' 
traditional functions from being impaired by Congress' attempt to use its Commerce 
Clause power to apply the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and mu-
nicipal employees). 
162. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that Congress has the power under the Com-
merce Clause to apply the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and mu-
nicipal employees). 
163. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (holding that the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, enacted under Congress' commerce power, could be applied to 
state and local employees); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S .. 742 (1982) (upholding the 
application of the federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies to the States); United Trans. 
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (holding that the Tenth Amendment did 
not prohibit application of the Railway Labor Act to state-owned railroads because oper-
ation of these railroads was not clearly a traditional state function); Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding application of the 
federal Surface Mining and Reclamation Control Act of 1977 to the States as a valid 
exercise of the Commerce Clause). 
164. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding the application of amendments to the Fair La-
bor Standards Act to state employees under Congress' Commerce Clause power). 
165. For commentaries describing National League of Cities as an aberration from the 
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Martha A. Field, Comment: Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority! The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 84, 85-87 (1985) (challenging the rationale in, and the States' need for, National 
League of Cities); Philip P. Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare Decisis and the Overruling of 
National League of Cities, 2 CaNST. CoMM. 341 (1985) [hereinafter Frickey, Further Com-
ment] (emphasizing National League of Cities' weaknesses as a precedent); PhilipP. Frickey, 
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CoNST. CoMM. 
123, 129-32 (1985) [hereinafter Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases] (highlighting 
the weak reasoning and lack of respect for precedent exhibited in National League of Cities 
as important factors making it a weak precedent). 
166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
167. See Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare Decisis, supra note 165, at 345-46; Frickey, 
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, supra note 165, at 132-38. 
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ironically demonstrated some respect for precedent, because reaf-
firming the core principles of National League of Cities in Garcia would 
have compelled the Court to weaken the series of decisions leading 
up to Garcia. 16B 
Sometimes, however, the Court can destroy a precedent without 
overruling it by distinguishing precedents in ways that practically 
nullify them, thereby obscuring the differences between distinctions 
and implicit overrulings. 169 The Court's decisions on proportional-
ity of punishment present such a quandary. In 1980, Rummel v. Es-
telle170 held by a 5-4 vote that Texas' statutory requirement of 
mandatory life sentence for a defendant convicted of three felonies, 
consisting in that case of fraudulent practices cumulatively depriv-
ing people of property totaling less than two hundred dollars, did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment. But this holding cast doubt on the validity of 
the Court's prior practice of applying, beyond the death penalty 
context, the standard that the Eighth Amendment prohibited impo-
sition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of 
the crime.I71 
Subsequently, the Court by a 5-4 vote in Solem v. Helm 172 struck 
168. Two of the dissenters in Garcia, however, made clear their intention to overrule 
Garcia as soon as they could command five votes. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). In one recent decision, the Court may 
have begun to take its first step in retreat from Garcia. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. 
Ct. 2395 (1991) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply 
to a state's mandatory retirement provisions applying to appointed state judges on the 
ground that, inter alia, those provisions fell into exemptions for "appointee[s] on a poli-
cymaking level" and intruded on matters of a "fundamental sort for a sovereign entity"). 
169. The slight differences between cases, however, might lead the Court to define 
the outer limits of a rule it has formulated previously. For example, in Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited search-
ing a person's home for obscene materials, but, in Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 
(1990), the Court held Stanley did not apply to the possession of child pornography. 
A variation occurs when the Court claims to be relying on a precedent in a decision 
but is, in fact, mischaracterizing it for the purpose of weakening it. For example, in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the Court did not overrule, but grossly mis-
characterized, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), as having "fashioned the 
principle that the constitutional guarantee[] offree speech ... do[es] not permit a State 
to forbid ... advocacy of the use offorce or oflaw violation except where such advocacy 
is directed to incit[e] or produc[e] imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 & n.2. In fact, Dennis had upheld the 
federal antisubversive law, the Smith Act, under a test that required the Court to "ask 
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion 
offree speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 341 U.S. at 510 (citation omitted). 
Nevertheless, subsequent to Brandenburg, the Court relied on Dennis on at least one occa-
sion. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (1976). Even more surpris-
ing may be that after Brandenburg explicitly overruled Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
357 (1927), the Court subsequently relied on justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney, 
id. at 377 (Brandeis,]., concurring), even as recently as Texas v.johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
419 (1989). 
170. 445 u.s. 263 (1980). 
171. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372, 377, 380 (1910) (striking down a 
penalty for falsifying a public record that included a twelve-year prison term with "acces-
sories" or "accompaniments" such as hard labor while chained). 
172. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In an intervening case, Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 
( 1982), the Court upheld a sentence offorty years' imprisonment and a $20,000 fine for 
possession of marijuana with intent to sell. /d. at 371. 
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down a punishment scheme almost identical to Rummel, except that 
Solem involved a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of 
parole. Justice Blackmun was the swing vote in Solem, but he did not 
write an opinion. Rather, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in 
Solem was virtually identical to his Rummel dissent, prompting the 
dissenters in Solem to claim that Rummel was being overruled sub 
silentio.173 
In Harmelin v. Michigan, 174 the Court recently tried to resolve the 
confusion Rummel and Solem had generated. The five-member ma-
jority upheld Michigan's imposition of a mandatory life sentence 
without parole for drug possession but split over how to deal with 
Solem. While ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Scalia argued that 
Solem should be overruled because it embodied an unworkable stan-
dard and was inconsistent with prior decisions and original in-
tent, 175 Justice Kennedy in a separate concurrence (joined by 
Justices Souter and O'Connor) refused the entreaty to overrule So-
lem and instead tried to reconcile Solem and Harmelin on the ground 
that the Eighth Amendment "forbids only. extreme sentences that 
are 'grossly disproportionate to the crime.' "176 
In summary, the degree to which the Court weakens precedents in 
unpredictable ways can reflect the Court's flexibility. Indeed, this 
flexibility is not necessarily undesirable because most observers 
would prefer the Justices to be sensitive to changes in social condi-
tions and to new arguments, while maintaining a healthy respect for 
stability and for the past. These debates ·will persist unless and until 
precedents become practically immune to overruling.t77 
4. The Confusion over the Criteria for Overrulings 
Even if all the Justices agree that they should reconsider a prior 
ruling, they may disagree on the appropriate criteria or standards 
for making such a determination. In his classic 1963 study on over-
ruling, Professor Jerrold Israel argued that the reasons given by the 
Justices for overruling prior cases fell into three categories: 
changed cond,itions, the lessons of experience (including un-
workability), and conflicting precedents.178 As a descriptive matter, 
173. Solem, 463 U.S. at 304 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (complaining that "[a]lthough 
to day's holding cannot rationally be reconciled with Rummel, the Court does not purport 
to overrule Rummel"). 
174. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
175. /d. at 2683-96. 
176. /d. at 2702, 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (citation omitted). 
177. See supra notes 73-~7 and accompanying t~xt. . 
178. See Israel, supra note 25, at 219-23 (observmg that these are the three most sig-
nificant bases on which the Court overrules precedents). For example, the Court relied 
on changed circumstances in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 233, 239 (1851) (stressing that the definition of"public rivers" in Article III had 
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the Court has, both before and after Professor Israel's article, gener-
ally grounded its overrulings on one or more of these reasons.179 
Moreover, these reasons generally reflect the Court's established 
practice· to ground its overrulings on the erroneous reasoning of the 
prior decision and some other substantial consideration such as the 
proven unworkability of that decision. 
Professor Israel, however, failed to account for the inapplicability 
of these reasons to the numerous cases in which the Court has over-
ruled itself in a short period of time.l80 In addition, the Court's 
stated reasons do not necessarily fully explain certain overrulings. 
For example, Justice Blackmun was the swing vote in .both National 
League of Cities v. Usery 181 and Garcia v. San Antonio Mass Transit Au-
thority, 182 and it was his belief that National League of Cities proved 
itself unworkable that became the Court's rationale in Garcia. 1as 
The four other Justices who joined his opinion in Garcia, however, 
joined at least in part because they believed National League of Cities 
simply had been decided wrongly as evidenced by their dissents in 
National League of Cities. 184 
As a normative matter, these criteria might be criticized for being 
changed), to overrule The Steamboat Thomas jefferson, 23 U.S. (12 How.) 428 (1825). 
The Court relied on the lessons of experience in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 
(1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the States}, to overrule Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 
455 (1942); and in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1978) (declaring that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when a state appeals from a decision in favor of 
the defendant when the defendant sought termination of the proceeding on a basis 
other than guilt or innocence), to overrule United States v.Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975}. 
The Court relied on inconsistent precedents in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 
297, 305-06 (1976) {holding that a grandfather clause permitting pushcart vendors with 
eight years' operation to continue was valid under the Equal Protection Clause), to over-
rule Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957}; and in Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington 
State Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 252 (1987} (holding that a Washington 
state business and occupation tax on manufacturing discriminated against interstate 
commerce), to overrule General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964). 
179. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
180. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that police can 
search even closed containers in a car's trunk whenever a police officer has reasonable 
cause to suspect that the car contains contraband), overruling Robbins v. California, 453 
U.S. 420 (1981}; United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (holding that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the state appeals from a judgment in the defend-
ant's favor when the defendant had tried to terminate the proceedings on a basis other 
than guilt or innocence), overruling United States v.Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975}; United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950} (holding that a warrantless search, conducted 
as incidental to the defendant's arrest, was reasonable and valid, even though the of-
ficers had time to procure a warrant prior to the arrest and search), overruling Trupiano 
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) 
(overturning the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting without a permit), 
overruling Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942}; Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 
(1871} (upholding the constitutionality of paper money), overruling Hepburn v. Gris-
wold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). 
181. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
182. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
183. Id. at 531. 
184. See National League if Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Brennan,J.,joined by White,J., and 
Marshall,]., dissenting); id. at 880 (Stevens,J., dissenting). In addition, one could spec-
ulate that the real explanation for any inconsistencies between Solem v. Helm, ~63 U.S. 
277 (1983), and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), turns on the undisclosed rea-
sons for justice Blackmun's casting the critical fifth vote in both cases, in neither of 
which did he write an opinion. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text. 
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manipulated too easily to produce overrulings or refusals to over-
rule. For example, some Justices have argued that changed condi-
tions should have led the Court to overrule its precedents 
upholding the death penalty, while other Justices have argued that 
changed conditions are better taken into account by legislatures in 
the process of designing punishment schemes.1s5 
Inconsistent precedents also have not invariably produced over-
rulings. For example, they have not produced ~xplicit overrulings 
in the area of separation of powers, in which the Court repeatedly 
has used inconsistent methodologies, 186 or under the religion 
clauses, in which the Court's shifts perennially defy explanation.l87 
Nor is there consensus on what would qualify as a lesson of expe-
rience requiring an explicit overruling. For example, even though 
Justice Lewis Powell joined the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick 1ss to 
uphold criminal prosecution of persons engaging in consensual ho-
mosexual sodomy, he admitted after his retirement from the Court 
that he had been mistaken to join the Bowers m~ority because he 
had underestimated the harm that Bowers would cause homosexu-
als.189 Yet none of the other members of the Bowers majority nor 
185. Compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (holding that 
mandatory death sentences violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment because "evolving standards of decency respecting the imposition 
of punishment in our society • • • conclusively point to the repudiation of automatic 
death sentences") and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (striking down the death 
penalty, in part, as violative of contemporary sense of decency), with Walton v. Arizona, 
110 S. Ct. 3047, 3067 (1990) (Scalia,j., concurring) ("It is quite immaterial that most 
states have abandoned the practice of automatically sentencing to death all offenders 
guilty of a capital crime(;] still less is it relevant that mandatory capital sentencing is (or 
alleged to be) out of touch with •contemporary community values' regarding the admin-
istration of justice."); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283-84 (1980) (then-
Justice Rehnquist arguing that changed conditions should not influence the Court, but 
rather should guide legislative decisions on the propo.rtionality of punishment). 
186. Compare Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement 
of Aircraft Noise, Ill S. Ct. 2298 (1991) (striking down as violative of separation of 
powers Congress' conditioning of the transfer of control over Washington area airpQrts 
to the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority on the creation of a Board of Re-
view partially composed of Congressmen with veto power over the decisions of the di-
rectors of the Authority) and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that 
Congress cannot confer certain executive functions over the budgetary process on offi-
cials within its removal power), with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding 
Congress' delegation of the executive function of criminal prosecution to an individual 
not formally associated with any of the three branches). See generally Peter L. Strauss, 
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Qpestions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 
CoRNELL L. REv. 488 (1987} (critiquing the fundamentally incompatible methodologies 
used by the Court in several recent separation of powers decisions). 
187. See supra note 43. 
188. 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986} (Poweli,J., concurring). 
189. See Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. PoST, Oct. 26, 1990, at 
A3. Similarly, ChiefJustice Warren and Justice Douglas let it be known after their retire-
ments that they each had regretted their efforts (Warren as California's Attorney Gen-
eral and Douglas as a Justice) to support the internment ofJapanese-Americans during 
World War II, which had been upheld in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
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any of the Justices who have been appointed to the Court since Jus-
tice Powell seem disposed to leam the same lesson he did from the 
aftermath of Bowers. t9o 
Nevertheless, although the criteria discussed above may mean dif-
ferent things to different Justices, this may not be a problem but 
rather a function of conscientious disagreements among the Jus-
tices. In this regard, .Professor Israel's categories of reasons for 
overrulings may not be any more difficult to apply or follow than 
any other standard the Court tries to use. 
Perhaps as an altemative to (or an expansion of) the criteria often 
followed by the Justices in making overruling decisions, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist declared in Payne v. Tennessee 191 that the Court's two 
prior decisions on victim impact statements deserved less than the 
usual deference owed to constitutional precedents because they 
were both decided by 5-4 votes with vigorous dissents and that the 
Court's practice has been to overrule prior decisions when those de-
cisions "are unworkable or are badly reasoned."192 He then cited 
thirty-three decisions in twenty Terms to support his statement.l93 
There are three serious problems with the Chief Justice's state-
ments regarding the deference to precedent and the Court's tradi-
tional approach to precedent. First, he misstated the Court's past 
practice. Perhaps as few as four of the thirty-three opinions cited by 
the Chief Justice-all four of which he had written himself-in-
volved the Court's overruling of some prior decision(s) on the sole 
basis of the precedent having been reasoned badly.194 The remain-
ing twenty-nine opinions, including two authored by then-:Justice 
Rehnquist, appear to ground the overruling on the bases of errone-
ous reasoning and the unworkability or outmoded nature of the 
overruled precedent or the existence of subsequent, inconsistent 
case law. 
Second, if adopted by a majority of the Court, the Chief Justice's 
(1944). See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PuBuc LIFE 75-77 (1982) (describing 
how Chief justice Warren later came to regret the role he had played in the internment 
of japanese-Americans); DouGLAS, supra note 93, at 39 (expressing regret for his being 
part of the Korematsu majority). Ironically, none of these disclaimers has ever led the 
Court to overrule itself on the issues in question. The reason for this is that the critical 
measure of whether precedents matter in constitutional decisionmaking is the degree to 
which the persons currendy sitting on the Court respect a prior decision. 
190. Similarly, the plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 
490, 516-19 (1989), pointed to the lessons of experience as demonstrating the un-
workability of Roe's framework for measuring the strength of the state's interest in regu-
lating abortions, while justice O'Connor argued in concurrence that the Court in Webster 
need only decide whether the constitutionality of the specific regulations at issue could 
be evaluated within Roe's framework. /d. at 525-30 (O'Connor, j., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
191. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
192. /d. at 2609. 
193. /d. at 2610 & n.l. 
194. Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2723 (1990) (overruling Thompson v. 
Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), and Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883)); Daniels v. Wil-
liams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-31 (1986) (overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)); 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,852-55 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)); Edelman v.jordan, 415 U.S. 651,671 (1974) (overruling in 
part Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). 
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criterion of "bad" reasoning clearly would wreak ·havoc on the legal 
system because it easily can be manipulated and abused. Given the 
current Court's lack of ideologkal balance, 195 it probably would be 
some time before a majority of the Justices even acknowledged that 
any argument except for one supporting their conservative viewpoint 
on a constitutional issue was persuasive or that the reasoning of 
some prior decision is wrong but respectable enough for them to 
leave it alone. Because it is not hard for intelligent Justices (particu-
larly if they share strong views about how the Constitution should 
be interpreted) to find some fault with a cons"titutional precedent, it 
is likely that if they were to follow the Chief Justice's criterion for 
overruling, they could overrule numerous precedents.196 
Third, the argument that 5-4 decisions with vigorous dissents are 
entitled to less than the usual (low) level of deference given to con-
stitutional precedents is inimical to the rule. of law in our society. 
These decisions state rules of law, no more nor less than any of the 
other of the Court's decisions. Moreover, many of the Court's 5-4 
decisions (for example, Knox v. Lee, 19 7 Miranda v. Arizona, 198 West Vir-
ginia Board of Education v. Barnette 199) practically are immune to re-
consideration or overruling, even though they included vigorous 
dissents. It would disrupt our legal system severely for anyone on 
or off the Court to treat a 5-4 ·vote with a vigorous dissent as a rule 
oflaw entitled to less respect from the Court and other.govemment 
decisionmakers than any of the Court's other constitutional law 
decisions. 20o 
Regardless of the criteria that the Court uses for making overrul-
ing decisions, the Court's explanations for those decisions cannot 
reasonably be expected to be consistent with each other. The rea-
sons ·given for explicit overrulings may change with the Justices and 
the kinds of cases heard. The more variables involved in the deci-
sionmaking process, .the less likely it is that any clear signal \vill 
emerge regarding the Justices' collective· attitude about any one fac-
tor. Nevertheless, a mqre comple.te picture of the role of precedent 
. . ., 
195. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Rehnquist Ascendancy: Marshall's VISion-and the E11d of 
Cottrt-Led Refonn, WAsH. PoST, June 30, 1991, at C1 (commenting on the consequences 
of Justice Marshall's departure as depriving the Court of its only consistently strong 
voice for social justice); Edwin M. Yoder, The Rehnquist Ascendancy: The Radical Agenda of a 
Triumphant Chief justice, WASH. PoST, June 30, 1991, at Cl (arguing that Justice Marshall's 
resignation ensures the transformation of the Court from the protector of individual 
liberties to the guarantor of governmental power). 
196. See supra note 44 {listing the decisions labeled by Justice Marshall as "endan-
gered" in his dissent in Payne). 
197. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871): 
198. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
199. 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
200. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2625-27 (1991) (Stevens, j., 
dissenting). 
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in the Court's decisionmaking emerges from Part III's analysis of 
the Justices' individual attitudes toward precedent. 
IlL The justices' Individual Approaches to Precedent 
This Part first examines the implications of focusing on the de-
gree to which precedents matter as a source of decision to each Jus-
tice. It then describes and critiques the different ways the Justices 
individually factor precedents into their decisionmaking. 
A. The Implications of Focusing on the justices' Individual Approaches to 
Precedent 
Critics complaining about the Court's inconsistencies in its review 
of its prior decisions often mistakenly assume that the Court can act 
as if it were a single person capable of making perfectly coherent 
and consistent decisions.201 Although it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to replicate the ways newly developed interpretive tech-
niques· such as public choice theory,2o2 chaos theory,2o3 or legal 
pragmatism,204 can be applied to explain the Court's decisions, it is 
significant that each of these techniques points to the same result: 
when institutions make decisions by majority vote, the majority will 
201. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 20; Moore, supra note 26; Munzer & Nickel, supra note 
49. 
202. Public choice theory has been used mosdy to explain congressional decision-
making. See William M. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice 
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 285 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip 
P. Frickey, The jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 908-11 (1987);Jerry L. 
Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
115, 150-60 (1989); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democ-
racy: Social Choice TheoT)~ Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2121, 
2139-40, 2212-13 (1990). For applications of public choice theory to judicial decision-
making, see Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 425-26; Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 811-31; 
Farago, supra note 26, at 229-31. Each of these latter commentaries has shown that 
multimembered courts produce inconsistent decisions because their members have dif-
ferent orderings of preferences. Moreover, the periodic changes in the composition of 
the Court exacerbates the inconsistencies, because the new members will introduce into 
the decisionmaking process different orderings of choices or preferences from those 
previous members had accepted or acted upon. 
203. For a discussion of chaos theory and constitutional decisionmaking, see Glenn 
H. Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 110 (1991) (arguing that the ways 
chaos theory demonstrates order within the apparent disorder of the universe can also 
clarify the chaos that seemingly characterizes the Court's constitutional decisionmak-
ing); cJ. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn 
from Modem Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989) (suggesting that just as classical constitu-
tional thought was strongly influenced by Newtonian paradigms of clockwork precision, 
regularity, and objectivity, so modern constitutional thought might gain from an appre-
ciation of certain post-Newtonian concepts). 
204. The notions that the Justices bring complex agendas to each case they decide 
and that their decisions incorporate their attitudes about precedents is consistent with 
recent work about legal pragmatism. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 
100 YALE LJ. 409 {1990) {critiquing legal pragmatism as an effort to return experience, 
practice, and common sense to legal thinking); Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 
MICH. L. REv. 104, 117 (1989) (suggesting that pragmatism encourages judges to decide 
which policies or results will achieve justice); see also Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism 
and The Co11Slitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1343 {1988) (making the case for greater 
judicial reliance on common sense and legal tradition as opposed to global theories in 
constitutional analysis}. 
114 (VOL. 60:68 
The Role of Precedent 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
generate logically inconsistent results unless the voters have very 
similar preferences. This proposition holds true for the Supreme 
Court, which over time will produce precedents whose reasoning 
and/or holdings will be inconsistent ·with each other. 
As an alternative to the traditional efforts to reconcile the Court's 
rulings on constitutional stare decisis, these techniques suggest that 
a particularly effective measure of the role of precedent in the 
Court's decisionmaking is to compare and contrast the degree to 
which eachJustice consistently follows a coherentjurisprudence on 
constitutional stare decisis. Because each Justice has discretion over 
her votes and decisions, their performance can be judged on the 
basis of the tendency of their respective choices to expand or con-
tract precedents. 
One can argue, however, that the practice of the Justices to oper-
ate as coalitions on the Court makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
isolate the expressed or preferred principles of individual Jus-
tices.205 This view posits that these principles become submerged 
in the inevitable bargaining process that enables the Court to re-
solve a case. In other words, the real opinions of the Justices may be 
obscured by the deals made on the Court. 
Although it may be true that focusing on the voting patterns of 
each Justice may not reveal much conclusive evidence about their 
attitude toward a matter not explicitly discussed in the Court's opin-
ion, that insight does point to something important about the 
weight of precedents in the Justices' decisionmaking: that prece-
dents can be counterbalanced by other considerations, such as the 
desire to form coalitions. 2°6 Of equal importance is the fact that 
precedents do make a discernible difference, as evidenced by the 
criti~al roles they can play behind the scenes in framing the Court's 
agenda2°7 and in the Justices' dialogues about the degree of defer-
ence they each should have for the Court's previous constitutional 
judgments. 208 
If one seriously were interested in increasing tJJ:e Court's respect 
for precedents, the solution may not be to have greater candor2°9 or 
205. See Tushnet, supra note 91, at 826-27;see also Mark V. Tushnet, The optimist's Tale, 
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1257, 1263-64 (1984) (showing how Justice Brennan finessed the 
differences among various Justices to build a coalition in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982)). 
206. IfTushnet were right about the impossibility of figuring out the preferred views 
of each Justice, then his major enterprise, critiquing the Court's constitutional opinions, 
would be pointless: it never would be possible to isolate the factors that influenced each 
justice, because they would have been submerged in the decisionmaking process. 
207. See supra notes 26-48 and accompanying text (discussing the role of precedent in 
the certiorari process). 
208. See, e.g., infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text (discussing how the justices 
individually balance certain factors when reviewing precedents). 
209. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 811, 832 (acknowledging that each justice 
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a criteria for overrulings210 as some commentators have suggested, 
because these proposals would complicate rather than clarify the 
orderings of preferences of the individual decisionmakers. Rather, 
one might follow the lead of some public choice theorists who have 
suggested that changes in outcomes are best achieved through 
structural alterations to the decisionmaking process.2u For exam-
ple, the Court could make an internal, structural change requiring a 
supermajority vote or the passage of a certain amount of time prior 
to overruling one of its prior rulings. 
The reasons such structural changes never would be accepted by 
the Court provide considerable insight into the Justices' views on 
constitutional stare decisis.212 First, these changes might seriously 
hinder constitutional decisionmaking. They could prevent the 
Court from fully discharging its constitutional duty to resolve cases 
or controversies because a minority of the Justices might be able to 
prevent the Court from resolving an issue as long as there was a 
potential for its decision to contribute in some way to the weakening 
of a precedent. Nor could the Court decide controversies if it were 
prohibited from reviewing the scope of some precedents during a 
set time period. The Court temporarily would be unable to clarify 
precedents because clarification might involve narrowing or weak-
ening a prior decision. 
Second, these structural modifications might conflict with the Jus-
tices' views on their respective roles and prerogatives in constitu-
tional decisionmaking. In particular, they might agree that each 
Justice should have the complete freedom to balance, as he sees fit, 
his normative views on constitutional interpretation and the social 
or institutional values associated with fidelity to precedent.213 
could be more open about the reasons for their judgments); Maltz, .supra note 12, at 483 
(urging the Court to explain more fully the principles on which its decisions rest, to 
refuse to apply reversals retroactively, and to devise holdings no more broadly than 
necessary); Monaghan, .supra note 7, at 764-67 (urging the Justices to provide greater 
candor about the reasoning underlying their decisions); see also Henry P. Monaghan, 
Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REV. 1, 19, 21, 23-25 (1979) (arguing 
that greater reasoned elaboration on the part of the Court would increase respect for 
the Court and would clarifY the grounds on which certain decisions have been based and 
may be challenged). 
210. BoRK, .supra note 12, at 156-59 (emphasizing whether the precedent conforms to 
original intent, and the degree of insitutional reliance on the precedent); Monaghan, 
supra note 7, at 756-63 (setting forth criteria for the Court to consider when deciding 
whether to adhere to a challenged precedent). 
211. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, .supra note 202, at 903-04 (noting the structural altera-
tions proposed by some public choice theorists to resolve chaotic and paradoxical ma-
jority rule); Mashaw, .supra note 202, at 131-33 (describing the structural changes some 
public choice theorists have proposed for resolving self-interested governmental 
decisionmaking). 
212. Cf. Monaghan, .supra note 7, at 754-55 (suggesting that how one regards the 
constitutionality of a congressional statute directing the Court to review precedents in a 
certain way will say a great deal about one's attitude toward the role of stare decisis in 
the Court's decisionmaking). 
213. In fact, the Justices do seem to agree that they each should have the freedom to 
conduct such a balance. See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text. Other problems 
with a stated standard or rule on the precise deference owed to precedents are that some 
Justices simply may refuse to follow the rule; they may argue that structural prohibitions 
against correcting the Court's mistakes merely perpetuate those errors and prevent the 
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Last, requiring a supermajority for overrulings might effectively 
prevent justifiable overrulings because getting more than five votes 
to overrule on tough constitutional issues is difficult at best.2 14 No 
matter how compelling the reasons may be for overruling a prece-
dent, no overruling could ever. be achieved without the minimum 
number of votes. If those votes are not forthcoming, then whatever 
harm that could be perpetuated by preserving the precedent would 
remain in effect. 
B. The Individual justices' Vwws on Precedent 
Commentators often do not discuss five themes that can be dis-
cerned from studying how each justice factors pret;edents into their 
decisionmaking.215 Most important, whenever the Court reviews its 
precedents, the standard practice seems to be for. the Justices indi- · 
vidually to balance their normative views on how the constitutional 
provision at issue should be interpreted216 and their perceptions of 
Court from getting back on the right constitutional track. These justices may argue that 
waiting to undo a precedent has no virtue.because it allows aefective precedents to dis-
tort our social arid governmental structures. Moreover, these structui'al changes might 
increase deception in decisionmaking because some justices may· feel compelled to act 
on their strong feelings to overrule certain precedents by falsely,claiming to be clarifying 
or distinguishing a precedent while actually trying to weaken it. This kind of conduct 
might increase friction on the Court and could provoke the oilier justices to engage in 
similar behavior to ensure cases are resolved in a manner agreeable to them. The end 
result could be the substantial lowering of collegiality on, and public respect for, the 
Court. 
214. There are two other difficulties with the supermajority rule. First, it could frus-
trate the Court's efforts to identify overruled precedents, and such identification is nec-
essarily a critical step in the process of effectuating reversals,., Second, there is no 
principled basis on which to choose the precise number for the-supermajority, although 
it is true that the larger the number required for overrulings the less likely such deci-
sions would ever be made. ~ 
215. This section illustrates these five themes by drawing examples primarily, but not 
exclusively, from the approaches to precedent of the 10 people who have thus far popu-
lated the Rehnquist Court, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. I address 
justice Clarence Thomas' views on precedent in a forthcoming piece. See supra note 5. 
Although some commentators have focused on some aspects ofindivi<iual decisionmak-
ing in constitutional law, they have not fully explored the consequences or implications 
of their analysis. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, A Dissent on Dissent, 74 jUDICATURE 255 
(1991) (generally distinguishing "institutionalist" justices, who appreciate the impor-
tance of stability and predictability in constitutional decisionmaking, from "individual-
ist" Justices, who are prone to dissent whenever the Court deviates from their personal 
view of how a case should be decided); Henry J. Bourguignon, The Second Mr. justice 
Harlan: His Principles of judicial Decision Making, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 251, 277-81 (recount-
ing Justice Harlan's philosophy of constitutional stare decisis); Maurice Kelman, The 
Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 227 (describing the different grounds on and 
ways in which various Justices have chosen to dissent). 
216. Each justice may feel a compulsion to act on their normative views on constitu-
tional interpretation because of the constitutional requirement that each Justice "shall 
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, ••• to support the Constitution.'' U.S. CoNsT. art. VI; 
see, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("I 
would think it a violation of my oath to adhere to what I consider a plainly unjustified 
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the practical needs to submerge those views for the sake of certain 
social or institutional values such as stability, continuity, or consen-
sus. The Court's decisions are inconsistent because each of the nine 
Justices tends to strike this balance differently in different cases.217 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services218 illustrates how, in striking 
this critical balance, the Justices reveal many of their attitudes about 
constitutional stare decisis. Indeed, the majority splintered over the 
appropriate point at which to strike the balance. The plurality's an-
swer was, as Justice Scalia described it, to "disassemble[] [Roe] 
dooijamb by dooijamb."219 Rather than declare that there was no 
foundation for the fundamental right recognized in Roe, the plural-
ity (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy) con-
fined its opinion to exposing the internal incoherence of Roe's 
trimester framework for measuring the strength of the state's inter-
est in regulating abortion.22° The plurality's argument that Roe 
could be undone by its own internal incoherence as revealed 
through a series of decisions221 may have had the effect of dispelling 
some criticism of the Court for having changed course on abortion 
rights because of a change in personnel. 
Justice Scalia argued that his normative views on how the consti-
tutional issue should be resolved and the social values of overruling 
Roe pointed clearly in favor of his voting to overrule Roe. He be-
lieved the Court should swifdy and unambiguously overrule Roe to 
undo the damage Roe had inflicted on social and governmental insti-
tutions.222 By denouncing the plurality's attempted ':_judicial states-
manship" in favor of casting the only vote to overrule Roe in its 
entirety,223 Justice Scalia distanced himself from his colleagues. 
Nevertheless, he cast a critical vote to uphold Missouri's regulations. 
Justice O'Connor also struck a balance that distanced her from 
intrusion upon the democratic process in order that the Court might save face.''). Less 
obviously, some Justices may feel that the oath they have taken requires them to con-
sider such social or institutional values as stability in their constitutional decisionmaking. 
Some Justices may believe that the Constitution is partly what the precedents say it is 
and, therefore, deviating from precedents is the functional equivalent of abandoning 
certain constitutional norms. 
217. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (explaining how various tech-
niques show the inevitability of inconsistent outcomes or rulings). 
218. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Webster raised questions regarding the constitutionality of 
Missouri regulations that prohibited the use of public facilities or employees to perform 
abortions, the use of public funding to support abortion counseling, and that required 
physicians to determine, when possible, whether a fetus at least twenty weeks old is 
capable of surviving outside the womb. 
219. 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
220. /d. at 516-21. 
221. This technique might have the effect of demonstrating how Roe could "decon-
struct" itself. SeeJ.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE LJ. 743, 755 
(1987) (using deconstructive techniques to expose the self:.contradictions inherent in 
constitutional analysis). But see Suzanna Sherry, Selective judicial Activism in the Equal Pro-
tection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEo. LJ. 89, 99 (1984) (sug-
gesting that because deconstruction reveals the inability of any legal text to constrain 
due to its inherent self-contradictions, the Court should be held accountable for the 
substantive results of its decisions). 
222. Webster, 492 U.S. at 532, 537 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
223. /d. at 532. 
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her colleagues. Rather than join the plurality and justice Scalia who 
approvingly cited her previous criticisms of Roe, 224 she spent much 
of her opinion trying to demonstrate that the Court could uphold 
the Missouri regulations at issue without disturbing any aspect of 
Roe, including its trimester framework. She stressed that Webster was 
not the appropriate case in which to reconsider Roe. 22s 
The dissent rested its argument in part on stare decisis. It 
stressed, inter alia, that the long line of cases affirming Roe would be 
undermined by the plurality's decision and maintained that deviat-
ing from those rulings at this juncture would make the Court look as 
if it were the political instrument of a President and interest groups 
bent on overturning Roe. 226 The dissent struck the balance solely in 
favor of stability, which meant deciding Webster consistently with its 
previous opinions on abortion rights.227 Because the dissenters 
views prevailed more often than not in previous abortion cases, ar-
guing for continuity in the law necessarily meant tracking or follow-
ing its previously expressed views on how the relevant constitutional 
provisions should be interpreted. 
The two cases decided on the last day of the 1990 Term also show 
how the Justices each try to balance their underlying views on how 
the Constitution should be interpreted and the need for the Court 
224. See, e.g., id. (citing Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
453-59 (1983) (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (criticizing Roe's trimester framework)). 
225. /d. at 526 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
("When the constitutional validity of a State's abortion statute actually turns on the con-
stitutional validity of Roe v. Wade, there will be time enough to reexamine Roe. And to do 
so carefully.'') 
226. See id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
227. See id. at 553-54, 558-59. In subsequent cases, a majority of the Justices have 
cqntinued their efforts to uphold restrictions on public access to abortions. See Rust v. 
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding federal regulations requiring that family 
counseling services receiving federal funds avoid mentioning abortion); Ohio v. Akron 
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (upholding an Ohio statute that, with 
certain exceptions, prohibited any person from performing an abortion on an unmar-
ried, unemancipated minor without giving notice to· one of her parents or receiving a 
court order of approval). But see Hodgson v. Minnesota, llO S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (invali-
dating a provision of a Minnesota statute that prohibited the performance of abortions 
on women under the age of 18 unless at least 48 hours had elapsed since the time when 
both parents were notified). Nevertheless, several states have passed laws for the pur-
pose of giving the Court the opportunity to revisit Roe. See, e.g., 1991 La. Sess. Law. 
Serv. 26 (West) (prohibiting physicians from performing abortions at any stage of the 
mother's preganancy except in cases of incest, rape, and when the abortion is intended 
to save the life of the mother; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (1983 & Supp. 
1991) (prohibiting physicians from performing abortions without obtaining "informed 
consent," spousal consent, and requiring a 24-hour waiting period). The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently upheld the Pennsylvania statutory 
scheme, but did strike down the spousal consent ·provisions. Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, No. 90-1662, 1991 WL 209106 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 1991). 
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to adhere to certain values such as stability and continuity. For ex-
ample, although Payne v. Tennessee 228 overruled two decisions bar-
ring victim impact statements from the sentencing phase of capital 
trials, the six-member majority disagreed on the criteria for overrul-
ing those decisions. Speaking for that majority (consisting of him-
self and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter), 
Chief justice Rehnquist argued that the previous decisions, Booth v. 
Maryland 229 and South Carolina v. Gathers, 2so should have been given 
less deference than constitutional decisions usually deserve because 
Booth and Gathers had been recent opinions, decided by 5-4 votes 
with vigorous dissents, and that Booth and Gathers required overrul-
ing because they were both erroneously reasoned.231 Joined by Jus-
tices White and Kennedy,Justice O'Connor followed with a separate 
concurrence arguing that Booth and Gathers needed to be overruled 
because they "were wrongly decided. "232 In another separate con-
currence, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, 
sharply argued that, contrary to the assertions made injustice Mar-
shall's dissent, the Court did not need to show any "special justifica-
tion" for overruling Booth and Gathers and that, in fact, those 
decisions did far more damage to the notion of stare decisis than the 
majority's opinion in Payne because those decisions violated the 
"general principle that the settled practices and expectations of a 
democratic society should generally not be disturbed by the 
courts."233 In yet another separate concurrence, Justice Souter, 
joined by Justice Kennedy, argued that Booth and Gathers should be 
overruled because they were erroneously reasoned and demonstra-
bly unworkable. 234 
Justice Marshall and justice Stevens wrote separate dissents, both 
joined by Justice Blackmun, challenging, inter alia, the majority's 
views on precedent. Justice Marshall argued that: (1) these overrul-
ings could be traced to the sole fact that the Court's personnel had 
changed;235 (2) overruling precedents based on their erroneous rea-
soning and close votes would disrupt constitutional law signifi-
cantly,236 and (3) the majority had generally failed to "come fonvard 
228. Ill S. Ct. 2597 (I991), overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 
(I989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
229. 482 u.s. 496. 
230. 490 u.s. 805. 
231. Payne, IllS. Ct. at 2609-11. 
232. ld. at 2611-12 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
233. Id. at 26I3-14 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
234. ld. at 26I6 (Souter,]., concurring). 
235. Id. at 262I (Marshall,]., dissenting). justice Marshall argued in dissent that the 
Court should follow Rumsey by showing "special justification" for overruling Booth and 
Gathers. I d. (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). justice Scalia rejected 
justice Marshall's argument as "[un]fair" and argued that he and the other justices 
should have the freedom to vote to overturn Booth and Gathers solely because these two 
cases were decided wrongly. Id. at 2613 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
236. I d. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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with the type of extraordinary showing that this Court has histori-
cally demanded before overruling one of its precedents."287 Justice 
Marshall maintained that the Chief Justice's argument that 5-4 deci-
sions, with vigorous dissents, deserve less than the usual deference 
owed to precedents threatened to "destroy" the Court's authority as 
the final decisionmaker on questions involving individual liberties, 
because it "invite[d]" state actors to treat certain decisions as non-
binding and instead "to renew the very policies deemed unconstitu-
tional in the hope that this Court may now reverse course, even if it 
has only recently reaffirmed the constitutional liberty in ques-
tion."238 In his dissent,Justi~e Stevens accused the majority of dis-
carding reasoning and stare decisis because of the " 'hydraulic 
pressure' of public opinion," and concluded his opinion by lament-
ing that "[t]oday is a sad day for a great institution."289 
An equally illuminating debate occurred in Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 240 in which the five-member majority split over the necessity 
and the criteria for overruling Solem v. Helm.24 l On behalf ofhimself 
and the ChiefJustice,Justice Scalia appeared to move away from his 
and the Chief Justice's previously stated views that overrulings 
should be based solely on the erroneous reasoning of a precedent. 
Instead, perhaps because Solem had been around a few years more 
than Booth and Gathers, Justice Scalia could assert more reasons 
favoring Solem's overruling; he argued that Solem should be over-
ruled because it was erroneously reasoned, articulated an unwork-
able standard, and was inconsistent with the original understanding 
of the Eighth Amendment and other case law.242 Nevertheless, Jus-
tices O'Connor and Souter joined Justice Kennedy's concurrence 
rejecting Justice Scalia's arguments in favor of overruling Solem. In-
stead, Justice Kennedy maintained that even though Solem could 
have been better reasoned and could have articulated a more worka-
ble standard, the Court could remedy those problems by narrowing 
237. !d. at 2621. Justice Marshall explained further that this "extraordinary showing" 
usually required 
such justifications [as] the advent of'subsequent changes or development in 
the law' that undermine a decision's rationale[;] the need 'to bring [a deci-
sion] into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained'[;] 
and a showing that a particular precedent has become a detriment to coher-
ence and consistency in the law. 
/d. at 2621-22 (citations omitted). 
238. /d. at 2624. 
239. /d. at 2631 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 
193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes,J., dissenting)). 
240. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
241. 463 u.s. 277 (1983). 
242. See Hannelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686-96 (pointing out how Solem deviated from the 
original understanding of the Eighth Amendment); id. at 2696-99 (demonstrating Solem's 
unworkability); id. at 2699-70 1 (describing Solem's incompatibility with other case law). 
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but not overruling Solem. 243 In dissent, Justice White (joined by 
Justices Blackmun and Stevens) found neither the history, nor the 
case law, regarding the Eighth Amendment supported Justice 
Scalia's conclusion that the Eighth Amendment contained no pro-
portionality principle or Justice Kennedy's analysis, which Justice 
White argued, was "contradicted by the language of Solem and by 
our other cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment."244 
A second theme is that the more areas in which a Justice routinely 
dissents or deviates from precedents, the less influence she has on 
the Court and the more likely she becomes a marginalist with more 
extreme views on stare decisis.245 Justice Brennan has said that a 
Justice can dissent routinely in no more than a handful of areas 
before he has impaired his ability to build coalitions.246 In his 
thirty-four years on the Court, he routinely dissented in only a few 
areas, including, most notably, capital punishment.247 Similarly, 
Justice Stewart's reluctance to dissent"in every substantive due pro-
cess case led him to concur in Roe on the ground that the right to 
have an abortion fell clearly within the scope of the right of privacy 
that had been well established by prior decisions.248 Unlike Justices 
Brennan and Stewart, Justice Scalia often has placed himself on the 
Court's margin by disregarding or direcdy challenging the Court's 
precedents in order to enunciate "correct" views in such areas as 
separation of powers,249 proportionality .of punishment,2so abor-
tion,251 the right to die,2s2 nude dancing,2ss obscenity,254 criminal 
243. /d. at 2703-05 (Kennedy,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment}. 
244. /d. at 2709, 2714 (White,J., dissenting}. 
245. See generally Kelman, supra note 215, at 248-58 (discussing various justices who 
have dissented repeatedly in a number of areas and the modest influence they each ex-
erted over their colleagues}. 
246. See Brennan, supra note 48, at 435-37. 
247. /d. at 432 (noting that he dissented routinely on obscenity, the death penalty, 
double jeopardy, and the Eleventh Amendment}. For the most part, Justice Marshall 
followed a similar pattern. See Kelman, supra note 215, at 253 (noting justice Marshall's 
persistent dissents on the death penalty and obscenity). 
248. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973} (Stewart, J., concurring}. justice 
White shows some affinity for a standard not dissimilar from justice Stewart's adherence 
to prior decisions when there is a clearly established practice on the part of the Court to 
follow them. Compare Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2458, 2474 (1991) (White, 
]., dissenting) (denouncing the majority's upholding of a state's regulation of nude 
dancing despite "settled doctrine" to the contrary) and Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 
1246, 1254 (1991) (White, J., dissenting in part) (harshly criticizing the majority for 
"overrul[ing a] vast body of precedent without a word and in so doing dislodg[ing] one 
of the fundamental tenets of our criminal justice system") with Payne v. Tennessee, Ill 
S. Ct. 2597 (1991} (joining Chief justice Rehnquist's opinion overruling the relatively 
recent decisions of South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989}, and Booth v. Mary-
land, 482 U.S. 496 (1987}). For more on justice White's approach to precedent, see 
supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text. 
249. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989} (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the Court's methodology in recent separation of powers decisions); Morrison 
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710-12 (1988} (Scalia,J., dissenting} (same}. 
250. See Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991} (joined only by Chief justice 
Rehnquist in urging the overruling of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)}. 
251. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989} (Scalia,] .• 
concurring in pan and concurring in the judgment} (arguing that Roe should be over-
ruled explicitly}. 
252. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, IIO S. Ct. 2841, 2860 (1990) 
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jury selection,255 negative commerce clause,255 affirmative action,257 
religion,258 and criminal procedure.259 In some other areas, Justice 
Scalia has assembled coalitions by distinguishing rather than di-
recdy challenging precedents, even though those distinctions seem-
ingly have narrowed prior decisions to their facts.260 
Justice Scalia's performance as a Circuit Justice provides a stark 
illustration of how, when removed from a setting in which consen-
sus is important in order to get things done, he grounds his deci-
sions solely on his views on how the Constitution should be 
(Scalia,J., concurring) (rejecting the reasoning of precedents such as Roe and arguing 
that there is no substantive due process fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment). 
253. See Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (Scalia,j., concur-
ring in the judgment) (suggesting, contrary to the Court's precedents, that nude dancing 
deserves no First Amendment protection). -
254. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505' (1987) (Scalia,J., concurring) (calling for a 
reconsideration of the Court's test for evaluating the constitutionality of obscenity laws, 
set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). 
255. See Powers v. Ohio, IllS. Ct. 1364, 1381 (1991) (Scalia,j., dissenting) (ques-
tioning Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S: 79 (1986), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966)). 
256. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303-06 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (challenging the Court's negative Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence). 
257. See City ofRichmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 (1989) (Scalia,j., 
concurring) (suggesting that race can never be the basis of legislative classifications, 
thereby calling into question the validity of Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)). 
258. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 611 (1987) (Scalia,j., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the first prong of the Court's test for evaluating Establishment Clause challenges). 
259. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 823 (1989) (Scalia,j., dissenting) 
(urging the overruling of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)). 
As the previously cited cases indicate, see supra notes 249-59, justice Scalia has written 
separately more often than any other member of the Rehnquist Court. See David Stew-
art, A Chorus of Voices, 77 A.B.A.j. 50, 52 (1991) (documenting justice Scalia's tendency 
to write separately). justice Scalia routinely quotes Justice Douglas' views on the im-
portance of correctly deciding cases rather than blindly following precedent. See, e.g., 
Gathers, 490 U.S. at 825 (Scalia,j., dissenting) (quoting Douglas, supra note 2, at 736). 
Ironically,justice Douglas was a notorious marginalist. See G. Edward White, The Anti-
judge: William 0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REv. 17, 42, 65 
(1988) (describing justice Douglas' lack of interest in consensus building). 
260. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) (maintaining that the Court had never recognized a free exercise of religion ex-
ception to the application of an otherwise valid criminal law by distinguishing several 
precedents upholding free exercise claims on the ground that they were unique to the 
employment context); james D. Gordon Ill, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. 
REV. 91, 94-100 (1991) (criticizing Smith for dubiously distinguishing clearly relevant 
precedents that previously had required the Court to strictly scrutinize laws significantly 
impairing the free exercise of religion); see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 
2105,2116 (1990) (holding that prior contacts with a state were not necessary for a state 
to exercise transient jurisdiction over a defendant by distinguishing Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186 (1977), and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), 
on the basis that they recognized only a narrow exception to this rule for defendants not 
in the state at the time of service of process even though they had been cited mostly for 
the proposition that a state must show minimum contacts whenever it wants to assert 
jurisdiction over a defendant). 
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interpreted rather than on the social consequences of deviating 
from past practice. In his capacjty as the Circuit Justice for the Fifth 
Circuit, Justice Scalia recently declared that he would break from 
the past practice ofFifth Circuit Justices to grant automatic time ex-
tensions in capital cases for defendants needing lawyers.261 This 
statement suggests that when Justice Scalia does not have to get 
consensus to formulate a rule oflaw of which he approves, he seem-
ingly prefers not to follow prior practice but rather to reach what he 
regards as the right conclusion, even though, as in this case, the 
prior practice had increased the opportunities for death row inmates 
to obtain legal counsel. Because Justice Scalia's decisions as a Cir-
cuit Justice are rarely reviewable, he has more freedom as a Circuit 
Justice to disregard the need to strike a balance. 
A third theme emerging from the study of the individualJustices' 
approaches to stare decisis is that the Justices each seem to have 
different approaches· to weakening or overruling precedents. For 
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist tends to weaken precedents by cit-
ing them for much narrower propositions than the ones they origi-
nally had held. For example, in W?Sconsin v. Constantineau, 262 the 
Court struck down a law permitting the public posting of the names 
of persons causing disturbances because of excessive drinking. But 
later, in Paul v. Davis, 263 then-Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court's 
opinion holding that government-inflicted injury to reputation, 
without more, does not require due process. He distinguished Con-
stantineau on the ground that the public posting in that case had al-
tered the plaintiff's legal right to purchase liquor,264 even though 
Constantineau originally had based its holding on the idea that when-
ever government action "stigma[tizes]" .a person, impairing the lib-
erty interest she has in her good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity, then due process must be afforded.265 
Justice Scalia rarely equivocates or uses indirect methods to dis-
mantle the precedents he does not like. He is the archetype of the 
Justice who prefers to challenge directly decisions he regards as er-
roneously reasoned.266 Although he shows great deference toward 
261. See Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Chilling Capital Appeals; Scalia Ruling Makes 
It Harder To Find Attorneys, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 11, 1991, at 1. 
262. 400 u.s. 433 (1971). 
263. 424 u.s. 693 (1976). 
264. /d. at 709-10. 
265. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at437. In another case, Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services, 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989), Chief justice Rehnquist speculated about the differ-
ent ways to characterize the fundamental right recognized in Roe and settled on the 
notion of having an abortion as a "liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause," 
subjecting state abortion regulations to the rational basis test in federal courts. Obvi-
ously, Chief justice Rehnquist's rephrasing of the right in Roe, if adopted in the future, 
would remove any meaningful federal constitutional protection for abortions. 
A variation on this practice is citing precedents for broader or completely different 
propositions than those for which they originally stood in order to support some present 
decision. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), justice 
Douglas cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925), as recognizing privacy interests under the First Amendment, even 
though those decisions concerned themselves solely with substantive due process. 
266. See, e.g., supra note 259. 
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the States' historical practices as strong evidence of constitutionally · 
permissible traditions,267 he rarely respects the Court's past prac-
tices or traditions simply because they are old: he prefers to cor-
rectly decide cases to restore certain constitutional nonns (for 
example, on federalism or separation of powers) rather than perpet-
uate errors unless the hann of overruling is so great that he finds he 
has no practical choice but to avoid reexamining an erroneous 
decision.268 · 
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy has tended to decide cases 
as if he had a strong but rebuttable presumption in favor of prior 
decisions. He tends to decide cases on the narrowest available 
grounds, hesitating to overrule or expand a previous ruling, for the 
sake of affecting settled doctrine as little as possible.269 More re-
cently, however, in Payne v. Tennessee,21o he joined the majority and 
two separate opinions that argued for overturning two precedents 
267. justice Scalia frequendy defers to what the States have permitted historically. 
See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, ll1 S. Ct. 1032, 1047 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that it is not possible for punitive damages to violate due pro-
cess if the States have had discretion concerning them for over 200 years); Burnham v. 
Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2112-13 (1990) (arguing that the states' historic treat-
ment oftransientjurisdiction establishes a tradition that satisfies due process); Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (suggesting that if the States have over-
whelmingly protected an interest through legislation it would then be permissible for a 
court to conclude that the interest in question is a "tradition" deserving of constitu-
tional protection under the Due Process Clause). 
268. Cf. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting) 
(observing that "I had thought that the respect accorded to [precedents] increases, 
rather than decreases, with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence, 
and the surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity"). 
269. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680,2702 (19Q1) (Kennedy,]., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the case before the Court 
could be decided based on prior case law, and therefore finding it unnecessary to over-
rule the Court's most recent deciSion on proportionality of punishment); Jones v. 
Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1989) (refusing to extend a precedent recognizing that 
"where one valid alternative provision of the original sentence has been satisfied, the 
[criminal defendant] is entided to be freed of further restraint [in compliance with the 
requirements of the Double jeopardy Clause]," to the present case "involv[ing] separate 
sentences imposed for what the sentencing court thought to be separately punishable 
offenses, one far more serious than the other") (citation omitted); Barnard v. Thorstenn, 
489 U.S. 546, 551-58 (1989) (refusing to determine whether the Court's "supervisory 
power" over lower federal courts could resolve the question before the Court, and in-
stead relying on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); City of Rich-
mond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy,]., concurring) (declining 
to join the majority or justice Scalia's separate concurrence commenting on the scope of 
Congress' power to adopt legislation designed to remedy past discrimination because 
the issue was not before the Court). See generally Michael]. Gerhardt, Anthony M. Kennedy, 
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (forthcoming Dec. 1991) (describing 
various cases in which justice Kennedy avoided expanding or contracting precedent). 
270. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 
(1989) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
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regarding victim impact statements on the grounds that those opin-
ions had been erroneously reasoned.271 In Payne, he also joined Jus-
tice Souter's separate concurrence arguing that those decisions 
should be overruled because they were erroneously reasoned and 
demonstrably unworkable. 272 In Payne, he also recently joine~ opin-
ions narrowing public access to abortions273 and challenging prior 
interpretations of the Establishment Clause, which he argues should 
be construed as prohibiting government from coercing people into 
believing sot:p.ething they do not believe or from establishing the 
functional equivalent of state religions.274 
Like Justice Kennedy,justice O'Connor seems to treat precedents 
with a strong presumption of validity. She explained in Arizona v. 
Rumsey, 275 that "[a]lthough adherence to precedent is not rigidly re-
quired in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of 
stare decisis demands special justification."276 Although Justice 
O'Connor has not yet personally spelled out the "special justifica-
tion" that would persuade her to overrule a precedent, she sepa-
rately concurred in Payne v. Tennessee 277 on the ground that Booth 
and Gathers should be overruled merely because they were badly 
reasoned. 278 
Similarly, justice Souter's views on stare decisis are not entirely 
clear, although he has shown a tendency to prefer that the Court 
show something more than erroneous reasoning to justify overrul-
ing a precedent. His respect for constitutional precedents can be 
gleaned primarily from his separate concurrence in Payne, in which 
he argued that the Court had "specialjustification" for overturning 
Booth and Gathers because those precedents were "unworkable" and 
badly reasoned.279 In addition, Justice Souter joined Justice Ken-
nedy's separate opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 280 which argued 
that the case could be decided without having to overrule 
precedent. 281 
Despite being on the Court for nearly thirty years, Justice White's 
views on stare decisis remain unclear. For example, although he 
271. See id. at 2601 (opinion of the Court}; id. at 2611 (joining Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion}; id. at 2613 (joining relevant part of Justice Scalia's concurring 
opinion}. 
272. ld. at 2614, 2626 (Souter,J., concurring). ' 
273. See Rust v. Sullivan, IllS. Ct. 1759 (1991) (voting to uphold a federal regula-
tion prohibiting counseling organizations that receive federal funds from talking about 
abortion}; Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (voting with 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White to dismantle Roe's trimester framework). 
274. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-63 (1989} (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part}. 
275. 467 u.s. 203 (1984}. 
276. ld. at 212. 
277. Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1991) (O'Connor,J., concurring}. 
278. !d. at 2612 (justifying her willingness to overrule Booth and Gathers only by stat-
ing that she "agree[ d) with the Court that [Booth] and [Gathers] were wrongly decided"}. 
279. /d. at 2614, 2616 (Souter,J., concurring). 
280. Ill S. Ct. 2680, 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
281. /d. 
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joined the Court's opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, 282 he ex-
pressly disavowed Sullivan in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc. 283 but did not indicate in his concurring opinions whether 
his disagreement with the reasoning in Sullivan would be sufficient 
grounds for overruling that precedent. 284 In the abortion context, 
Justice White has more than once urged the overruling of Roe but 
did notjoinJustice Scalia's concurrence urging Roe's overruling.285 
Justice Stevens has explained what would satisfy his "special ex-
amination [before an overruling]. Among the questions to be con-
sidered are the possible significance of intervening events, the 
possible impact on setded expectations, and the risk of undermining 
public confidence in the stability of our basic rules oflaw."286 Jus-
tice Stevens, however, apparendy did not find any such conditions 
barring his argument in United 8_tates v. Eichman 287 for overruling 
Texas v. johnson, in which the Court recognized First Amendment 
protection for flag burning.28B 
These different approaches to precedent indicate that even when 
the Justices might agree that something substantially more than er-
roneous reasoning should be the basis for an overruling, they might 
still disagree in particular cases whether the standard has been met. 
These latter disagreements suggest that an even higher standard of 
deference for precedents would not necessarily preclude overrul-
ings because many of the Justices may still have strong feelings or 
juogments about how the Constitution should be interpreted and 
about the Court's role in our political system that lead them to apply 
the standards for overrulings differendy. In other words, a higher 
standard of deference to precedents does not guarantee any particu-
lar outcome. It is also true, however, that any lower standard for 
282. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that a public official may not recover for libel ab-
sent a clear showing of actual malice). 
283. 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985) (White,J., concurring in the judgment). 
284. In a similarly confusing vein, justice White wrote the Court's opinion in Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause did not pro-
hibit prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to remove from petit juries mem-
bers of the defendant's race), but he joined the Court's opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 100, 102 (1986) (White,j., concurring), which overruled Swain. 
285. Compare Thornburgh v. American College 'or Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 788 (1986) (White,j., dissenting) (arguing that Roe should be overruled, and 
stating "[t]hat the flaws in an opinion were evident at the time it was handed down is 
hardly a reason for adhering to it") with Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 
U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment). 
286. Stevens, supra note 46, at 9 (footnote omitted). 
287. 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
288. 491 U.S. 397 (1989); see also supra note 71. In contrast, justice Stevens argued 
there were no conditions requiring the overruling of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 
(1979), in California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1994, 2003 (1991) (Stevens,J., dis-
senting) (complaining that "[t]he [majority's decision] is .•• not nearly as significant as 
the Court's willingness to [overrule Sanders] without a colorable basis"). 
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overruling a precedent, such as a prior decision's erroneous reason-
ing standing alone, would be likely (depending, of course, on the 
kinds of people who apply it) to produce many disagreements, nu-
merous overrulings, and general confusion in constitutionallaw.289 
A fourth theme is that the position of Chief Justice may make its 
occupants less likely to write separate opinions. As "the first among 
equals,"290 the Chief Justice is in a unique position to exercise so-
cial, intellectual, and policy leadership on the Court.291 Some Chief 
Justices have made a greater investment in avoiding or discouraging 
divisions on the Court than the average Associate Justice,292 sug-
gesting the possibility that someone who has moved from being an 
Associate Justice to Chief Justice, such as William Rehnquist, may 
change his attitudes about the need for consensus after becoming 
the Chief Justice. Interestingly, as an Associate Justice, Rehnquist 
frequently wrote separately to denounce precedents, but, as Chief 
Justice, he has severely limited that practice.293 As Chief Justice, he 
has also moderated several earlier positions in order to build coali-
tions to weaken some precedents294 and to bolster others.295 
Perhaps emboldened by the Court's decisive ideological shift to 
the right during the 1990 Term, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
289. See, e.g., Paynev. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,2619,2621-22 (1991) (Marshall,J., 
dissenting). 
290. ROBERT j. STEAMER, CHIEF jUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 10 
(1986). 
291. See generally STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME CouRT IN THE FEDERAL jUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 188 (2d ed. 1984) (describing the various leadership roles a Chief justice can 
perform). 
292. Chief justices sometimes have voted against their beliefs in the interest of soli-
darity. See Kelman, supra note 215, at 241-42 n.50; see also STEAMER, supra note 290, at 
24-32 (describing the practice of Chief justices to submerge their personal opinions on 
some issues to build coalitions). 
293. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 215, at 255 n.1 (showing that in the year before 
becoming Chief justice, then:Justice Rehnquist had been the Court's fifth most prolific 
dissenter, but, in his first year after becoming the Chief Justice, he became the least 
prolific dissenter, a position he held again during the 1990 Term); see also Stewart, supra 
note 259, at 50 (comparing then-Associate justice Rehnquist's writing 12 separate con-
currences in the October Term 1978 with his writing only three concurring opinions in 
the 1989 and 1990 Terms as Chief justice). 
Interestingly, Edward D. White, who served as Chief justice from 1910-21 after having 
served as an Associate justice, also moderated some of his previous positions after be-
coming Chief justice. BENNO C. SCHMIDT, 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, THE jUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GoVERNMENT 1910-1921 (PART II), at 
745 (1984) (noting Chief justice White's moderations of his previous positions on segre-
gation); see also WASBY, supra note 291, at 189 (noting that Chief justice White ranked 
relatively high among Chief justices in avoiding conflict during his tenure as Chief jus-
tice). Harlan Fiske Stone, however, who served as Chief justice from 1941-46 after hav-
ing served as an Associate justice, achieved little success in coalition building despite his 
stated desire to do otherwise. See ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF 
THE LAw 574-75 (1956); see also WASBY, supra note 291, at 188 (noting that Chief justice 
Stone "dissented in a larger proportion of non-unanimous cases than did any other 
Chief Justice"). 
294. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 492 (1989) (not fol-
lowing Justice Scalia's call to overrule Roe based on arguments derived from previous 
dissents joined by then:Justice Rehnquist); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469 (1989) (joining justice O'Connor's majority opinion and, in so doing, soften-
ing his absolute rejection of affirmative action indicated by his joining justice Stewart's 
dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart,]., dissenting)). 
295. For example, Chief justice Rehnquist's opinion in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 
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ventured to explain in a speech before the Fourth Circuit Judicial 
Conference what he perceived as the basis for the Court's decision 
in Payne v. Tennessee 296 to overrule two precedents prohibiting the 
admission of victim impact statements in the sentencing phase of 
capital trials.297 Going beyond the actual reasons given in the ma-
jority's opinion in Payne, he maintained that constitutional prece-
dents carry little weight in and of themselves in decisionmaking, but 
they usually carry even less weight than usual in criminal procedure 
cases.29S He explained further that with decisions involving prop-
erty or contracts, parties have a "reliance interest" in desiring stabil-
ity from the Court but that " '[a] criminal defendant has no reliance 
interest at all' ... [given] that few criminals'would base their deci-
sions to commit a crime on whether Booth and Gathers were still in 
place. "299 · 
If Chief justice Rehnquist's point is that people's expectations re-
garding their social, economic, and political interests are more set-
tled ·with respect to property and contracts cases than with criminal 
procedure precedents, he may be right, but he has yet to produce 
empirical support for his proposition. MQre importantly, if the 
Chiefjustice's point is that criminal defendants have less legitimate 
interests in preserving the precedents that favor them than do the 
parties in property or contract decisions, then he is seriously mis-
taken. The fact remains that many of the people interested in the 
outcome of these different precedents, including criminal defend-
ants, are asserting constitutional rights that the Court has recog-
nized and enforced in the past. Thus, it is the Court itself that has 
legitimated the claim& of (and any reliance by) all these parties. 
When economic interests, liberty, or, ·more importantly, life itself, 
tum on the Court's reasons for abandoning previously recogn~zed 
rights, the Court is the institutidn best situated to bear the burden 
and the responsibility of sho·wing why the social costs of withdraw-
ing constitutional protections are different with respect to the peo-
ple, rights, and situations involved. 
485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that public plaintiffs cannot recover for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress without a showing that the publication complained of con-
tained a false statement of fact published with actual malice), surprised many of his 
critics, because it strengthened New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), rather 
than follow his criticisms of that decision made before he became Chief justice. See, e.g., 
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166-68 (1979) (refusing to apply Sulli-
van automatically to someone who had engaged in criminal conduct); Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (restricting Sullivan to apply to voluntary public 
figures and declining to apply it at 'all to reports of judicial proceedings). 
296. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). · 
297. See Tony Mauro, Courtside: Marshall: Scant Mementos, Scattered Clerks, LEGAL 
TIMES, july 15, 1991, at 8. 
298. /d. at 9. 
299. Id. 
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Finally, the current and recent Justices rarely take contradictory 
stances on constitutional stare decisis. For example, despite charges 
to the contrary,30° Chief Justice Rehnquist has shown remarkable 
consistency in demonstrating respect for precedents only when he 
agrees with the values underlying them. 301 Similarly, Justice Black-
mun abandoned National League qf Cities v. Usery 302 as demonstrably 
unworkable in his majority opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority, 303 but provided a vigorous defense of Roe on 
the basis of stare decisis in his Webster dissent because he believed 
Roe had proved to offer workable standards for reviewing abortion 
regulations. 304 
The general reluctance of the Justices to state a theory of stare 
decisis conforms to their general practice of confining their rhetoric 
to the present case to avoid painting themselves into a corner in 
future decisions.305 Ironically, this selective disclosure preserves 
the Justices' flexibility for future dialogues regarding the sanctity of 
particular precedents. 
A number of constitutional experts, including Dean Guido Cala-
bresi of the Yale Law School, testified during the confirmation pro-
ceedings for Justice Thomas, however, that the Court lacks 
300. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 371 n.16, 374 
n.28 (1988) (criticizing then:Justice Rehnquist's lack of respect for, and inconsistent 
posturings regarding, precedent). 
301. Compare City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (expressing dismay at the Court's deviation from precedents up-
holding the states' power to prohibit importation of diseased items, and to enact 
quarantine laws) with National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,855 (1976) (sug-
gesting that Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), must be overruled, given its incom-
patibility with the standard he had just set forth for limiting congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause); see also supra note 168. But see Hearings Before the Comm. on the 
judiciary, United Slates Senate, On the Nomination of William H. Rehnquisl to be an Associate 
justice of the United Slates, 117 CoNG. REc. 39765 (1971) (statement of William H. Rehn-
quist) ("I feel that great weight should be given to precedent."). 
302. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
303. 469 u.s. 528, 531, 548-58 (1985). 
304. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537, 553-60 (1989) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
305. The perception that many Justices do not speak more fully about precedents is, 
of course, a source of the view that precedents do not matter to the Court. See supra note 
24 and accompanying text. This Article has tried to show, however, that this view is 
overstated because the Justices do seem to consider precedents in the certiorari process 
seriously, see supra notes 27-48 and accompanying text, and because it is possible for the 
Justices to achieve a suitable balance between their reasoned elaboration on the merits 
of precedents and their efforts to promote stability or achieve consensus. See supra notes 
215-27 and infra notes 356 & 384 and accompanying text. 
Interestingly, whenJustices have tried to state a complete theory of stare decisis, they 
sometimes have found themselves on the margin of the Court, as demonstrated by Jus-
tices Scalia and Douglas' routine disregard of precedent in order to do what each 
thought was right, and by Justice john Marshall Harlan, who frequently found himself 
alone when offering his complex view that a "precedent should not be jettisoned when 
the rule of yesterday remains viable, creates no injustice, and can reasonably be said to 
be no less sound than the rule sponsored by those who seek change, let alone incapable 
of being demonstrated wrong." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 128-29 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Bourguignon, supra note 215, at 277-81 (describing 
Harlan's unique practice of dissenting from a particular decision for the duration of the 
Term in which it was issued and thereafter considering himself bound by the precedent 
while expressing his dissatisfaction with it); Kelman, supra note 215, at 274-83 (describ-
ing justice Harlan's handling of precedents whose holdings he opposed). 
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ideological balance and is, therefore, not likely to be interested in 
preserving or pursuing a dialogue about how the Constitution 
should be interpreted.3°6 Although the preceding survey suggests 
that the current conservative Justices do not yet seem to share a con-
sensus on the appropriate criteria for overruling precedents, it is 
likely that, for their part, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia 
will continue to press the other Justices to adopt the practice of 
overruling precedents deemed erroneously reasoned. This scenario 
raises a serious question as to what the consequences for precedent 
would be if a mcrlority of the Justices were dogmatists set on over-
turning or abandoning any principles that deviate from the over-
arching, single, or unifying principle by which they believe the 
Constitution should be interpreted. Part IV explores the conse-
quences for precedent posed by a Court dominated by such a single 
normative vie·wpoint with regard to constitutional interpretation. 
IV. Constitutional Theory and the Problem of 
Nonconforming Precedents 
This Part describes the incompatibility between unitary constitu-
tional theories, which aim to restrict constitutional interpretation 
and adjudication to one overarching or unifying principle, and 
precedents whose reasoning or holdings do not conform to that 
principle or vision. This analysis not only provides additional in-
sights into the role of precedents in constitutional decisionmaking 
but also shows the practical failure of unitary constitutional theory. 
This Part concludes lvith a normative proposal for reconciling con-
stitutional theory with nonconforming precedents. 
A. The Tension Between Unitary Theory and Precedent 
My focus in this section is narrow but significant. I am addressing 
so-called unitary theories that favor one unifying or overarching 
principle for organizing, explaining, or guiding constitutional inter-
pretation.307 Unitary theories have been criticized for being logi-
cally inconsistent and incoherent and for being generally incapable 
of achieving their stated objectives. 308 They also can be criticized 
306. See Kurt Shillinger, What Was Learned from Senate Hearings, THE CHRISTIAN Sci-
ENCE MoNITOR, Sept. ,24, 1991, at 6. 
307. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 1, 3, 181 (1988) (defining "grand" or "unitary" theories as nonna-
tive attempts to justify judicial review in a democracy in terms of a single unifying or 
overarching principle). 
308. Id. at 179, 313 (arguing that no unitary theory is immune to internal incoher-
ence, or to the problem of not being able fully to achieve its stated objective). 
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for not containing any mechanism by which they can be imple-
mented without doing serious damage to many of the settled gov-
ernmental, social, and personal expectations and practices built up 
around precedents. 
So much constitutional doctrine is premised on the rejection of 
any one view of theory and so much unitary theory is premised on 
the idea that most precedents have been decided wrongly that, as a 
practical matter, the Court would face an inescapable dilemma if it 
were to rigidly or dogmatically adhere to a single unifying principle 
of constitutional interpretation. The Court would have to choose 
between rejecting most of its precedents, thereby precipitating con-
stitutional turmoil, or rejecting or seriously modifying the proposed 
unitary theory to ensure stability or continuity in constitutional 
decisionmaking. 
The conflict between a unitary theory and precedents derives 
from their fundamentally different purposes. Precedents perform 
various roles in the Court's decisionmaking and for society, virtually 
all of which are ignored by a unitary theory. Perhaps most impor-
tant, the Court's review of its decisions comprises a dialogue among 
the Justices on the need to decide cases narrowly and move incre-
mentally to avoid constitutional error and on whether to perpetuate 
certain values the Court previously has approved for guiding the op-
eration of government. A unitary theory purports either to end this 
dialogue or to explore the implications of only one constitutional 
vision, not the process of mediating among different visions.so9 A 
unitary theory attempts to provide strict guidelines for the Justices 
to correct or avoid many of the Court's past errors. Consequently, a 
dogmatic application of such a theory is at odds with most prece-
dents because the Court's fidelity to a unitary theory would cause 
substantial social and political disruption, and because no unitary 
theorist has incorporated into her approach standards for dealing 
with nonconforming precedent and the actual process by which the 
Justices interpret or apply precedents. 
Moreover, the practical value of a unitary theory is seriously 
threatened by its failure to comprehensively and coherently con-
front all of the questions precedents pose for constitutional deci-
sionmaking and theory. Precedents can, for example, force 
theorists in general to make judgments about which precedents are 
worth keeping. Although skeptics can emphasize a unitary theory's 
lack of responsiveness to precedents, proponents of such ap-
proaches have yet to respond to this criticism. Precedents also can 
provide theorists with an escape clause in the sense that they may 
avoid problems with their theory by claiming the need to preserve 
precedents for the sake of constitutional stability; however, unitary 
theorists have rarely used precedents in this manner, nor is it clear 
309. For a general discussion of theories that restrict constitutional interpretation to 
certain unifying concepts, see William A. Kaplin, The Process of Constitutional Interpretation: 
A Synthesis of the Present and A Guide to the Future, 42 RUTGERS LJ. 983 (1990). For a 
criticism of these theories, see Fallon, supra note 20, at 1248. 
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which escape routes different unitar.y theorists would prefer. Last, 
precedents impose a disorder on constitutional law that necessitates 
a comprehensive theory of constitutional interpretation that accom-
modates precedent.s10 In short, a theorist bent on restricting con-
stitutional interpretation to one unifying principle QUt who cares 
about the practical value of her thepry and prefers stability to consti-
tutional turmoiP11 must find a principled solution to nonconform-
ing precedents. 
Nevertheless, some unitary theories imply less respect for prece-
dents than others. The unitary theory that probably implies the 
least respect for precedents is original understanding.s12 Indeed, 
the failure to reconcile originalism with constitutional doctrine is a 
prime example of the dilemma that nonconforming precedents can 
pose for theory. So many Supreme Court precedents have been 
based ·on a rejection of original understanding31S that faithful adher-
ents to original understanding face an inescapable dilemma.8 14 
They either can strive to overrule the better part of constitutional 
310. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 747 (arguing that "one needs a general theory of 
constitutional interpretation that includes some account of precedent" to justify the 
Court overruling precedents in some areas but not others). . 
311. A number of theorists may not defer much to precedent because they may desire 
some kind of revolution precipitated by the Court's overturning, of all of the precedents 
they regard as wrongly decided. See, e.g., RtcHAIU> EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE PoWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 29;31 (1985) (advocating a level of judicial inter-
vention with respect to eminent domain far great~r than any precedents in existence 
would support); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON 
LIFE AND LAw 213 (1987) (arguing that the Court's obscenity and pornography decisions 
contribute to the enslavement of women and, therefore, need to be overturned); BER-
NAIU> H. SIEGAN, EcoNOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE .CONSTITUTION 318-22 (1980) (setting 
forth five reasons for the Court to overrule its decisions abandoning strict scrutiny of 
governmental regulations of economic activities); TusHNET, supra note 307, at 15, 275, 
314 (indicating that a social and political revolution is necessary to bring about the kind 
oflegal system that would satisfy him); see also Frank I. Michelman, Process and Property in 
Constitutional Theory, 30 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 577, 583, 590-92 (1982) (acknowledging a 
number of precedents inconsistent with the results his mode o£ judicial decisionmak-
ing-public values-would produce). . 
312. For a brief summary of this theory, see BoRK, supra note 12, at 143-60 (1989) 
(maintaining that the most effective way that judges can restrain tlieir tyrannical tenden-
cies is if they confine themselves to discovering, and consequently- respecting, what each 
constitutional provision objectively meant to its framers and ratifiers-leaving to the 
majoritarian legislative process any matter on which the Constitution, or the original 
understanding of its framers and ratifiers, is silent or ambiguous). 
313. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 739 ("[N]o acceptable version of original under-
standing theory can [explain] the major features of our •Bicentennial Constitution': 
nontextual guarantees of civil liberties; a powerfully presi~entially centered national 
government; a huge administrative apparatus; and national responsibility for what has 
long been considered of either as local responsibilities or as not the responsibility of 
government at all."). 
314. For discussions of this dilemma, see MICHAEL J• PERRY, THE CoNSTITUTION, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE CouRTS 64-67 (1982); Monaghan, supra note 7, at 723-24; 
Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 1383-85. Prominent originalists that have tried to resolve 
this problem include RAOUL BERGER, FEDERAUSM: THE FoUNDERS' DESIGN 178-92 
(1987); RoBERT BORK, supra note 12, at 155-59; and Cooper, supra note 12, at 404, 406, 
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doctrine and thereby thrust the world of constitutional law into tur-
moil, or they must abandon original understanding in numerous 
substantive areas in order to stabilize constitutionallaw.815 
When originalists have acknowledged the need to reconcile their 
respective theories of constitutional interpretation with nonoriginal-
ist precedents, they have suggested approaches to stare decisis so 
riddled with exceptions as to be meaningless restraints on judicial 
activism. Originalists tend to propose some variation of the follow-
ing three principles as guides to stare decisis: (1) lower courts 
should respect precedents more rigorously than the Court itself;816 
(2) the Court should never overrule any decision unless the Court 
has found that it was wrongly decided;817 and (3) the Court should 
not overrule prior, erroneous decisions when it would create serious 
upheaval of established governmental operations.sts 
None of these principles of stare decisis produces any meaningful 
deference to nonoriginalist precedents. First, originalists tend to fo-
cus only on the Supreme Court rather than lower courts, so there is 
insufficient data to discern just how closely these originalists would 
expect lower courts to adhere to precedent.319 Second, requiring a 
case to be decided wrongly before it can be overruled is hardly a 
barrier to overruling, as demonstrated by the large number of deci-
sions criticized and rejected by many originalists. a2o Third, it is a 
mistake to believe that once a constitutional issue can be resolved 
correctly in terms of original understanding the decision will be im-
mune to overruling because it is not likely there will be consensus 
on the Court that originalism is the preferred mode of constitutional 
decisionmaking or can be read in only one way.32I Lastly, original-
ists' approaches to nonconforming precedents do not derive from 
408, 410. But see Kay, supra note 118 (responding to three objections to original under-
standing but not mentioning, much less addressing, the dilemma posed by the tension 
between precedents and original intent). 
315. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, What Is The Constitution? 9-12 (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author) (continuing to adhere to his position that the incom-
patibility between originalism and precedents is so profound that he can conceive of no 
justification for advocating a return to the former); Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 1383-85 
(discussing the magnitude of the tension between original intent and precedents by 
demonstrating the few instances that the Coun has tried to follow original intent). 
316. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 12, at 157-59. 
317. ld. 
318. BERGER, supra note 12, at 79-80 (suggesting that in the rare case where practical-
ities argue against reversal, the Court can refuse to expand or to apply the mistaken 
decision in the future); Cooper, supra note 12, at 410 (following Bark in accepting the 
need to follow precedents whose reversal "would pitch the country into the abyss"). 
319. Indeed, for one originalist, Robert Bork, this admonition to lower courts is 
purely hortatory and glosses over the complex ways in which lower federal courts may 
bypass, tamper with, or even challenge Supreme Court precedent. See BORK, supra note 
12, at 156; see also Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 1384. 
320. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 12 (suggesting that much of the Court's Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence is inconsistent with original intent); BoRK, supra note 12, at 
19-32, 133-266, 323-36 (interspersing critique of particular decisions with his originalist 
views); Berger, supra note 82, at 755-66 & 774-83 (critiquing the Court's federalism ju-
risprudence as inconsistent with original intent); Cooper, supra note 12, at 410 (sug-
gesting that certain unnarr.ed precedents would survive a judicial return to original 
intent). 
321. See Richard A. Posner, Bork a11d Beetllovell, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1371, 1382 
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original understanding but rather from their consideration of cer-
tain social values such as the need for stability and continuity in con-
stitutional law; however, for some originalists, taking the perceived 
social impact of a decision into account is· more akin to legislating 
from the bench than interpreting the law.s22 
A unitary theory that is only slightly more deferential to prece-
dents is neutral principles, which posits that the judicial process is at 
its most legitimate when it rests its decisions and each step of its 
reasoning on grounds of appropriate neutrality and generality.s2s 
This approach requires overruling many precedents, including 
Brown v. Board of Education, 324 for the approach's chief adherent has 
noted thatjudges should "stand with the long tradition of the Court 
that previous decisions must be subject to reexamination when a 
case against their reasoning is made."325 
Adopting theories aimed at critiquing decisions in terms of moral 
reasoning also pose problems for precedents. For example, Profes-
sor David Richards has argued that judicial review is at its most le-
gitimate :when judges are guided by moral principles of justice. He 
has explained that "[m]ajority rule is not the basic moral principle 
of the constitutional order. The basic moral principles are the prin-
ciples of justice, including the principle of greatest equal liberty. 
Mcyority rule is justified only to the extent that ·it is compatible with 
this deeper moral principle."326 Professor Richards has elaborated 
on the theory of human rights underlying this principle, the funda-
mental assumptions of which are "the belief that <=:.very person has a 
capacity for autonomy, and ... the principle that every person has 
the right to equal concern and respect in pursuit of his auton-
omy."327 For Professor Richards, this theory leads to the recogni-
tion of constitutional protection for a significant realm of personal 
autonomy, including "the principle oflove as a civil liberty," a right 
(1990) (suggesting that neither the authority of, nor the public's approval of, the Court 
depends on its adherence to originalism). 
322. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 12, at 187-221 (critiquing any contemporary theorist's 
reliance on anything but original understanding as a source of judicial decision). 
323. See HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 21 
(1961). 
324. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
325. See Wechsler, supra note 87, at 19, 31-32, 34 (criticizing Brown for lack of neutral 
principles supporting it}. More recently, Professor Maltz has argued that "the most im-
portant institutional constraint on the Court's action [is] the requirement that the Court 
reach its results by a rational, consistent application of'neutral' principles." Maltz, supra 
note 12, at 467. Even though Professor Maltz is a conservative constitutional scholar 
who has expressed dismay over the Court'~ seemingly increasing disregard for prece-
dent, id., he has identified as the most important constraint on the-Court's review of pre-
cedent a theoretical approach to interpretation that includes no mechanism for 
deferring to precedent. 
326. DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, THE MoRAL CRITICISM oF LAw 50-51 (i977}. 
327. David AJ. Richards, Se:o.-ual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Priva0•: A Case 
Study in Human Rights and the Unwrillen Constitution, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 957. 964 {1979}. 
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to die, consensual homosexual conduct and possibly such "basic life 
choices" as dress and hair length, or perhaps even "soft drug 
use."328 While it seems as if Professor Richards' theoretical view of 
constitutional law is at odds with-existing constitutional doctrine, he 
has yet to clarify as a general matter the principles by which he 
would determine which precedents to preserve or overrule. 
Professor John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcing approach is 
yet another unitary theoretical approach that has been constructed 
without incorporating any concept on the respect due to noncon-
forming precedent, even though his approach purports to explain 
or justify more precedents than perhaps any other unitary theory.329 
He argues that judicial interference with majoritarian decisionmak-
ing is justified when certain people have been formally or structur-
ally denied the opportunity to participate equally in the political 
process. 330 Although Professor Ely identifies decisions that do not 
conform to his approach, such as Griswold v. Connecticut 33 1 and Roe v. 
Wade, 332 he does not suggest the degree of deference representa-
tion-reinforcing judges should have for such precedents.333 
The theoretical approach that is most deferential to precedents is 
antiformalism. Antiformalists accept the Court's aversion to unitary 
theory as a principled decision rather than an exercise in judicial 
tyranny. Antiformalists characterize judicial review as an integral, 
indispensable, and inevitably value-laden component of our consti-
tutional government. 334 Although many antiformalists do not dis-
cuss the criteria by which an antiformalist judge should review 
328. Id. at 1005, 1015 n.245; cJ. PERRY, supra note 155, at 150-51 (arguing that each 
justice should routinely consult precedents in order to test her own beliefs in a "dia-
log[ic] encounter with the wisdom of the past," but adding that no justice should accord 
any precedent "determinative status"). Although Professor Perry does not elaborate on 
the factors the justices should take into account when deciding whether to overrule 
precedents, he obviously understands the relationship between constitutional theory 
and practice: that constitutional theory and prac~ice are interdependent, given our gen-
eral "rel[iance] ... on historical and predictive claims and on moral judgments about 
the consequences of the style/role at issue-as a part of our constitutional-theoretical 
enterprise." Perry, supra note 17, at 249. 
329. See ELY, supra note 114, at 73-75, 87-104 (attempting to reconcile interprevist 
techniques with many Warren Court decisions). 
330. Id. 
331. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
332. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
333. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 114, at 221 n.4; Ely, supra note 155, at 928-30. 
334. For antiformalists, constitutional adjudication is described in positive, non-
threatening terms such as (1) a dialogue among governmental actors and the citizenry 
using the framework and language of the Constitution as the medium and subject of 
discourse; see infra note 355; (2) government decisionmakers' search for the public val-
ues that underly the Constitution and that provide the guidelines for legislation, see, e.g., 
Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or Whats Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 508-09 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, 
and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 127, 165 (maintaining that constitu-
tional interpretation should be understood as the process by which judges try to define 
the "public value" that underlies the concepts embodied in the Constitution); (3) the 
balancing of the competing constitutional claims of individuals and the government, see, 
e.g., Gerald Gunther, In Search qf judidal Quality on a Changing Court: The Case qf justice 
Powel~ 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972) (praisingjustice Harlan's balancing in First Amend-
ment cases); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a 
General Theory qfthe First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1251-53 (1983) (defending 
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nonconforming precedents, 885 I consider in the next section the ar-
guments of some of those antiformalists who do discuss precedent 
as a source of decision. 
B. The Challenge of· Reconciling Standards for Reviewing Precedents and 
Interpreting the Constitution 
There are two misunderstood aspects of reconciling standards for 
reviewing precedents with nonunitary theories of constitutional in-
terpretation. First, the choices of such standards often tum on a 
theorist's preferences to preserve only certain precedents. Second, 
the more precedents that accumulate on a certain constitutional is-
sue, the more difficult it becomes to consider the affected .area with-
out taking the relevant precedents into account. Both aspects 
underscore the need for theorists to grapple more with precedent. 
1. Explaining Theories of Precedent 
The effort to reconcile standards for interpreting the Constitution 
and reviewing precedent often turns on the degree to which such 
standards derive from theorists' preferences on how they would 
strike the critical balance as Justices between their views on how the 
Consitution should be interpreted and the practical needs to sub-
merge those views for the sake of consensus or stability.sss Theo-
rists also need to explain more fully which effects they intend for 
their proposals to have in order to clarify the reach and scope of 
their proposed standards for guiding constitutional interpretation 
and reviewing precedents. ss7 
balancing methodology in First Amendment cases); and (4) the allocation of different 
theories to specific areas of constitutional law. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dia-
logue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Fetleral]urisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (sug-
gesting that Article III authorizes a dialogue between the courts and the political 
branches over the proper scope of federal jurisdiction); Gerhardt, supra note 63, at 41-
43, 103-04 (suggesting the impeachment clauses make sense only if they are interpreted 
on their own terms rather than those of a "grand" theory). 
335. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE 
LJ. 455 (1984); Shiffrin, supra note 334. 
336. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 741-43, 748-50, 753, 757-58, 760, 762-64 (sug-
gesting that commentators generally have failed to appreciate the degree to which their 
own normative views on constitutional interpretation tend to influence their review of 
precedents by making them more skeptical of certain kinds of decisions and, therefore, 
more disposed to devise a rule for review that allows the precedents they each prefer to 
survive). 
337. For example, there are problems with Professor Maltz's proposal, supra note 12, 
at 483 (suggesting that the Court more fully explain the principles on which its decisions 
rest and not apply its overrulings retroactively nor issue holdings more broadly than 
necessary). First, if his rules were voluntary, then they would be of use only as long as 
all of the Justices were inclined to accept them. Second, the constraining power of the 
rule, even if mandatory, is limited because they are subject to manipulation through 
different interpretations. Third, it is not clear at what point a precedent would deviate 
fr~m his preferred mode of decisionmaking such that he would then be concerned. 
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For example, many commentators have recommended increased 
candor among the Justices in constitutional cases but have not fully 
considered or discussed two possible effects of this proposal. 338 
First, this proposal could have the effect of making consensus more 
difficult on the Court. More particularly, greater candor on the 
Court might complicate or hinder coalition building, and thereby 
inhibit and weaken the Court's ability to issue rulings more quickly, 
or possibly at all, on such politically divisive or contentious subjects 
as abortion or economic regulations.339 Consequently, the theorists 
making this proposal need to address more fully the degree to which 
Justices need to compromise their normative views when reviewing 
precedent or in generally deciding a case.340 
Second, a proposal for greater candor might have the effect of 
increasing respect for the Court by providing an outlet for the rea-
soned differences among the Justices. This suggestion, however, 
can overlook that respect for the Court might just as easily depend 
on the Justices' submergence of their personal views, even as to the 
important reasons for overruling precedents, for the sake of consen-
sus or stability.341 
Of course, the effects of different proposals for reconciling the 
standards for interpreting the Constitution and reviewing prece-
dents may be only some of the factors theorists take into account in 
making choices between different proposals. The choices may also 
turn on the reasons or goals underlying the proposal and on certain 
political or moral judgments of the kind of Court and society the 
Justices or theorists prefer.342 It is long overdue for Justices and 
theorists to disclose the extent to which they rely on the latter kind 
of judgments in making their choices on their approaches to 
precedent. 
Such disclosures might clarify the seeming impropriety of liberals 
tending toward those theories that do not conform to conservative 
precedents, while conservatives may tend toward those theories that 
are incompatible with liberal precedents. Until now, neither liberals 
nor conservatives have been much inclined to defend their choices 
in terms of the political or moral judgments underlying their prefer-
ences because doing so might brand them as biased. 343 
338. See supra note 209. 
339. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 805-07, 832 (suggesting greater reasoned 
elaboration on the part of each justice but accepting the inevitable conflict that this 
would produce on the Court). 
340. Professor Monaghan's suggestion that the reasoned elaboration of principle 
should be the goal for each justice, see supra note 7, at 764-67, strikes a balance that 
would preserve certain kinds of constitutional precedents and secure a specific role for 
the Court under the Constitution. 
341. Another proposal suggests that to increase stability, predictability, and imparti-
ality in the Court's decisionmaking each justice should try to emphasize the institutional 
considerations of each decision more than her normative views on constitutional inter-
pretation. See Bennett, supra note 215, at 258-60. 
342. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CoNSTITUTION 
15 (1991); Richard Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 Omo ST. LJ. 187, 204, 206 (1981); 
Perry, supra note 95, at 718-19. 
343. See supra note 342. 
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Fuller disclosure of a theorist's political or moral judgments 
about the good society might also clarify to some extent the prob-
lem that Professor Jack Balkin calls "ideological drift," by which po-
sitions identified at a particular moment in history with a given 
political stance, come at a later-point to be identified with quite dif-
ferent positions.s44 For example, many liberals are beginning to 
discover the virtues of judicial restraint and stare decisis, 345 while 
many conservatives have begun to differ on the merits of a more 
active judiciary for the sake of restoring certain basic principles of 
constitutional law, or on whether the very existence of a body of 
precedent is a conservative, stabilizing force in adjudication.346 
2. Critiquing Constitutional Hierarchies 
As a practical matter, it is no longer true that the Constitution is 
the sole "touchstone" of constitutiomU decisionmaking.347 Instead, 
the Justices tend to consider, weigh, and arrange differently a variety 
of sources of decision, including precedent, in resolving any consti-
tutional matter brought before them.348 The gloss added to the 
Constitution in the form of precedents is an integral part of most 
dialogues among the Justices about the Constitution. 
The more difficult, and perhaps impossible, question to answer is 
whether one· can determine precedent's precise influence as source 
of decision for each of the Justices. In one of the more comprehen-
sive efforts to resolve this question, Professor Richard Fallon argues 
that 
mostjudges, lawyers, and commentators recognize the relevance 
of at least five kinds of constitutional argument: arguments from 
the plain, necessary or historical meaning of the constitutional 
344. J .M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amend-
ment, 1990 DUKE LJ. 375, 383. 
345. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
346. Compare RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DoMAIN (1985) (arguing that the original understanding supports interpreting the 
takings clause to invalidate a wide range of economic regulation) and BERNARD StEGAN, 
EcONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1980) (arguing for a resurgence in eco-
nomic substantive due process) and Earl Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival Of Conservative 
Activism in Constitutional]urisprudence, 24 GA. L. REv. 629, 668 (1990) (suggesting that 
"the emergence of conservative activism may ultimately be the best hope for a general 
resurgence of the philosophy of judicial restraint") with Monaghan, supra note 7, at 752 
(suggesting that "[a] practice ofjudicial adherence to this body of precedent will further 
conservative values") (citation omitted). Professor Monaghan explains that his latter 
statement reflects "an avowedly conservative conception of the judicial office-con-
servative in a Burkean, not libertarian sense. There is an important and wide difference 
between the two." !d. at 752 n.l65. 
347. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,J., concurring). 
348. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 315, at 14~17 (expressing concern that the text is 
only one factor among many in contemporary constitutional decisionmaking). 
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text; arguments about the intent of the framers; arguments of con-
stitutional theory that reason from the hypothesized purposes that 
best explain either particular constitutional provisions or the con-
stitutional text as a whole; arguments based on judicial precedent; 
and value arguments that assert claims about justice or social 
policy.349 
According to Professor Fallon, the Court's objective should be to 
reconcile its decisions with respect to each of the five kinds of con-
stitutional argument. 
My quarrel with Professor Fallon's suggestion about how consti-
tutional disputes should be resolved is that it would produce more 
conflict than consensus because the Justices may have signififant dif-
ferences of opinion about how each of the five kinds of constitu-
tional arguments apply in a given case. Nor does his analysis 
account for legitimate differences among the Justices concerning the 
ranking and content of the different sources of argument. More-
over, Fallon discounts the practical reality that each Justice might 
have good reason to defer to a single source that points to a clear 
result in a particular case. For example, in separation of powers 
cases, Justice White might be inclined to place precedent more to-
ward the forefront of the sources that he consults in light of the 
Court's settled practice to defer to Congress' innovations;350 how-
ever, in this same area, Justice Scalia seems to place comparatively 
more weight on the text and history than he places on the relevant 
precedents in order to protect individual liberty from congressional 
deviations from constitutional structure.sst 
In addition, it is interesting to note that, even though he lias yet to 
participate in deciding any cases, Justice Thomas repeatedly testi-
fied in his confirmation proceedings that in approaching constitu-
tional issues he would consult the relevant precedents or case law as 
his first step in making a decision on the Court.ss2 Although Justice 
Thomas' statements may have been designed to alleviate some Sen-
ators' concerns about his intentions to help undo many liberal 
precedents, his stated position conflicts with Professor Fallon's 
ranking of the different sources of decision and demonstrates the 
degree to which the Justices each have the discretion, flexibility, and 
need to arrange the sources of decision as they see fit. 
C. Toward a Reconciliation of Theory and Precedent 
If Justices or theorists were seriously interested in accommodat-
ing precedent in their work product, then they should try to do two 
things. First, they should formulate criteria for overruling decisions 
349. Fallon, supra note 20, at 1189-90. 
350. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White,J., dissenting). 
351. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,413 (1989) (Scalia,J., dissenting); 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
352. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Adding up the Supreme Quiz Score; Flawed but Passing, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, al Fl; Walter V. Robinson, Thomas Self-Portmit: Rightist, .Vol Ac-
til•lst, BosT. GI.OBE, Sept. 18, 1991, at I; David G. Savage, Thomas Backs Pl"l!cedent as Testi-
mouy Ellds, L.A. TIMES, Sepl. 17, 1991, at I. 
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that provide (1) real protection for most precedents and (2) suffi-
cient flexibility for the Justices to act conscientiously to undo.deci-
sions when they believe there are important reasons to do so. The 
appropriate criteria that seem to meet these objectives already have 
been proposed in effect by several Justices and by Professors 
Monaghan and Israel: the demonstration of a precedent's errone-
ous reasoning and some other substantial or important considera-
tion, such as the precedent's proven unworkability or inconsistency 
with substantial case law.sss 
Second, theorists and the Justices should recognize that the most 
effective way to implement the .criteria proposed above is through 
the Justices' pressuring each other in the decisionmaking process. 
The criteria are the common ground that the Justices should be try-
ing to influence each other to occupy. In other words, the current 
Justices need to send the message to each other and to future Jus-
tices (in the form of precedents) that the former will overrule deci-
sions only if they find those decisions were erroneously reasoned 
and are otherwise substantially problematic in some demonstrable 
way. As a practical matter, the most likely way that the Justices can 
pressure each other to follow certain criteria for overrulings is for 
them to adopt a practice under which they each are expected at 
some point in the deliberative process to give their reasons for find-
ing that the criteria for overrulings have been met or not met in a 
given case. 
The antiforrnalist concept of dialogue is the theoretical approach 
to interpretation and acljudication that best seems to accommodate 
the criteria that I have proposed above; it allows the Justices to pres-
sure each other through the disclosure of their respective reasons 
for finding that the criteria have been met or not met. Indeed, 
American law exalts dialogue. Much recent theoretical writing has 
focused on ·the degree to which a meaningful exchange of ideas 
should be at the center of governmental decisionmakfug authorized 
by the Constitution/354 and the Court's review ofits precedents es-
sentially has involved a colloquy among the Justices on the criteria 
353. See Israel, supra note 25, at 219-26; Monaghan, supra note 7, at 758. 
354. A growing number of theorists have sought to revive a "republican" system of 
government in which "dialogue" figures prominently as the critical device by which con-
sensus on the public good is achieved in legislative decisionmaking. See, e.g., BENJAMIN 
R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POUTICS FOR A NEW AGE 117, 173 
(1984); Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1529-37 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1580-81 (1988). These schol-
ars offer their conception of the legislative process as an alternative to the classical lib-
eral view, which maintains that as long as all relevant groups have equal access to the 
democratic process, they should be allowed to battle among themselves for whatever 
benefits they can get from the state. See, e.g., RoBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMO· 
CRATIC THEORY 132 (1956); ELY, supra note 114, at 135; M. MARGOLIS, VIABLE DEMOC· 
RACY 99 (1979); Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107, 
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for evaluating the need to disrupt previously settled constitutional 
doctrine. 355 
As a normative matter, there are five reasons that a dialogic ap-
proach insisting on greater reasoned elaboration of the Justices' 
grounds for finding a heightened standard for overruling decisions 
has been met is superior to the status quo. In reviewing these rea-
sons, however, one should keep in mind that, in practice, they may 
not guarantee any particular outcome because the Justices can argue 
conscientiously that strong reasons point in favor of overruling. 
Nevertheless, reasoned elaboration discloses to present and fu-
ture generations and Courts the Justices' grounds for following 
heightened criteria for overruling decisions and for having applied 
them in a certain way in a particular case.356 Reasoned elaboration 
can provide guidance to litigants and Justices on how to argue 
against previous Courts' choices and in favor of different choices on 
overruling precedents. 
Second, reasoned elaboration on whether heightened criteria 
have been met can demonstrate the Justices' careful consideration 
of each litigant's arguments for overruling.357 Indeed, constitu-
tional adjudication is at its most legitimate when the Court deliber-
ates carefully about the constitutional visions of different segments 
150-51 (1976). For an excellent survey and critique of both the "liberal" and "republi-
can" views of the legislative process, see Cynthia V. Ward, The Limits of"Liberal Republi-
canism·~ Why Group-Based Remedies and Republican Citizenship Don't Mix, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 
581 (1991). For commentators focusing on the degree to which constitutional adjudica-
tion is a form of dialogue, see irifra note 355. 
355. For the notion of constitutional acljudication as a form of dialogue requiring 
reasoned elaboration on the principles or values underlying particular decisions, see 
Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE LJ. 455 (1984) 
(arguing that the legitimacy of the Court's adjudication ultimately depends on an under-
lying alliance between opponents); Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 90, 95, 99-100 (em-
phasizing the importance of disclosure and discussion of values pertinent to the 
constitutional issue at hand); Farber, supra note 204, at 1343 (claiming that pragmatism 
increases the possibility of dialogue between the Court and society by showing the Jus-
tices how to balance competing social values through legal reasoning and experience); 
Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10-15 (1979) (constru-
ing the judicial function as an attempt to reveal or elaborate the meaning of constitu-
tional values through the dialogue of adjudication); see also Richard H. Fallon, What Is 
Republicanism and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1695, 1697, 1735 (1989) (pro-
viding a liberal critique of two modem republican conceptions of constitutional deci-
sionmaking as dialogue); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 
STAN. L. REv. 29, 86-87 (1985) (arguing that constitutional adjudication should be a 
dialogic process in which the judiciary prevents interest groups from manipulating gov-
ernmental power against the "common good" by closely scrutinizing legislation to en-
sure that it accurately reflects citizens' preferences). 
Of course, reasoned elaboration does not take place in a vacuum; it occurs within a 
multimembered Court in which each member should take into account the need to com-
promise for the sake of such social institutional values as stability and consensus. See 
supra notes 215-27 and accompanying text and infra note 363 and accompanying text 
(discussing the factors individual justices might be inclined to consider when reviewing 
precedents). 
356. See supra note 355; see also Terrence Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 
MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1033, 1048, 1051, 1067-68 (1981). 
357. But too much discussion can result in unclear holdings. See supra note 99; see also 
Monaghan, supra note 7, at 755 n.184 (arguing that the individual justices have an insti-
tutional obligation to harmonize their views}. The appropriate equilibrium between dis-
cussion of precedents and clarity in the Court's decisionmaking is an indispensable 
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of society and the values that it might endorse (or perpetuate) for 
the operation of govemment.35B When the Justices explain their re-
fusal to overrule a precedent under heightened criteria, the Justices 
show that they have taken seriously. the arguments for upsetting the 
status quo, including settled expectations, while revie·wing the pre-
cedent reveals the Justices' willingness to look at new ways of deal-
ing with old ideas. 
Third, reasoned elaboration in the Court's opinion writing on 
whether heightened criteria have been met is a necessary precondi-
tion for a genuine dialogue on which values should continue to 
guide the Court's decisionmaking in a particular area. There can be 
no meaningful exchange of ideas among th~ Justices on the ques-
tion of continued adherence to precedent unless they each disclose 
their reasons for the positions they have taken and the values they 
believe should continue to guide the Court's decisionmaking on the 
particular issue under reconsideration. · 
Fourth, reasoned elaboration on whether the criteria have been 
met can sharpen the Justices' thinking about whether continued ad-
herence to a particular doctrine is worthwhile. The Justices' delib-
erations about the values they are thinking about substituting for 
other values previously endorsed by the Court for the operation of 
government will be clarified if they each know they must include in 
their opinions the reasons for finding that the criteria for overrul-
ings have been satisfied or not. 
Last, criticism of the Court's overruling of precedents may actu-
ally be a complaint about the Court's departure; from a common law 
mentality in constitutional decisionmaking.ssg The common law ap-
proach, which feeds off reasoned elaboration, seeks to preserve a 
variety of values, including the legitimation of judicial review itself 
as an impartial decisionmaking process distinguishable from the 
heated partisanship of the legislative process. If the Justices have 
important reasons for abandoning a previously formulated rule of 
law, then it is more likely that their decision to overrule will appear 
to be impartial rather than meanly political. 
But even if they were using a tougher standard for overruling 
precedents, many Justices still might conscientiously find good rea-
son for overruling or severely narrowing many precedents. Each 
Justice still may have different views on the plausibility and strength 
element of the more general decisionmaking process in which the justices balance their 
normative views on constitutional interpretation and the need to submerge those views 
for the sake of certain institutional values such as stability or consensus. See supra notes 
215-27 and accompanying text. 
358. See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 752-53. 
359. See supra notes II & Ill; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
FRAMERS' CoNSTlTUTION 329-49 (1988) (describing the tradition of the common-law 
Constitution). 
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of the reasons being put forward for overruling or reaffirming cer-
tain precedents. Consequently, it is not surprising to find, for exam-
ple, that in Payne v. Tennessee 360 the conservative majority split on the 
criteria for overrulings, but not on whether the criteria that each of 
the Justices each chose to follow were met in that case. 
Without doubt, the Court's ideological shift to the right will have 
an inevitable impact on precedent because, depending on the area 
involved, many of the Justices may not rank precedent very high in 
their calculations and, as such, find other compelling reasons for 
overruling, or at least weakening, certain precedents. For instance, 
even though in Harmelin v. Michigan 361 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter refused to find that Justice Scalia's criteria for overruling 
Solem v. Helm 362 had been met, those same three Justices favored 
severely narrowing Solem in part because their reading of the text and 
history of the Eighth Amendment and other case law suggested to 
them that Solem was problematic. Given the ideological makeup of 
these latter Justices, it will not be hard for critics to charge that the 
reasoning of those three Justices in Harmelin was bad, partisan, or 
could have been better; however, this kind of criticism is almost al-
ways applicable in constitutional law because there are so many re-
spectable and defensible angles from which to view constitutional 
problems and the sources of decision with which to resolve those 
issues. 363 In the final analysis, even though we might insist that each 
Justice should seriously consider and even try, when possible, to de-
fer to certain values, such as the need for stability or continuity in 
constitutional law, this insistence will not and cannot guarantee any 
particular outcome or result in a particular case. 
Regarding constitutional adjudication as a form of dialogue be-
tween the Justices and different segments of society using the Con-
stitution as the required medium of discourse concedes that the 
power that enabled the Justices to reject Plessy can also be used to 
abandon Brown. 364 This idea is disturbing because it acknowledges 
that, as a practical matter, precedents can last only as long as a ma-
jority of the Court wishes to preserve them. Hard-fought victories, 
such as Roe, can erode over time. But this insight is also instructive 
because it underscores the need for the Justices and the citizenry to 
defend the precedents about which they care most. Brown has 
achieved permanency precisely because subsequent generations (on 
360. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991}. 
361. Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991}. 
362. 463 u.s. 277 (1983). 
363. Indeed, as the hearings on Robert Bork's nomination to be an Associate justice 
illustrated, the public exhibits no preference for finding a single theory to resolve the 
countermajoritarian difficulty. See Posner, supra note 321, at 1382. In large part, the 
people's respect for the Court may be premised on their perception of each justice's 
willingness to factor into his or her decisionmaking such institutional values as stability 
and consensus, and of the Court's flexibility preserved through its steadfast refusal to 
endorse one overarching methodology or set of values directing constitutional interpre-
tation. Thus, respect for the Court seems to turn more on the Court's aversion to, 
rather than attraction for, one theoretical view of constitutional decisionmaking. 
364. See WELLINGTON, supra note 11, at 152, 158; Sandalow, supra note 356, at 1068-
72; Stone, supra note 8, at 72-73. 
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the Court and in the political process, including confirmation pro-
ceedings) have been willing to endorse the value of ending segrega-
tion chosen by the Warren Court to displace the value of 
segregation previously embraced by the Plessy Court. The values or 
criteria that the Justices use in reviewing precedents cannot be taken 
for granted by the citizenry, who can voice their concerns in the ju-
dicial nomination and confirmation processes, their choices of the 
President who nominates Justices, and the kinds of arguments they 
make in the adjudicative and legislative processes. 
Conclusion 
Given that the present Supreme Court is as ideologically unbal-
anced as it has ever been in this century, many people fear it will 
overrule or severely narrow numerous precedents about which they 
care. This Article has tried to relieve this anxiety to some extent. It 
has argued that, in constitutional decisionmaking, it is inevitable for 
thejustice:5 to come into contact and conflict with many precedents 
with whose reasoning, holdings, and/or constitutional visions and 
values they disagree. This Article has also argued that the Court's 
review of i_ts precedents is, for the most part, a dynamic process in 
which the Justices individually balance their views on how the Con-
stitution should be interpreted and the social or institutional conse-
quences of no longer preserving particular values previously 
endorsed by the Court for the operation of government. 
This Article argues further that once we shift our focus from try-
ing to figure out whether the Court has crafted a coherent doctrine 
on precedent to the particular ways in which the individual Justices 
approach precedent, we can expect that in the forseeable future the 
Justices will probably be debating which one of two standards they 
should use for resolving their conflicts over precedents. First, some 
may prefer to overrule precedents that they have deemed errone-
ously reasoned. This approach has the virtue of preserving the Jus-
tices' flexibility in making decisions and of sharpening the reasoning 
of the Court's opinions. It has the obvious drawback of ultimately 
producing chaos or uncertainty over the longevity of various princi-
ples in constitutional law by providing later Justices (with their 
unique perspectives) with a rule of law on which to rely in overrul-
ing precedents that they deem erroneously reasoned. 
A second approach is for the Justices to demand something more 
than erroneous reasoning as a basis on which to overrule a prece-
dent. Indeed, in one form or another, most Justices throughout his-
tory have favored overruling precedents on the grounds of 
erroneous reasoning and some other serious flaw justifying overrul-
ing, including unworkability and incon~istencies with case law. The 
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benefit of this second approach is that, like the common law ap-
proach to constitutional adjudication, it ultimately may not prevent 
overrulings but rather, if followed, might slow down the overrulings 
because it justifies overruling precedents only if after the passage of 
some time a decision has proved to be defective in some serious 
way. This approach would not guarantee any particular outcomes, 
however, because the justices still can state conscientiously their 
reasons for overrulings in sufficiently strong terms to satisfy even a 
heightened standard of review for precedents. Although adherents 
to this second approach may split on whether the criteria have been 
met in a particular case, it has the additional advantage of paying 
more explicit attention to the traditional values associated with fi-
delity to precedent, including the neutral, consistent, ~md predict-
able application of the rule of law as well as the legitimation of 
judicial review itself. 
Because neither of the approaches the Justices are likely to follow 
in determining whether to overrule precedents would provide much 
lasting protection for precedents, people interested in safeguarding 
precedents from being overruled might also look to the political 
process. If it chose, the Senate could insist, inter alia, that nominees 
to the Supreme Court express a clear liking for the values associated 
with fidelity to precedent, and detail the circumstances under which 
they would vote to overrule precedents. Or, the Senate could inves-
tigate further into the moral or political judgments of the nominees 
regarding the Court's role in our political system and the kind of 
society we should have, with the hope of finding people who share 
the Senators' views on either the appropriate criteria for overruling, 
or the cases that should not be overruled. Yet another solution is 
for the Congress to take more decisive action in passing legislation 
to restore the liberties that the Supreme Court may restrict.365 
For their part, theorists need to accommodate precedent (and the 
values associated with its preservation) in their proposals for consti-
tutional interpretation and adjudication. In this regard, they, like 
the Justices and the Senate, should pay more explicit attention to 
their respective moral or political judgments about the Court's role 
and the kind of society we should have that may be the starting 
points for their constitutional analysis. 
In the final analysis, the difficult thing is, of course, to identify 
precisely precedent's place among the sources of constitutional 
decisionmaking, including the text, history, and theory. Perhaps the 
most that safely can ever be said is that precedent has a pervasive 
role in constitutional decisionmaking, and that it is an integral part 
of the more general dialogue in which each Justice considers the 
reasons for preserving or rejecting the values his predecessors have 
previously endorsed for guiding the operation of government. In 
365. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. 
L. REv. I (1975) (arguing in part that Congress effectively could overrule Supreme 
Court decisions failing to recognize individual liberties by passing legislation that pro· 
vides protections for such liberties~. 
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my opinion, no analysis of the Court's review of precedent is com-
plete, nor could any proposal for improving that process work, with-
out taking into account that there is a point at which, in reviewing 
precedents, eachjustice tends to balance his views on how the Con-
stitution should be interpreted, and perceptions of the need for the 
Court to defer to the social or institutional values of stability and 
continuity in constitutional law. 
As long as it is likely that the Court will not adopt a standard of 
review for precedent that will guarantee a particular outcome, then 
the most that one can expect, or demand, from the Court is for a 
·heightened degree of discussion regarding the reasons for restrict-
ing or overruling a precedent. In the long run, the Court's most 
important mission is to preserve this dialogue. Candid and rea-
soned elaboration of the criteria for overruling precedents is indis-
pensable to constitutional adjudication because it provides a basis 
for present and future generations to understand, and to respond 
to, the reasons underlying each Justice's choices on the values to 
perpetuate for guiding governmental operation, and because it dem-
onstrates that the Court has fully and seriously considered the argu-
ments in favor of preserving precedent. Consequendy, the more 
openly and fully the Justices discuss the reasons or criteria for ad-
hering to or rctiecting precedent, the more confident the people can 
be that the Court is taking seriously the values associated with pre-
cedent, and that the rumors of its demise have been gready 
exaggerated. 
Appendix* 
Any list of explicit overrulings is idiosyncratic. In this Appendix, I 
offer my list of those cases in which the Supreme Court made unmis-
takably clear its intent to overrule some prior decision(s). The Ap-
pendix does not include precedents involving statutory 
interpretation. 
0VERRUUNG CAsE OVERTURNING 
VOTE OF THE CouRT OVERRULED CAsE(S) LANGUAGE SUBJE!=i" MAnER 
Tk Propelkr Gemste Tk Tlzomasjtjfmon, 23 "if we follow [Thomas maritime jurisdiction; 
Clziif v. Fitzlzugh, 53 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 173 ]tjfmon], we follow an art. Ill, § 2, cl. I 
U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1825); Tlze Or/tans v. erroneous decision." 
(1851) (8·1) Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 53 U.S. at 456. 
Pet.) 175 (1837) 
Knox v. Lu, (Legal Htpbum v. Griswold, 75 "overrule." 79 U.S. at impairment of 
Tender Cases), 79 U.S. U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 553. contrncts; art. I, § 2, 
(12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (1870) cl. 1 
(5·4) 
* Laura Dalton, Class of 1991, deserves special mention for her creative and 
diligent work in helping to construct this Appendix. 
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0\'F.RRUUNG CASE OvERTURNING 
\'oTF. oF TilE CouRT 0\'ERRULED CASE(S) LANGUAGE SUBJECT MATTER 
Krlhoum t•. Thompson, Amln:son v. Dmm, 19 "notwithstanding what power of Congress to 
103 u.s. 168 (1880) U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 is said in the case of punish witness for 
(7-0) (1821) Anderson v. Dunn" 103 contempt; art. I, § 5 
U.S. at 199-200. 
Plnlad~lphra and S. State Tax on Ry. t•. Gross "the first ground on state taxation in 
Sttamslup Co. t•. Rmipts, 82 U.S. (15 which the decision in violation of Commerce 
Permsy/vama, 122 U.S. Wall.) 284 (1872) State Tax ••• was Clause; art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
326 (1887) (8-0) placed is not tenable." 
122 U.S. at 342. 
In reAym, 123 U.S. Osborn v. United States decision distinguished sovereign immunity; 
443 (1887) (8-0) Bank, 22 U.S. (9 at 123 U.S. at 488. amend. XI 
Wheat.) 738 (1~24) 
ul.oup v. Port 'If Mohik, Osborne v. Mohik, 83 "an ordinance [of the state taxation in 
127 u.s. 640 (1888) U.S. (16 Wall.) 479 type in Osborne] would violation of Commerce 
(9-0) (1872) now be regarded as Clause; art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
repugnant to the power 
conferred upon 
Congress." 127 U.S. at 
647. 
Lezsy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. Prerce v. New Hampshire, "Prerce v. New Hampshire interpretation of 
100 (1890) (6-3) 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 ••• must be regarded Congressional silence 
(1847) as having been concerning interstate 
distinctly overthrown commerce; art. I, § 8, 
by the numerous cases cl. 3 
hereinafter referred 
to." 135 U.S. at liS. 
Garland v. ll'ashi11gton, Crain v. United States, "overruled.'' 232 U.S. criminal procedure and 
232 u.s. 642 (1914) 162 u.s. 625 (1896) at 647. due process; Amend. 
(9-0) XIV 
United States v. Nice, 241 Malter 'If Ht}f. 197 U.S. "overruled." 241 u.s. commerce with Indian 
u.s. 591 (1916) (9-0) 488 (1905) at 601. tribes; art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
Pen11sylvania R.R. v. Lake Shore Ry. v. Smith, "overruled.'' 245 u.s. rate fixing and due 
Towm, 245 U.S. 6 173 u.s. 684 (1899) at 17. process; Amend. XIV 
(1917) (9-0) 
Terral v. Burk~ Comtr. Doyle v. Co11tinentallm. "overruled." 257 U.S. right to resort to 
Co., 257 U.S. 529 Co., 94 U.S. 535 at 533. federal courts; art. III 
(1922) (9-0) (1876); Security .Hut. Lift 
lm. Co. v. Prewilt, 202 
u.s. 246 (1906) 
Alpha Qmmt Co. t•. Baltic Mini11g Co. v. "definitely state ta.xation in 
Massachus~tts, 268 U.S. MasJachusetts, 231 U.S. disapproved." 268 u.s. conflict with the 
203 (1925) (8-1) 68 (1913) at 218. Commerce Clause; art. 
I,§ 8, cl. 3 
Fanner's Loan and Trust Blackstone v. .\ltller, 188 "definitely overruled. •• due process concerning 
Co. v. Min11esota, 280 u.s. 189 (1903) 280 U.S. at 209. inheritance tax; Amend. 
u.s. 204 (1930) (7-2) XIV 
East Ohio Gas Co. v. Ta...: Pnmsylvania Gas Co. v. "disapproved to the state taxation under 1he 
Comm 'n, 283 U.S. 465 Public Sert•. Comm n, 252 extent it is in conflict Commerce Clause; art. 
(1931) (9-0) u.s. 23 (1920) with our decision I,§8,c1.3 
here." 283 U.S. at 472. 
ChiCago & E. Ill. R.R. v. Em R.R. v. Collms, 253 "definitely overruled." FELAandthe 
btdustnal Comm'n, 284 U.S. 77 (1920); Erie 284 U.S. at 299. Commerce Clause; art. 
u.s. 296 (1932) (9-0) R.R. t•. S:ary, 253 U.S. I,§ 8, cl. 3 
8 (1920) 
Fox Frlm Corp. v. Doyal, Lo11g v. Rockwood, 277 - "definitely O\'erruled." immunity from state 
286 u.s. 123 (1932) u.s. 142 (1928) 286 U.S. at 131. taxation of federal 
(9-0) instrumentalities under 
Supremacy Clause; art. 
\'1, cl. 2 
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OVERRULING CAsE OVERTURNING 
VoTE OFntE CouRT OVERRULED CAsE(S) LANGUAGE SUBJECT 1\fATI'ER· 
ll~t Coast Hotel Co. v. Adkins v. Childrm:r "overruled.'' 300 U.S. due process concerning 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 at 400. minimum wage Jaw; 
(1937) (5-4) (1923) amend. XIV 
Htlumng t•. Mountain Burmt v. Cowrada Oil & "overruled.'' 303 U.S. immunity of state 
Producm Corp., 303 U.S. Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 at 387. instrumentality from 
376 (1938) (5-2) {1932); Gillispie v. federal tax; amend. X 
Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 
{1922) 
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. "In disapproving [the rights reserved to the 
304 u.s. 64 (1938) (16 Pet.) I (1842) Swift] doctrine" 304 states; amend. X 
{S.O) U.S. at 79-80. 
Graves v. Nni~ York a reL Dobbins v. Erie County, "overruled.'' 306 U.S. immunity of federal 
O'Kttft, 306 U.S. 466 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 at486. and state officers from 
(1939) (7-2) (1842); Colkclor v. Day, income taxes; amend. 
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 X 
(1870); Nni~ lork a rtL 
Rogm v. Graves, 299 
U.S. 401 (1937); Bmsh 
v. Commissioner, 300 
u.s. 352 (1937) 
O'Malley v. IVoodrough, Euans v. Gore, 253 U.S. "to the extent that diminution of judges' 
307 u.s. 277 (1939) 245 (1920); Miles v. what the Coun now salaries through 
(7-1) Graham, 268 U.S. 501 says is inconsistent ••• taxation; an. III, § I. 
(1925) [Miles] cannot survive.'' 
307 U.S. at 282-83. 
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 "overruled." 309 U.S. right to engage in 
u.s. 83 (1940) (7-2) u.s. 404 (1935) at93. certain incidents of 
business and the 
Privileges and 
Immunities Clause; 
amend. XIV 
Htlumng v. Hallock, 309 Becker v. St. Louis Union "We therefore reject as value of remainder 
u.s. 106 (1940) (7-2) Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 untenable the interest is part of 
(1935); Helumngv. St. diversities taken in the decedent's gross estate 
Louis Union Trust Co., St. Louis Trust Cases in under the Revenue Act 
296 u.s. 39 (1935) applying the Klein of 1926. 
doctrine ••• .'' 309· 
U.S. at 122. 
1ignerv. Ttxas, 310 U.S. Comrolly v. Union Sewer "Connolly :r case ••• is equal protection of 
141 (1940) (8-1) Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 no longer controlling.'' various industries 
(1902) 310 U.S. at 147. under criminal laws to 
deter monopolies: 
amend. XIV 
C!nittd Statts v. Darby, Hammer v. Dagenhart, "overruled." 312 U.S. fair labor standards 
312 u.s. 100 (19·H) 247 u.s. 251 (1918) at 116-17. within the Commerce 
(9-0) Clause; amends. V, X 
l'nittd Statts v. Chirago, l'nittd Statts t•. Htytmrd, "(S)o far as [L_wzah and authorized takings and 
.\filu•auktt, St. Paul & 250 u.s. 633 (1919); Htyu•ard] sanction[ ) just compensation; 
Par. R.R .. 312 U.S. 592 l'nittd States t•. L:rnah, such a principle, it is in amend. V 
(1941) (9-0) 188 u.s. 445 (1903) irreconcilable conflict 
with our later decisions 
and cannot be 
considered as 
expressing the law." 
312 l'.S. at598. 
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0VERRUUNG CASE OVERTURNING 
VoTE OF THE COURT OVERRULED CASE(S) LANGUAGE SUBJECT MATrER 
California v. Thompson, DiSanto v. Pmnsylvania, "overruled." 313 U.S. licensing criteria for 
313 u.s. 109 (1941) 273 u.s. 34 (1927) at 116. free agents under the 
(9-0) Commerce Clause; art. 
I, §8,cl.3 
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 Ribnik v. McBrilk, 277 "The drift away from due process concerns 
u.s. 236 (1941) (9-0) u.s. 350 (1928) [Ribnik] has been so of business affected 
great that it can no with a public interest; 
longer be deemed a amend. XIV 
controlling authority." 
313 U.S. at 244. 
Alabama v. King (5 Panhandle Oil Co. v. "(S]o far as a different immunity of federal 
Boour, 314 U.S. 1 Knox, 277 U.S. 218 view has prevailed [in government from state 
(1941) (9·0) (1928); Graves v. Ttxa.s Panhandle and Graves], taxation under the 
Co., 298 u.s. 393 we think it no longer Supremacy Clause; art. 
(1936) tenable." 314 U.S. at VI, §2 
9. 
State Tax Comm n v. First Nat'l Bank v. "overrule." 316 U.S. at due process and death 
.-tldrich, 316 U.S. 174 Maine, 284 U.S. 312 181. tax; amend. XIV 
(1942) (7-2) (1932) 
llllliams v. North Haddock v. Haddock, 201 "overruled." 317 U.S. full faith and credit 
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 u.s. 562 (1906) at 304. concerning divorce 
(1942) (7-2) decree; art. IV, § I 
jones v. Opelika, 319 jones v. Opelika, 316 "The judgment injones license tax imposed on 
U.S. 103 (1943) (per u.s. 584 (1942) v. Opelika has this day religious colporteurs; 
curiam); Murdock v. been vacated." 319 amend. I 
Pmnsy/vania, 319 U.S. U.S. at 117. 
105 (1943) (5-4) 
Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. Chillkrs v. Beaver, 270 "Chillkrs ••• was in state estate taxes 
u.s .. 319 u.s. 598 u.s. 555 (1926) effect overruled by the imposed on federally 
(1943) (5-4) Mountain Producm restricted Indian 
decision." 319 U.S. at property under the 
604. Supremacy Clause; art. 
VI,§ 2 
!Vest l'irginia Bd. of Educ. Minmvi/le Sch. Dist. v. "overruled." 319 U.S. freedom of religion and 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 at 1187. due process; amends. I, 
624 ( 1943) (6-3) (1940) XIV 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 Cravey v. Townsend. 295 "overruled." 321 U.S. right to vote; amend. 
u.s. 649 (1944) (8-1) u.s. 45 (1935) at 666. XV 
Girouard v. United States, United Stales v. "We conclude that the construction of the 
328 u.s. 61 (1946) Schwimmer, 279 U.S. Schwimmer, Macintosh, Naturalization Act in 
(5-3) 644 (1929); Unittd States and Bland cases do not light of freedom of 
v. Macintosh. 283 U.S. state the correct rule of religion guarantee; 
605 (1931); United States Jaw." 328 U.S. at 69. amend. I 
v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 
(1931) 
.-tngelt•. Bullmgton, 330 Lupton :S Sons Co. v. "Cases like Lupton s ... diversity jurisdiction; 
u.s. 183 (1947) (6-3) Automobile Club, 225 are obsolete insofar as art.lll, § 2 
u.s. 489 (1912) they are based on a 
view of diversity 
jurisdiction which came 
to an end with Eri~." 
330 U.S. at 192. 
Lmcol11 l'mo11 ''· .-tdair ''· l'mttd Statts, "This Court has state legislation 
.\'orthwtslml Iron & 208 u.s. 161 (1907); steadily rejected the prohibiting injurious 
.l!ttal Co., 335 U.S. 525 Coppage ''· Kansas, 236 due process philosophy business practices and 
(1948) (9-0) U.S. I (1914) enunciated in the .-tda~r due process; amend. 
- Coppage line of cases ... XI\' 
335 U.S. at 536. 
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Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Choctaw, OAla. & Gulf "overruled." 336 U.S. non-Indian leases of 
Tc:as Co., 336 U.S. 342 R.R. v. Harrison, 235 at365. restricted Indian lands 
(1949) (9·0) U.S. 292 (1914): Indian are subject to state 
Taritory /Uuminating Oil production and excise 
Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 taxes: amend. X 
u.s. 522 (1916): 
Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 
247 u.s. 503 (1917): 
Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 
248 u.s. 549 (1919): 
Oklahoma v. Banudall 
Refineries, 296 U.S. 521 
(1936) 
United States v. Trupiano v. United States, "overruled." 339 U.S. reasonableness goes to 
Rahinowit:, 339 U.S. 56 334 u.s. 699 (1948) at66. I the search, not the 
(1950) (5-3) procurement of a 
warrant: amend. IV 
Buntyn v. Wilson, 343 Mutual Film Co. v. "overruled." 343 U.S. freedom of speech and 
u.s. 495 (1952) (9-0) Industrial Comm 'n, 236 
u.s. 230 (1915) 
at 502. press: amend. I 
EIHns v. United States, Weeks v. United States, "reason and experience admissibility of 
364 u.s. 206 (1960) 232 u.s. 383 (1914) ••• point to the evidence obtained by 
(5-4) rejection of [the Weeks] state search in federal 
doctrine." 364 U.S. at court; amend. IV 
222. 
Mapp v. Ohia, 367 U.S. IVo!f v. Colorado, 338 "[w}e can no longer admissibility of 
643 (1961) (5-4) u.s. 25 (1949) pc:nnit that right [to be evidence obtained in an 
secure against invasions illegal federal search in 
of privacy by state state court; amend. IV 
officers] to remain an 
empty promise." 367 
U.S. at660. 
Gickon v. Wainwright, BellS v. Brady, 316 U.S. Amici "argue that BellS applicability of 
372 u.s. 335 (1963) 455 (1942) should now be constitutional right to 
(9·0) overruled. We agree." counsel in state court; 
372 U.S. at 345. amends. VI, XIV 
Ferguson v. Sltrupa, 372 Adams v. Tanntr, 244 "[R]eliance on [Adams] state restrictions on 
u.s. 725 (1963) (8-1) u.s. 590 (1917) is as mistaken as would operation of certain 
be adherence to [Adkins businesses and due 
••• overruled by IJ~I 
Coast Hotelj." 372 U.S. 
process; amend. XIV 
at 731. 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 Twining v. New jmey, "Decisions of the Court privilege against self-
U.S. I (1964) (5·4) 211 u.s. 78 (1908); since Tu•ining and incrimination is 
Adamson v. Colifon~ia, Adamson have departed applicable to state 
332 u.s. 46 (1947) from the contrary view actions; amends. V. 
expressed in those XIV 
cases.'' 378 U.S. at 6. 
• lfurph,r v. llateifront jack v. Karuas, 199 U.S • "The Court today use of federally 
Comm~r. 378 U.S. 52 372 (1905); l"nited States rejected [the rule of the compelled evidence to 
(1964) (7-2) t•. ,\lllrdock, 284 U.S. aforementioned cases], incriminate at state 
141 (1931); Feldman v. and with it, all the level; amends. V, XIV 
l"nited Stales, 322 U.S. earlier cases resting on 
487 (1944); Knapp v. that rule.'' 378 tt.S. at 
Srhu•nl:.n; 357 U.S. 371 77. 
(1958); .\lills v. 
I.onisiar111, 360 U.S. 230 
(1959) 
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jackson v. Dmno, 378 Stein v. Nnu York, 346 "overruled." 378 u.s. determination of 
u.s. 368 (1964) (5-4) u.s. 156 (1953) at 391. voluntariness of a 
confession and due 
process; amend. XIV 
Escobedo ''· 1/lmois, 378 Crooktr v. California, 357 "[T]o the extent that statements made prior 
u.s. 478 (1964) (5-4) U.S.433 (1958); Cicenia ClCmia or Crooktr may to reading of rights 
v. lAGay, 357 U.S. 504 be inconsistent with the when investigation is 
(1958) principles announced focused on one 
today, they are not to individual are 
be regarded as inadmissible; amends. 
controlling." 378 U.S. VI, XIV 
at 492. 
Pointtr v. Texas, 380 !Vest v. lAuisiana, 194 "In the light of Gideon right to confrontation 
u.s. 400 (1965) (7-2) u.s. 258 (1904) ••• the statements applicable in state 
made in 11~1 ••• can coun; amends. VI, XIV 
no longer be regarded 
as the law." 380 U.S. 
at 406. 
Harptr v. Virginia BtL of Bmdlave v. Shu/lies, 302 Breedlove "overruled." state conditioning of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 U.S. 277 (1937); Butltr 383 U.S. at 669. The right to vote is 
(1966) (6-3) v. Thompson, 341 U.S. Butler decision is only violation of equal 
937 (1951) mentioned in dissent, protection; amend. XIV 
but stands for the same 
overruled proposition. 
Sproack v. Klein, 385 Cohtn v. Hurley, 366 "overruled." 385 U.S. equal protection of 
u.s. 511 (1967) (5-4) u.s. 117 (1961) at 514. lawyers assening right 
against self-
incrimination; amends. 
V,XIV 
Keyishian v. Board of Adltr v. Board of Educ., "[C]onstitutional public employment 
Regmts, 385 U.S. 589 342 u.s. 485 (1952) doctrine which has conditioned upon 
(1967) (5-4) emerged since that surrender of 
decision has rejected constitutional rights; 
[Ad/tr's] major amend. I 
premise." 385 U.S. at 
605. 
Afroy•m v. Rusk, 387 Ptrez. v. Brownell, 356 uoverruled ... 387 u.s. state's attempt to 
u.s. 253 (1967) (5-4) u.s. 44 (1958) at 268. revoke citizenship 
violative of Citizenship 
Clause; amend. XIV 
Camara v . .\lumcipal Frank v. Maryland, 359 "overruled." 387 U.S. warrantless searches by 
Court, 387 U.S. 523 u.s. 360 (1959) at 528. municipal health 
(1967) (6-3) inspector; amend. IV 
Kat~ v. l'nited States, 389 0/msttad v. United States, "We conclude that the recordation of oral 
u.s. 347 (1967) (7-1) 277 u.s. 438 (1928); underpinnings of statements 
Goldman v. United States. Olmstead and Goldman unaccompanied by 
316 u.s. 114 (1942) have been so eroded by actual trespass; amend. 
our subsequent IV 
decisions that the 
'trespass' doctrine 
there enunciated can 
no longer he regarded 
as controlling." 389 
U.S. at 353. 
Bmtou t•. l"mttd Statts, Delli Paoli v. {'mttd "overruled." 391 u.s. co-defendant 
391 l 1.S. 123 (1968) Statts, 352 U.S. 232 at 126. confession at joint trial: 
(6-2) (1957) amend. VI 
jones t• .·llfud II • .\la_rn Hodges ''· l'mttd States. "overruled." 392 U.S. congressional power to 
Co., 392 U.S. 409 203 U.S. I (1906) at 441 n.78. decide ,,·hat arc 
(1968) (7-2) incidents of slavery and 
enact legislation: 
amend. XIII 
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Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 MadJougaU v. Grtm, "overruled." 394 U.S. residency requirements 
u.s. 814 (1969) (7-2) 335 u.s. 281 (1948) at819. for political parties and 
due process; amend. 
XIV 
Brandmburg v. Ohio, 395 IVhitnty v. California, "overruled." 395 U.S. freedom of speech; 
u.s. 444 (1969) (8·0) 274 u.s. 357 (1927) at449. amend. I 
Chimtl v. California, 395 Harris v. United States, "It is time ••• to hold searches at the time of 
u.s. 752 (1969) (6-2) 331 u.s. 145 (1947); that ••• insofar as the arrest must be limited 
United States v. principles [that Harris to the person and the 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 and Rabinowil%] stand area within his reach; 
(1950) for are inconsistent amend. IV 
with those that we have 
endorsed today, they 
are no longer to be 
followed." 395 U.S. at 
768. 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 Palko v. Conntcticut, 302 "overruled." 395 U.S. Double jeopardy 
u.s. 784 (1969) (7-2) u.s. 319 (1937) at 794. prohibition is 
applicable to the states; 
amends. V, XIV 
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 Hoagv. Newjmty, 356 The Court compared guarantee against 
u.s. 436 (1970) (7-1) u.s. 464 (1958) the virtualJy identical double jeopardy 
facts of Hoag and Ashe includes collateral 
finding that more estoppel as a 
recent decisions constitutional 
changed the Court's requirement; amend. V 
perspective on the 
applicability of 
collateral estoppel. 
Haag is implicitly 
overruled since the 
Court reaches the 
opposite result on 
nearly the same facts. 
397 U.S. at 445. 
Price v. Georgia, 398 Brantlty v. Georgia, 217 "overruled." 398 U.S. new trial for defendant 
u.s. 323 (1970) (8.0) u.s. 284 (1910) at330 n.9. convicted oflesser 
offense limited to that 
lesser charge; amends. 
V,XIV 
Williams v. Florida, 399 Thompson v. Utah, 170 The overruled cases six-personjul}' is not 
u.s. 78 (1970) (6-2) u.s. 343 (1898); are cited as authority violative of defendant's 
Rassmussm v. United for a twelve-man jul)', Sixth Amendment 
Statts, 197 U.S. 516 399 U.S. at 91-92, and right; amends. VI, XIV 
(1905) are implicitly overruled 
by the announcement 
of the ne1v rule 
allowing six-man juries. 
!d. at 103-04. 
Perc. v. Campbtll. 402 Kesler v. Dtpartmm/ of "We can no longer state legislation that 
u.s. 637 (1971) (5-4) Pub. Sq{et)'. 369 U.S. adhere to the frustrates full 
153 (1962) aberrational doctrine of effectiveness of federal 
Kesler." 402 U.S. at law is invalid under 
651. Supremacy Clause even 
. 
if supported by 
legitimate state 
purpose; art. VI, § 2 
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Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 Pope v. Williams, 193 "To the extent that one year residency 
u.s. 330 (1972) (5-2) u.s. 621 (1904) dicta in [Pope] are requirement to voting 
inconsistent with the violates Equal 
test we apply or the Protection Clause; 
result we reach today, amend. XIV 
those dicta are 
rejected." 405 U.S. at 
337 n.7. "[T]he Court 
today really overrules 
the holding in Pope v. 
Williams and does not 
restrict itself, as 
footnote 7 says, to 
rejecting what it says 
are mere dicta." ld. at 
362 (Biackmun,j., 
concurring). 
Lehrzlzausen v. Lake Shore Q}taker City Cab Co. v. "overruled." 410 U.S. state law requiring 
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. Pmruylvania, 277 U.S. at 366. payment of ad valorum 
356 ( 1973) (9-0) 389 (1928) taxes on corporations 
but not individuals 
does not violate Equal 
Protection Clause; 
amend. XIV 
Miller v. California, 413 A Book Named 'John "Mcnoirs test has been obscenity test; amend. I 
u.s. 15 (1973) (5-4) Ckland's Mcnoirs of a abandoned as 
Woman of Pkasure" v. unworkable by its 
Attorney Gen. of Mass., author, and no Member 
383 u.s. 413 (1966) of the Court today 
supports the Mcnoirs 
formulation." 413 U.S. 
at 23. 
North Dakota Phannacy Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, "overruled." 414 U.S. state law requiring 
Bd. v. Sn)'tfer's Drug 278 u.s. 105 (1929) at 167. pharmacists to be 
Stores, 414 U.S. 156 registered, or majority 
(1973) (9-0) of stock to be owned 
by pharmacists in good 
standing not violative 
of equal protection; 
amend.X1V 
Ecklman v.]ordan, 415 Slzapiro v. Thompson, 394 "we disapprove the retroactive payment of 
u.s 651 (1974) (5-4) U.S. 618 (1969); Stale Eleventh Amendment benefits under AABD 
D.p't of Health and holdings of those cases programs which were 
Relzab. Serv. v. Zarate, to the extent that they withheld ''Tongfully by 
407 u.s. 918 (1972); are inconsistent with state officials 
Serretl v. Mother.s' and our holding today." prohibited; amend. XI 
Chi/duns' RightJ Org., 415 U.S. at 671. 
409 u.s. 809 (1973) 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 HO)·t v. Florida, 368 U.S. "we cannot follow the automatic exemptions 
u.s. 522 (1975) (8-1) 57 (1971) contrary implications of cannot be used to 
the prior cases, exclude women from 
including Ho)'l v. jury to obtain male 
Flon'da." 419 U.S. at venire; amend. VI 
537. 
,\ftchelizz 1ire Corp. v. Law v. Austin, 80 U.S. "overruled." 423 U.S. state may assess non-
llages, 423 U.S 276 (13 Wall.) 29 (1968) at 301. discriminatory ad 
(1976} (7-1) valorem tax on 
imported items; art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 2 
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HudgtnS v. NLRB, 424 AIIUllgamawl Food "[WJe make it clear picketing is not 
u.s. 507 (1976) (5-3) Empla]ees Union Lorol now, ifit was not clear protected speech on 
590 v. Logan 'Valley before, that the private shopping center 
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 rationale of Logan 'Valley property; amends. I, 
(1968) did not survive the XIV 
Court's decision in the 
Lla]d case." 424 U.S. 
at 518. 
Pirginia Bd. of Plumnacy 'Valmtine v. Chrestmsen, Overruling is implicit purely commercial 
v. Pirginia Citizens 316 u.s. 52 (1942) in the discussion of speech is protected 
O:msumer Counci~ 425 'Valmtine and the speech but is subject to 
u.s. 748 (1976) (7-1) following contrary regulation; amend. I 
holding. 425 U.S. at 
760-62. 
National League of Cities Maryland v. Jllirtz, 392 "overruled." 426 U.S. Congress cannot force 
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 u.s. 183 (1968) at855. states to make certain 
(1976) (5-4) choices in the guise of 
regulating interstate 
commerce; arL I, § 8, 
cl. 3 
City of N~ Orftans v. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. "overruled." 427 U.S. purely economic 
Duks, 427 u.s. 297 457 (1957) at 317. legislation given 
(1976) (8-0) deferential treatment; 
amend. XIV 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. Goesam v. Cltary, 335 "Insofar as Goesaert ••• gender discrimination; 
190 (1976) u.s. 464 (1948) may be inconsistent, amend. XIV 
that decision is 
disapproved. 
Undoubtedly reflecting 
the view that Goesaert's 
equal protection 
analysis no longer 
obtains, the District 
Court made no 
reference to that 
decision in upholding 
.Oklahoma's statute." 
\ 429 U.S. at 210 n.23. 
Ortgon v. Corvallis Sand Bonelli Calllt Co. v. "Bonelli's application of disputed ownership of 
& Gravel Co., 429 U.S. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 federal common law to riverbed lands must be 
363 (1977) (6-3) (1973) cases such as this must determined as a matter 
be overruled." 429 of state law 
U.S.at382. 
Compltte Auto Transit v. Spector Motor Serv. v. "overruled." 430 U.S. state tax levied for the 
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 O'Connor. 340 U.S. 602 at 289. privilege of doing 
(1977) (9-0) (1951) business is not per se 
unconstitutional; art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3 
Snojfer v. Heitner. 433 Ptnnoyerv •• Ndf. 95 U.S. The jurisdictional due process and 
u.s. 186 (1977) (8-0) 714 (1878) framework of Pmnuyer personal jurisdiction; 
is implicitly rejected in amend. XIV 
the Court's discussion. 
433 U.S. at 197-206. 
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Department of R~mue v. Puget Sound St~edoring "overruled." 435 U.S. business and 
Association of Washington Co. v. Stale Tax Comm 'n, at 750. occupation tax does 
St~cdoring Cos., 435 302 u.s. 90 (1937); not violate Commerce 
u.s. 734 (1978) (8-0) joseph v. Cartrr (!J JVeeka Clause when applied to 
St~edoring Co., 330 U.S. the commercial activity 
422 (1947) of stevedoring; art. I, 
§8,cl.3 
l'nited State.s v. Scoll, Unittd States v. jenkins, "overruled." 437 U.S. Double jeopardy 
437 u.s. 82 (1978) 420 u.s. 358 (1975) at87. Clause is not violated 
(5-4) when a state appeals 
from a decision in 
favor of defendant 
when defendant sought 
termination of 
proceeding on a basis 
other than guilt/ 
innocence; amend. V 
Hughe.s v. Oklahoma, 441 Cur v. Connecticut, 161 "overruled." 441 U.S. state regulation of 
u.s. 322 (1979) (7-2} u.s. 519 (1896) at 335. wildlife is to be 
analyzed by same rules 
in respect to 
Commerce Clause as 
other natural resources; 
art. I, § 8, d. 3 
United States v. Salvucci, jone.s v. United State.s, "We are convinced that defendants charged 
448 u.s. 83 (1980) 362 u.s. 257 (1960) the automatic standing with possession may 
(7-2) rule ofjone.s has only claim benefits of 
outlived its usefulness exclusionary rule if 
in this Court's Fourth their own Fourth 
Amendment Amendment rights have 
jurisprudence." 448 been violated; amend. 
U.S. at 95. IV 
Commonwealth Edison Co. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery "Any contrary state tax is not 
v. Montana, 453 U.S. Co., 260 U.S. 245 statements in Heisler protected from 
609 (1981) (6-3) (1922) and its progeny are Commerce Clause 
disapproved." 453 U.S. scrutiny by a claim that 
at 617. the tax is imposed on 
goods before they 
enter the stream of 
commerce; art. I, § 8, 
d. 3 
United State.s v. Ross, 456 Robbins v. California, "[W]e reject the scope of search in 
u.s. 798 (1982) (6-3} 453 u.s. 420 (1981) precise holding of automobile not limited 
Robbins." 456 U.S. at to the container, but by 
824. the object of the search 
and probable cause 
giving rise to the 
search; amend. IV 
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex Hudson County Water Co. Court explains that ground water is an 
rtl. Douglas, 458 U.S. v. AlcCarter, 209 U.S. Hudson was based on article of commerce 
941 (1982) (7-2) 349 (1908) Geer which was and is subject to 
expressly overruled Commerce Clause 
previously. 458 U.S. at regulation; art. I, § 8, 
950-51. d. 3 
lllmois v. Gaits, 462 Aguilar v. Ttxas, 378 The Court discussed "totality of the 
u.s. 213 (1983) (6-3) U.S. 108 (1964}; Spinelli the tests contained in circumstances .. 
t•. l'mttd Slale.s, 393 .-lgmlar and Spmelli and determines probable 
u.s. 410 (1969) concludes that "it is cause questions; 
wiser to abandon the amend. IV 
"two-pronged test" 
established by our 
decisions in .-lguilar and 
Spmtllt." 462 U.S. at 
238 (footnote omitted). 
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Pmnhurst Start Sch. & Rolston v. Milsouri Fund "In sum, contrary to rule that claim against 
Hosp. v. Haltfmnan, 465 Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390 the view implicit in state officials is a claim 
u.s. 89 (1984) (5-4) (1887): Siler v. Louisville decisions such as against the state and is 
& Nashville R.R. Co., Gr~ • ••• , neither barred by the 11th 
213 u.s. 175 (1909): pendent jurisdiction, Amendment also 
Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry. nor any other basis of applies to state claims 
v. O'Connor. 223 U.S. jurisdiction may in federal court under 
280 (1912): Grtme v. override the Eleventh pendent jurisdiction: 
Louisville & lnttrurban Amendment." 465 amend. XI 
R.R., 244 U.S. 499 U.S. at 121. 
(1917):johnson v. 
Lanlford, 245 U.S. 541 
(1918): 28 additional 
cases listed at 465 U.S. 
89, 109 nn.17-21, 165-
68 nn.50 &. 52, and 
accompanying text 
Unittd Statts v. One Coffey v. Unittd States, "[W]e reject today the remedial forfeiture 
Assortmml of 89 Fireanns, 116 u.s. 436 (1886) contrary rationale of proceeding following 
465 u.s. 354 (1984} Coffey v. Unittd Staus." an acquittal on related 
(9.0) 465 U.S. at 366. criminal charges is not 
barred under the 
Double Jeopardy 
Clause: amend. V 
Limbcuh v. Howm & Ho011tn & Allison Co. v. "Howm I, to the extent focus on validity of ad 
AUison Co., 466 U.S. Eva//, 324 U.S. 652 it espouses the valorem tax on imports 
353 (1984) (9-0) (1945} [original package] should be on whether 
doctrine, is not to be the tax is an "impost" 
regarded as authority or a "duty": art. I, 
and is overruled." 466 § 10, cl. 2 
U.S. at 361. 
Garda v. San Antonio National Lea~ of Cities "overruled." 469 U.S. determination of state 
Mtlro. Transit Auth. 469 v. Ustry, 426 U.S. 833 at 557. immunity does not tum 
u.s. 528 (1985) (5-4) (1976) on whether the 
government function is 
traditional or integral: 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
Uniltd States v. Miller, Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. "to the extent that Bain to drop allegations 
471 u.s. 130 (1985) 1 (1887) stands for the unnecessary to an 
(8-0) proposition ••• to offense that is clearly 
avoid further contained within an 
confusion, we now indictment is not an 
explicitly reject that unconstitutional 
proposition." 471 U.S. amendment: amend. V 
at 144. 
Danitls v. n7Uiams, 474 Parra// v. Taylor. 451 "overruled." 474 U.S. lack of due care by 
u.s. 327 (1986) (9-0) u.s. 527 (1981) at 330. state official which 
amounts to negligence 
does not "deprive" a 
person oflife or liberty 
and therefore does not 
implicate Due Process 
Clause; amend. XIV 
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Batson v. Kentucky, 476 Swain v • .Alabama, 380 "For the reasons that defendant may present 
u.s. 79 (1986) (7-2) u.s. 202 (1965) follow, we reject this a prima facie case of 
evidentiary formulation discriminatory selection 
as inconsistent with of venire based solely 
standards that have on prosecutorial 
developed since Swain." conduct in his case, 
476 U.S. at 93. which gives rise to an 
inference of 
unconstitutional 
behavior; amend. XIV 
Puerto Rico v. Brans/ad, Kentudry v. Dennison, 65 "Kentucky v. Dennison is federal courts have 
483 u.s. 219 (1987) U.S. (24 How.) 66 the product of another authority to compel 
(9-0) (1861) time ••• We conclude performance by asylum 
that it may stand no state to deliver fugitive 
longer." 483 U.S. at upon proper demand; 
230. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 
Solorio v. United Stales, 0 'Callahan v. Parker, "overruled.'' 483 U.S. jurisdiction of court 
483 u.s. 435 (1987) 395 u.s. 258 (1969) at 436. martial depends upon 
(6-3) status as a member of 
the military and not on 
the relationship 
between the offense 
and service; art. I, § 8, 
d. 14 
Welch v. Texas Dtp't. of Parden v. Tmninal Ry., "overruled.'' 483 U.S. if Congress intends to 
Highways and Pub. 377 u.s. 184 (1964) at478. abrogate the Eleventh 
Transp., 483 U.S. 468 Amendment in 
{1987) (5-4) exercising the 
Commerce Clause 
power, it may do so 
expressly in the statute; 
amend. XI 
South Carolina v. Baker, Pollock v. Fanners • Loan "\Ve thus confirm that state bond interest is 
485 u.s. 505 (1988) & Trust Co., 157 U.S. subsequent case law not immune from 
(6-2) 429 (1895) has overruled the nondiscriminatory 
holding in Pollock." federal tax; amend. 
485 U.S. at 524. XVI 
.Alabama v. Smith, 490 Simpson v. Rice, 395 "Believing, as we do, sentencing 
u.s. 794 (1989) (8-1) u.s. 711 {1969) that there is no basis 
for a presumption of 
vindictiveness where a 
second sentence 
imposed after a trial is 
heavier than a first 
sentence imposed after 
a guilty pleas, we 
overrule Simpson v. Rice 
••. to that extent.'' 
490 U.S. at 803. 
Healy v. Bttr Inst. Inc., joseph E. Seagram & "to the extent that Commerce Clause; art. 
491 u.s. 324 (1989) Sons, Inc. v. Hostetler, Seagram holds that 1,§8,cl.3 
(6-3) 384 u.s. 35 (1966) retrospective 
affirmation statutes do 
not facially violate the 
Commerce Clause, it is 
no longer good law.'' 
491 U.S. at343. 
Thornburgh v . .Abbott, PToronier v. Martine:, "overrule.'' 490 U.S. at distinction between 
490 u.s. 401 (1989) 416 u.s. 396 (1974) 413. correspondence from 
(6-3) prisoners or 
nonprisoners in prison 
regulations 
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Olllins v. Younghlootl, Kring v. Missouri, 107 "ovenule.'' 110 S. Ct. E." Post Facto Clause; 
110 S. CL 2715 (1990) u.s. 221 (1883); at 2723·24. art. I, § 10, cl. I 
(9-0) Thompson v. Utah, 170 
u.s. 343 (1898) 
California v. Acevedo, Ill ArAansas v. Sander.s, 442 "We conclude that is is search and seizure; 
S. CL 1982 (1991) (6· u.s. 753 (1979} better to adopt one amend. IV 
3) clear-cut rule to govern 
automobile searches 
and eliminate the 
warrant requirement 
for closed containers 
set forth in Sander.s." 
111 S. CL at 1991. 
Payne v. Tennessee, Ill South Carolina v. Gathm, "Reconsidering these admissibility of victim 
S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (5· 490 u.s. 805 (1989); decisions now, we impact evidence; 
4) Booth v. Maryland, 482 conclude for the amend. VII 
u.s. 496 (1987) reasons heretofore 
stated, that they were 
wrongly decided and 
should be, and now 
are, overruled." 
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